IA 11- NUCLEAR PROLIFIEATION COMTEE ON

IA 11 Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation

	Date	To	From	Class	Exp.	No.	To	From	Class
1	11-25-64	MSAM 320 Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation Gilpatric, Roswell	vee	s	2				
2	12-28-66	USE of Nuclear Materials in Proliferation Nuclear Materials in Proliferation	et						

I-A 11- Nuclear Proliferation

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Res. & Status Br. - GTN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : File

DATE: July 28, 1965

FROM : W. B. McCool, Secretary

Original signed
W. B. McCool

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON DETERRENT PHILOSOPHY AND PROLIFERATION BY STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SECY:JCH

1. At Information Meeting 498 on July 22, 1965, the Commissioners noted the desirability of scheduling a briefing on deterrent philosophy and proliferation based on a recent presentation at the Sandia Corporation attended by Commissioner Ramey.

2. This briefing has now been scheduled for August 13, 1965.

cc:
Commissioners
General Manager
Deputy General Manager
Asst. General Manager
Exec. Asst. to Gen. Mgr.
Asst. Gen. Mgr. for Admin.
Asst. Gen. Mgr. for IA
General Counsel
Special Assistant for Disarmament
Dir., Military Application
Director, IA

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7-28-65

1A-11-3
Center on Phs.

No. 498

From the Office of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

For Sunday a.m. Release
January 30, 1966

SECRETARY RUSK TO TESTIFY
ON
NON-PROLIFERATION RESOLUTION

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is scheduled to be the first witness to testify in open session before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Senate Resolution 179 relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was announced today by Senator John O. Pastore, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Secretary Rusk will present testimony on February 9, 1966 beginning at 9:30 a.m. in the Joint Committee public hearing room (AE-1) in the U.S. Capitol.

On January 18, 1966 Senator Pastore introduced a resolution in the Senate (S. Res. 179):

> "Resolved, That the Senate commends the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems."

This resolution was co-sponsored by 55 other Senators.

Senator Pastore also announced that subsequent to the testimony of the Department of State, representatives from the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be called as witnesses. The schedule of appearance of these witnesses will be announced at a later date.

The Committee will consider requests to testify by public witnesses. Persons desiring to testify are requested to submit a prepared statement to the Joint Committee not later than February 15, 1966. The statements will be considered for inclusion in the record of the hearings. The Committee will assign for oral presentation those statements which are considered appropriate for further elaboration.

* * *

1-30-66

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I-A-N Nuclear Proliferation
Res. & Status Br. - GTE Center 7

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : File

DATE: July 1, 1965

FROM : W. B. McCool, Secretary

SUBJECT: STATUS OF GILPATRIC REPORT

SECY:JCH

At Information Meeting 494 on June 29, 1965, the Commissioners discussed appropriate responses to any queries from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy regarding the status of the Gilpatric report. The Secretary's hand notes for this Meeting contain additional details regarding possible questions and answers.

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7-1-65

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HA-11. Nuclear Proliferation Committee on

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

JUN 29 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN SEABORG
COMMISSIONER BUNTING
COMMISSIONER PALFREY
COMMISSIONER RAMEY
COMMISSIONER TAPE

THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER

SUBJECT: FOSTER ARTICLE AND KENNEDY SPEECH ON NON-PROLIFERATION

It has been reported in the press that the article by William C. Foster on non-proliferation in the journal Foreign Affairs and the speech by Senator Robert F. Kennedy before the Senate on the same subject on June 23 were cleared by various government agencies. This office was not aware of either the Foster article or the Kennedy speech prior to their respective release to the press; thus, we did not take part in any clearance process regarding them.

Signed by
Allan M. Labowitz

Allan M. Labowitz
Special Assistant for Disarmament

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6/28/65

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6-29-65

IA-11. Nuclear Proliferation, Control of

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January 22, 1965

Dear Glenn:

I want to record what I said to you yesterday before our meeting with the President, namely that John Palfrey was most helpful to our Committee, and all of us on it are grateful to you and to him for the excellent assistance and cooperation the Committee received from you both.

Sincerely,

Ros Gilpatric

Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg,
Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C. 20545.

