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9. AEC 751/41 - International Atomic Energy Agency (pp. 67-92)  
(See minutes of Meetings 1156 and 1157)

The Commissioners discussed with the General Manager and staff, Mr. Hall's paper which summarized the Commission's previous consideration of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the related subject of assistance to foreign power reactor programs. Mr. Murray said that at this point he believed the Commission should consider recommendations on this issue, obtain Department of State comments, and present a coordinated position to the President.

Mr. Libby suggested consideration of the following principles:

a. That the U. S. would support IAEA by matching the sum total of the contributions of all other countries in the agency,

b. That, in addition, the U. S. would proceed with bilateral agreements for power reactors, as necessary in order to provide the additional material required to install in foreign countries by the early 1960's power reactors producing 1,000,000 kilowatts of electricity, and

c. That the IAEA would usually perform the inspection functions required by these agreements.

Mr. Murray said that he agreed with Mr. Libby's proposals, and observed that AEC's bilateral agreements could be completed now and that the inspection functions, which would be performed by the IAEA, could be integrated later. Mr. Hall pointed out that this could be accomplished by a declaration of intent in each bilateral agreement. In answer to a question by Mr. Hall, Commissioners Murray and Libby indicated that they did not wish to provide, at this time, that countries must assure the U. S. that they would not use this material for weapons. However, Mr. Libby said that the Commission could agree that the Agency could establish such a requirement. He observed that in this manner the U.S. could still assist France with its power reactor program.

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Department of Energy Declassification Review

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Authority: <u>R. H. Hirschens</u>	Name: <u>R. H. Hirschens</u>
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Mr. Hall pointed out that if the test of U.S. participation in the IAEA was a contribution of fissionable materials by the U.S.S.R., he believed this position would be contrary to the President's statements in 1953 to the effect that the U.S. would support an IAEA even though the U.S.S.R. would not support it.

Mr. Murray observed that the Commission could make new recommendations to the President, in view of different circumstances.

During consideration of the question of the increased capabilities of foreign countries to make weapons as a result of assistance to their power reactors projects, Mr. Murray said he wished to emphasize the importance of proceeding with power reactor bilateral agreements and not delaying this program until the IAEA was organized. The Commissioners indicated that they were willing to take a calculated risk by providing material to the Agency for re-allocation to other countries. Mr. Libby added that the IAEA could establish inspection procedures at a later date.

Mr. Isenbergh observed that if the Commissioners envisaged concluding bilateral agreements which would contain less stringent inspection provisions than those to be required by the Agency, foreign countries might prefer to deal on a bilateral basis rather than with the IAEA. Mr. Libby said he believed the U.S. should reserve the right to conclude whatever bilateral agreements it wished. However, it would be understood that the U.S. would not normally require less inspection in its bilateral agreements than that required by the IAEA.

Mr. Fields observed that it would be necessary for the Commission to indicate what measure of inspection is considered sufficient to protect against diversion of materials provided to foreign countries by the IAEA. Mr. Libby said he believed that an inspection which would prevent any diversions would be too expensive. Therefore, he believed the inspection functions finally agreed upon would be a compromise which might permit some diversions to be made. However, in order to facilitate foreign

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power reactor programs it would be necessary to take such risks. He said that the general policy of the Commission to install one million kilowatts of power reactor capacity in foreign countries by the early 1960's provided for the assumption of certain risks to meet this goal. He added that the details of the inspection functions of the IAEA could be modelled after the inspection/functions which could be included in the power reactor bilateral agreements to be negotiated shortly.

Mr. Hall said that on the basis of this discussion he would prepare for the Commission's consideration a staff paper containing agreed principles on the IAEA.

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