X

1-22-65

SECRET IA-11 Peaceful Proliferation Control

DEC 24 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER PALMBY

~~THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER~~ Original signed by George M. Kavanagh

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION PAPER ON PLOWSHARE

Attached are 20 copies of "Background Information on Plowshare for the Gilpatric Committee." This is in accordance with our discussion of December 18.

/S/

John S. Kelly, Director
Division of Peaceful
Nuclear Explosives

Attachment:
Background Information on Plowshare
for the Gilpatric Committee (Cys 1A thru 20A)

cc: Chairman Seaborg, w/attach. (Cy 21A)
Commissioner Ramey, w/attach. (Cy 22A)
Commissioner Ramey, w/attach. (Cy 23A)
Commissioner Tape, w/attach. (Cy 24A)
General Manager, w/attach. (Cy 25A)
S. G. English, AGREP, w/attach. (Cy 26A)
John Hall, AGMIA, w/attach. (Cy 27A)
Allan Labowitz, GADiscom, w/attach. (Cy 28A)
John Vinciguerra, EMEM, w/attach. (Cy 29A)
Joseph Hennessey, GSC, w/attach. (Cy 30A)
Secretariat, w/attach. (Cys 31A32A)

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DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DOE/NN-528
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12-24-64

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No. 32 of 57 Copies, Series A

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON PLOWSHARE FOR THE GILPATRIC COMMITTEE

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY: LF L.K. Ferguson 12/8/94 DOE/NN-523

The President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation (Gilpatric Committee) has identified or may wish to consider sub-areas to which Plowshare is related. These include questions such as:

a. How would a Plowshare program operate under a comprehensive test ban?

b. What are dangers of Plowshare contributing to nuclear proliferation?

c. What measures can be taken to inhibit improvement of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers?

d. What can be done to reduce the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities?

e. What are or may be the effects of peaceful uses of atomic energy outside the U. S.?

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In consideration of these and other questions, the following should prove of interest to the Committee as background information.

I. Plowshare and Proliferation

The question of whether the U. S. Plowshare program can or would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a significant problem.

A. Effect of Dissemination of Plowshare Technology

Under the U. S. Atomic Energy Act, the Plowshare program cannot legally, and there is no intention to, contribute to any other country, materials or technology which could be used in the design, development or production of nuclear explosives. Only information concerning the utilization and application of Plowshare energy sources

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BY: ADAM R. HORNIBUSKLE DOE/NN-523

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

20-1351-5-6 SECRET

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

for peaceful projects can or need be contributed; i.e., primarily already unclassified information concerning the effects of nuclear explosives on the earth. The availability of the nuclear explosives from the U. S. should greatly reduce rather than accelerate the necessity or justification for other countries to undertake an independent Plowshare device development program. U. S. furnished Plowshare energy sources, would, of course, remain under complete U. S. control at all times. In return for U. S. Plowshare devices and services, arrangements could be devised whereby plutonium produced from reactors in the host country would be accepted as payment. This conceivably could result in the availability of less plutonium for other purposes and make the Plowshare program an effective agent in restraining proliferation.

B. International Plowshare Economies

The availability of U. S. energy sources at reasonable costs for proposed applications would make it both unnecessary and uneconomic for a nation to initiate and develop a costly independent nuclear explosive capability. Accordingly, there is not reasonable justification for the undertaking by an Nth country of the development of nuclear explosives. A statement of such an intention would constitute an obvious effort to mask an intention to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, an announced U. S. program for international cooperation on Plowshare applications would serve to further restrain the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation.

C. Technical Considerations

Plowshare device development was feasible by the U. S. only on the basis of the investment of many billions of dollars expended for

weapons development over almost 20 years. The technical requirements for Plowshare devices are such that fission devices, even of the most sophisticated type, are not generally suitable. Fission devices require large quantities of fissionable materials which are (1) too expensive to offer economic advantage over chemical explosives and (2) introduce unacceptable amounts of radioactivity. Thus, thermonuclear devices employing advanced technology are essential for a justifiable program. The progress of the French weapons development program toward the development of a thermonuclear device provides a measure of the time and effort required, even given the determination and resources applied in that case, for such an achievement.

D. General

The U. S. Plowshare program, viewed strategically, is consistent with efforts to prevent proliferation. No U. S. material or weapons development information would be disseminated under the program. Fissile material, of other nations could, however, be consumed for peaceful purposes, under a payment plan for U. S. Plowshare devices. In nations already possessing nuclear explosives, the expenditure of fissile materials on peaceful projects would be preferable to its entrance into the weapons stockpile.

Significant amounts of time, effort, money and material would be needed to accomplish Plowshare objectives, thus, diverting interest to a peaceful avenue of accomplishing world nuclear prestige. Thus, it appears logical and probable that Plowshare could make a significant contribution to the world's well-being through focusing of attention on peaceful rather than military aspects of an inevitably growing nuclear technology.

II. Potential of Plowshare

The use of nuclear explosives in peaceful applications has been under study by the Atomic Energy Commission since June 1957. These studies have encompassed the following applications which appear to be possible, and probably economically attractive. Excavation for large civil engineering and water resource development projects; excavation to remove overburden from ore bodies for strip mining; breaking up ore bodies for ore recovery by block caving or in-situ leaching techniques; fracturing oil shale to facilitate oil recovery by in-situ retort processes; raising the temperature of oil sand formations to facilitiate oil recovery; stimulating natural gas recovery by shattering the gas bearing formation to increase its permeability; shattering underground rock formations to produce voids for gas storage or waste disposal; and providing an intense neutron flux for isotope production and neutron physics measurements.

In total, well over 100 specific projects have been suggested to the AEC. These have come from more than a dozen states in the U. S. and about 15 countries on five continents.

A principle value of using nuclear explosives in excavation is that their use makes feasible many projects which could not be seriously considered with conventional methods. Only a few of the proposed excavation projects have been evaluated and of those which have, the second trans-isthmian canal is best known. In this potential project, the estimated savings in construction cost along is in excess of $1.0 billion. The presence of a few projects larger than the trans-isthmian and a half dozen or so of comparable magnitude in addition to many smaller ones throughout the world suggests that the potential savings in construction

cost alone is many billions of dollars. No attempt has ever been made to evaluate the sociological and political benefits which might be derived from this technology.

The potential of nuclear explosives in the development of natural resources (mining, oil recovery, gas stimulation) has never been fully evaluated, but the chief value clearly lies in the fact that nuclear explosive technology holds the promise of extending our resource reserves by making feasible the recovery of reserves not otherwise recoverable. No attempt has been made to assess either the dollar value or human value of utilization of nuclear explosives in developing our most valuable natural resource, i.e., water.

The value of the nuclear explosive as a source of neutrons is that it produces many more neutrons, i.e., about 10^{25} neutrons on target per detonation as compared to a maximum of about 10^{23} neutron on target per year of operation from a reactor. This abundant source of neutrons makes feasible many scientific measurements not otherwise possible.

This summary is supported by extensive laboratory calculations made from data derived from more than a dozen nuclear detonations and about two hundred experiments with chemical explosives. The technical data from these studies and experiments have been made public through publication of hundreds of reports and articles both for scientific and public consumption. The most concise summaries are contained in the reports of two classified symposia, one held in LRL in February 1957 and the other in LASL in July 1959; two unclassified or public symposia, one held in San Francisco in May 1959 and the other in Davis, California in April 1964; and in the JCAE Frontiers of Atomic Energy Hearings of March 1960.

III. Commitments to Plowshare

A. Public Information Activities

The Atomic Energy Commission first announced the Plowshare program in June 1958 when plans for a bio-environmental survey in northern Alaska were released. This announcement stated that:

> "During the past year, the Atomic Energy Commission has been carrying forward a program identified as Project PLOWSHARE to determine the possibilities for the non-military use of nuclear explosives."

Most of the public announcements on Plowshare released since then have included statements of either or both (1) U. S. high hopes for the program and/or (2) its intention to share the results with other nations. For example, an announcement released on March 16, 1960, relative to Project Gnome stated:

> "The scientific results of Project Gnome, like all Plowshare projects, will be made available on a world wide basis, and the United States will welcome observers from the United Nations or any of its member countries which are interested in the Project."

A similar statement was included in the White House announcement of October 25, 1961, announcing approval of the Gnome experiment. More than 20 foreign observers representing about 10 countries witnessed the Gnome event. Each Plowshare event since Gnome has been publicly announced. Tours of the Nevada Test Site have been arranged for domestic news media representatives, foreign news media representatives, interested foreign engineers and scientists, and domestic scientific and engineering groups. Similarly, the Sedan event was announced and aroused considerable public and international interest. No public or foreign observers were invited to witness the Sedan

event; however, 10 months later (May 7, 1963), a tour of the Sedan crater was arranged which was attended by 18 representatives of 14 news media. A color movie of Sedan is very popular and has been shown many times in both official and public meetings. Excerpts from this film have been shown on most major TV networks and still shots from it have been carried in several major magazines such as Life.

The principal results of each Plowshare event, in addition to being published in technical literature, are released to and carried by the newspapers and popular magazines. An example of this is the announcement on November 29, 1964, of the results of the Par event. This announcement states that:

> "A major advance has been made in the nuclear explosive production of heavy elements".

and that:

> "the results demonstrate the practicability of using the method to produce significant quantities of isotopes of ultra-heavy synthetic elements."

Additionally, the announcement states that:

> "....nuclear explosives development indicates the method can supplement accelerators and reactors in the discovery, production, study, and practical use of heavy elements. In particular, nuclear explosives may be a means for discovering new elements and for producing a spectrum of radioisotopes that are not obtained by other methods."

The U. S. had a Plowshare section in its exhibit in Geneva for the Third Atoms for Peace Conference in September 1964. This section was one of the more popular in the exhibit. A similar Plowshare exhibit was on public display in the Joint Atomic Industrial Forum-American Nuclear Society meeting during the first week of December 1964, in San Francisco.

The AEC receives many requests for information and for speakers on the Plowshare program. These come from educational institutions, professional societies and civic groups.

B. Testimony to Congress

Since June 1957, when the Plowshare program was established, there has been much testimony relative to the program before various congressional committees. Much of this testimony was given in connection with appropriation requests or authorization approval. It is significant to note that in September, 1961, the Congress, at the recommendation of the Senate Appropriations Committee, appropriated $2.4 million more for Plowshare than the Administration had requested. In the spring of 1964, the JCAE added $1.0 million to the Administration authorization request for Plowshare, however, the House Appropriations Committee only appropriated the amount requested by the Administration. Probably the most significant testimony by Administration representatives to Congress was that given by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Secretary of the Army Ailes, AEC Chairman Seaborg, and Assistant Secretary of State Mann, in behalf of the liegislation which became Public Law 88-609. This testimony was given to the Senate Commerce Committee in March, 1964, and to the House Marchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in June, 1964.

Examples of pertinent statements by major witnesses to the Senate Commerce Committee are as follows:

> "Finally, the current difficulties between the U. S. and Panama over the present canal and Canal Zone emphasize the advisability of expediting early consideration of and a final decision on a sea level canal. Once such a decision is made, those difficulites would not be likely to arise with respect to a sea level canal... ... "It is our opinion that the U. S. should immediately embark

on a course of action designed to enable the government to reach a final decision on a series of vital questions: whether such a canal is feasible, where and when it should be built, and what means and under what arrangements." (DOD - Dep. Sec. Vance 3/3/64)

"We are proceeding on the assumption that we will be able to utilize nuclear excavation as the cratering techniques and devices are developed which have less fallout. The fallout, as I understand, outside the boundaries of any route would be very small. ...."If we had a sea level canal, simply by reducing the magnitude of our security problems, it would be possible in our national interests and without prejudice to world commerce or our defense posture to have an entirely different type of arrangement..... "This is why we are anxious, Senator, that this not appear as I said earlier, as a punitive measure against Panama but something, ...that has been under consideration for many years, that should go on even though we had no difficulties with Panama, in our own interests and in the interest of world commerce and national security." (State - Ass't. Sec. Mann 3/3/64)

"Many of the potential projects of this type would be either too costly or infeasible unless the tremendous and relatively inexpensive energy available from nuclear explosives can be used. ....."Although only a few of these suggestions were accompanied by sifficient information to permit the development of feasibility and cost estimates, it does appear, in those cases where information was available, that cost savings over conventional excavation methods could range from 50 to 90 per cent. ..... "Thus, it is our belief, that a fully developed technology of nuclear excavation would be of wide usefulness in this country and abroad. Since it is our statutory responsibility to conduct research and development so that atomic energy will make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, the Atomic Energy Commission has pursued the acquisition and study of additional information on nuclear excavation ....."In addition, through carrying out such experiments as can be done within the limitations of the Treaty and allowing international observation of them, as we did with Project Gnome, we believe that other nations may be able to observe for themselves the practicability, safety, and feasibility of using nuclear explosives for the peaceful purpose of large-scale excavation." (AEC- Chairman Seaborg 3/4/64)

"So the urgency of this sea level canal could act almost as a laboratory, experiment No. 1, for opening a whole new vista for the use of nuclear power. ...."In the event we develop a nuclear explosive that would be suitable for this type of project, this could be the beginning, for everybody in the world, of a great peaceful use of nuclear energy." (Senator Magnuson 3/4/64)

At the conclusion of House and Senate Hearings, both Committees strongly recommended passage of the Interoceanic Canal bills to their respective Houses.

C. Plowshare and Bans on Weapons Testing

The history and analysis of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests clearly indicate the fact that the United States never altered or retreated from its stand in favor of treaty provisions which would permit the continuance of Plowshare activities. President Eisenhower's public statement of August 22, 1958, announcing the U. S. agreement to the moratorium on atomic testing and the technical feasibility of an agreement to eliminate nuclear testing stated:

> "The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests."

A further indicator of the U. S. attitude is a statement from AEC's March 16, 1960 announcement of site construction plans for Project Gnome. The statement which was specifically and personally agreed to by President Eisenhower and then AEC Chairman McCone reads:

> "During the current nuclear test suspension negotiations in Geneva, the UK, the US, and the USSR have agreed in principle on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The scientific results of Project Gnome, like all Plowshare projects, will be made available on a world-wide basis and the United States will welcome observers from the United Nations or any of its member countries which are interested in the project."

Later (10/25/61), in a White House statement, announcing approval for the conducting of Gnome, President Kennedy stated:

> "This is a further example of this country's desire to turn the power of the atom to man's welfare rather than his destruction."
>
> "the United States will welcome observers from interested United Nations countries as well as news media and the scientific community.

While the USSR periodically opposed inclusion of a "Plowshare" provision in the treaty throughout the talks, they also made propositions to allow Plowshare and, as the above Gnome quote indicates, ultimately agreed with the US and the UK in principle regarding Plowshare. Since Plowshare events could be carried out underground, however, under the terms of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Governor Harriman and Premier Khruschev, during their talks in Moscow in July, 1963, agreed not to complicate the treaty through inclusion of a Plowshare provision.

During U. S. internal consideration of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, it became abundantly clear that the continuance of a viable Plowshare program was a significant factor given extensive consideration by many parties. The testimony of the Administration witnesses, the words of members in the Senate as reflected in the Senate Report of the Treaty, and speeches on the floor of the Senate, indicate that it was fully intended that some experiments to develop excavation techniques could be continued within the limitations of the treaty, but an amendment to the treaty would probably be necessary in order to carry out excavation projects near borders, such as the digging of canals or harbors. In this vein, President Kennedy's letter of September 10, 1963, to Senators Mansfield and Dirksen contained the following:

> "The United States will diligently pursue its programs for the further development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by underground tests within the terms of the treaty, and as and when such developments make possible constructive uses of atmospheric nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the United States will seek international agreement under the treaty to permit such explosions."

This statement does not indicate that we would not carry out cratering experiments, and was received and interpreted in the Senate floor debate in a manner consistent with Dr. Seaborg's testimony, i.e., that we planned to carry out at least some cratering experiments to complete development of the technology.

Another indication of feelings toward Plowshare emanating from U. S. consideration of the Limited Test Ban Treaty is evident in the following statement by Senator Fulbright on September 9, 1963, during formal Senate debate on the treaty:

> "I came away from the hearings with the feeling that the Plowshare program was important not only to us but to the economic improvement of the world and, therefore, certainly when we consent to this treaty, we should make it clear to the executive department of our Government that this must be worked out."

The attitude of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is evident in the following excerpt from their report of September 3, 1963, regarding the treaty.

> "p. 20. 'THE PLOWSHARE PROGRAM'
> The Committee understands that the Plowshare program, which involves the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, will not be seriously inhibited by the treaty. A great many, if not most, of such projects can be conducted underground and within the limits of the treaty."

While definition of Plowshare activities was not absolutely necessary in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, it becomes an inescapable area for consideration under a Comprehensive Treaty. A system of safeguards is necessary to work against the development of weapons technology under the guise of a peaceful program. A realistic system of safeguards to permit the carrying out of Plowshare applications and the development of Plowshare energy sources (devices) is possible. For example,

safeguard details for Plowshare applications, including disclosure of overall plans, purpose of the shot, on-site inspection, joint measurements, sharing of collected debris samples, and agreement as to adequacy of safety plans, would operate as an effective deterrent to any meaningful or important progress in weapons development. In order to preserve the military balance while allowing progress in Plowshare energy source development, an annual quota of a minimum number (say 3 to 5) of fully contained, underground Plowshare shots could prove useful while severely limiting any weapons design accomplishment. The quota approach could include (1) correlation of the stated need for the energy source (device) development shots against the achievement of Plowshare program results and (2) adequate prior and post-shot announcements, in unclassified terms, as to the date, place, purpose, and results of the quota shots.

D. Administration Use of Plowshare

The Plowshare concept and capability has been of significant use in international negotiations. An example of this is found in National Security Action Memorandum No. 152 of April 30, 1962, on the subject of Panama Canal Policy and Relations with Panama. NSAM 152 was developed after an 8-month study following Panama's President Chiari's letter request to President Kennedy of September, 1961, requesting renegotiation of our Panama Canal treaties. As such, the document (NSAM 152) became the official guide or position paper of this Government. A pertinent quote from this document provides that:

> "The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, will establish within the PLOWSHARE program a research goal to determine within approximately the next five years the feasibility, costs and other factors involved in nuclear methods of excavation. The

necessary research program will be a joint responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense in accordance with the mutual agreement between those two Agencies."

President Kennedy, in discussions on June 12, 1962, at the White House with President Chiari of Panama, utilized NSAM 152 as a guide in these conversations and the document thus became the gist of the proposed U. S. course of action conveyed to President Chiari. This appeared to have the effect of allaying, to some extent, the Panamanian drive to renegotiate the 1903 treaty.

Following this, legislation was introduced at the Administration's request for carrying out the feasibility studies of the possibility of and problems connected with a sea level canal across the American Isthmus. Although field trips and site inspections were conducted, no legislation became law. The Panama problem erupted again, however, in the canal zone riots in 1964. The Administration once again requested legislation and following extensive Congressional consideration, Public Law 88-609 was approved by President Johnson on September 22, 1964, providing for an investigation and study to determine a site for the construction of a sea-level canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Law provides, among other things, that the study should determine:

"....the best means of constructing such a canal, whether by conventional or nuclear excavation and the estimated cost thereof."

Thus, Plowshare has been and can be a foreign policy tool of considerable merit. The Plowshare capability for accomplishing heretofore impossible feats of civil engineering provides added strength to U. S. negotiations in various international situations. Skilled use of this negotiating tool can be very effective.

E. International Interest in Plowshare

Many expressions of interest in Plowshare applications have been received from outside the United States. These have ranged from official expressions to informal suggestions for projects; however, they serve to underline the international aspects of Plowshare. Some of these countries are:

Panama	Thailand	Australia
Colombia	The Philippines	Canada
Mexico	Egypt	Brazil
Chile	Tunisia	Japan
Peru	Algeria	South Korea

Australia, in particular, has shown considerable interest in Plowshare capabilities and possible applications for projects in the development of that nation. The tenth annual report of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission for 1961-1962 related the widespread Australian interest in Plowshare in connection with the visit of Dr. Gary Higgins, Director of the Plowshare Division, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California. In return, from September 1, 1963 through October 24, 1963, three scientists representing the Australian Atomic Energy Commission were in the U. S. to gain a first-hand appreciation of the scientific, engineering, and safety aspects of the use of nuclear explosives for constructive purposes.

Another international development concerning Plowshare was the U. S. offer of Plowshare aid to the USSR in connection with their potential Samarkand catastrophe. This refers to a gigantic mountain landslide which occurred in April, 1964, in interior Russia which completely blocked the Zeravshan River, damming in water in such manner as to create a serious flood threat to several villages and

the city of Samarkand. The U. S. offer of assistance made by Ambassador Thompson to Russian Ambassador Dobrynin at a Soviet Embassy dinner included the offer of the services of a team of American peaceful nuclear explosive experts. The U. S. offer of assistance was cabled to Moscow by Dobrynin; however, the problem was ultimately solved through use of non-nuclear explosives.

Particularly significant evidence of Russian interest in Plowshare operations was the attitude of USSR representatives to the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in September, 1964. Russian representatives indicated considerable interest in the Plowshare portion of the U. S. exhibit. Rumanians suggested possible international collaboration on the Plowshare program under the auspices of the IAEA. Perhaps of most importance was Dr. Gerald Johnson's (LRL) discussion, with Vasily Emelyanov of the Soviet Union concerning Plowshare. Three areas of interest to the Soviet Union were discussed:

a. Overburden removal from a large molybdenum deposit in Northeast Siberia.

b. Irrigation canal construction from the Ob River to a desert area.

c. The release of gas from tight geological formations.

Dr. Emelyanov inquired as to Dr. Johnson's views concerning possible cooperative efforts by the Soviet and U. S. Engineers jointly examining the potential applications of nuclear explosives to these problems. The positive interest of the Russian delegates was unmistakable. Dr. Johnson in his post conference report states that:

> "The contrast between the attitude taken by the Soviet Union and satellites during this session and that in 1958 is impressive."

The Geneva conference also saw representatives of the Egyptian Government contact U.S. officials (Commissioner Tape and DPNE Director Kelly) concerning the possibility of using nuclear explosives in digging a canal which would connect the Qattara Depression in Northern Egypt with the Mediterranean Sea.

A more recent example of Russian interest in Plowshare capabilities occurred when the President's Science Advisor, Dr. Donald Hornig, during the course of negotiations regarding the joint US-USSR desalting agreements, was queried by Dr. Keldysh, Head of the USSR National Academy of Sciences, as to whether Plowshare could be handled on an international cooperative basis, similar to the desalinization cooperation. Dr. Keldysh was reported interested in Plowshare generally and particularly the area of oil recovery through explosive stimulation.

I A-11- Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation

DEC 16 1964

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

Enclosed is the AEC contribution on "Summary of independent peaceful atomic energy programs indicating extent to which they are not subject to IAEA or other safeguards". This summary is based on the information available to the AEC on the atomic energy programs of other countries as described in the booklet entitled "Summaries of Atomic Energy Programs Abroad," which is also enclosed.

Only free world countries other than the U.K. with significant nuclear programs are included in the summary indicating safeguards applicability.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) John G. Palfrey

John G. Palfrey
Commissioner

Mr. Roswell W. Gilpatric, Chairman
President's Task Force on Preventing
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Executive Office Building

bcc: Chairman Seaborg
Commissioner Palfrey
Commissioner Bunting
Commissioner Ramey
Commissioner Tape
GM
AGMIA
Secretariat (2)
OGC
AD/S

Enclosures:
1. Summary of atomic energy programs
2. Booklet

Filed in B.P.

Concurrences:
DIA:Downing
DIA:Strauser

DIA DIA AGMIA AGM DGM GM

Caja/
Strauser:bb Kraiser
12/7/64

IA-11- Nuclear Proliferation, Cuban Mis

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : File

DATE December 15, 1964

FROM : W. B. McCool, Secretary

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 13 AND 14 MEETINGS OF THE GILPATRIC COMMITTEE

SECY:JCH

At Information Meeting 435 on December 14, 1964, Commissioner Palfrey reported briefly on his attendance at the Gilpatric Committee Meeting held on December 13 and 14 and said the next meeting of the Committee is scheduled for January 7, 1965 and it is planned that the Principals will attend. The Chairman requested background material for his use and Commissioner Palfrey noted that continued assistance from the staff is required.

cc:
Chairman
Commissioner Palfrey
General Manager
Deputy General Manager
Asst. General Manager
Asst. Gen. Mgr. for IA
Asst. Gen. Mgr. for Admin.
General Counsel
Director, International Affairs

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IA-15-64

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IA-11- Nuclear Proliferation, Task Force on

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

DEC 11 1964

DL
C/9

Dear Senator Pastore:

As you are aware the President has appointed a Task Force headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, to consider the problem of proliferation of atomic weapons. The membership consists of:

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Arthur H. Dean
Allen W. Dulles
General Alfred M. Gruenther
Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky
John J. McCloy
Dr. James A. Perkins
Arthur K. Watson
William S. Webster
Dr. Herbert F. York

The group's interests encompass the relationship of both military and civilian programs of the United States to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the more general question of how the independent nuclear programs of other nations may be confined to peaceful purposes. Many of the areas of interest to this Task Force involve activities and programs of the Commission, and the Commission has, of course, been requested to furnish information to the Task Force in these areas.

It is our understanding that the Task Force hopes to finish its work around the end of January 1965. The Commission's role with reference to the Task Force is essentially one of providing factual information on Commission programs and our evaluation of the extent to which AEC activities may affect

12-11-64

either positively or negatively, the capability of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. In the course of this, we hope to stress the positive contribution that has been made and will continue to be made by the application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear programs abroad.

If the Committee has any further questions on this subject, I will try to answer them.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

The Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Congress of the United States

bcc: Chairman (2)
Commissioner Bunting
Commissioner Palfrey
Commissioner Ramey
Commissioner Tape
GM
AGMIA
Secretariat (2)

IA:D AGMIA AGM DGM GM

Kratzer:ws
12-4-64

RECEIVED

TA-11- ~~Task~~ Force on Nuclear Proliferation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Comm & Gen/I

DL,

December 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 320

SUBJECT: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation

The Presidential study group covered in NSAM 320, formerly referred to as the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, will henceforth be referred to as the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation.

McG Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

12-7-64

November 27, 1964

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
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Mr. Roswell W. Gilpatric, Chairman
President's Task Force on Preventing
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Room 300
Executive Office Building

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

Attached is material responsive to Item 7 of your "background papers" list. The material is subject to some future editing, but I wanted you to have it as soon as possible.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DOE/MN-523
WITHOUT ENCL/ATTACHMENTS

Sincerely,

(Signed) John G. Palfrey

John G. Palfrey
Commissioner

BCC: Chairman (2)
Comm. Bunting
Comm. Palfrey
Comm. Ramey
Comm. Tape
GM
AGMIA
OGC
SECRETARIAT (2)

Attachments:
As stated

Attachment "Achievements of A-Weapons, etc."

Copy 1 - Comm. Palfrey
Cys. 2-8 Gilpatric Committee
9 Chairman
10 ~~Mr. Kratzer~~ 270'B
11 Chairman
12 Comm. Bunting
13 Comm. ~~RAMMM~~ Tape
14 Comm. Ramey
15 GM
16 AGMIA
17 OGC
18 Secretariat
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20 HQB

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DATE ▶	11/27/64					

Ltr to file

NOV 25 1964

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

In recent conversations with members of your staff, I received a list of topics on which background information is to be developed for the use of the committee which you will head. The Commission is preparing material on those items of the list for which it was indicated the Commission should be responsible. I am forwarding at this time the tabular material which forms a part of the Commission's submission on item 7 of the list. Additional tabular material relating to the amounts of fissionable material supplied abroad has been furnished previously to Mr. Charles Johnson and should be regarded as part of our submission on this item.

A narrative description of the United States program and its legislative and historical background is in preparation and will be provided to you shortly, completing our submission on item 7. Responses to the other items on the list for which the Commission is responsible will also be provided as soon as possible.

I look forward to the opportunity of assisting you and your committee in your task and will be glad to provide any information which is of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John G. Palfrey

John G. Palfrey
Commissioner

Mr. Roswell W. Gilpatric, Chairman
President's Task Force on Preventing
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Executive Office Building

Enclosure:
Tabular material

bcc: Chairman Seaborg
Commissioner Palfrey
Commissioner Bunting
Commissioner Ramey
Commissioner Tape
~~GM~~
AGMIA
Secretariat (2)
OGC

IA:DIR AGMIA ADM DGM GM

Kratzer
11/25/64

11/25/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IA-11- Task Force on Proliferation

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

DEC 9 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN SEABORG
COMMISSIONER BUNTING
COMMISSIONER PALFREY
COMMISSIONER RAMEY
COMMISSIONER TAPE

John E. Hall for
~~THROUGH~~ GENERAL MANAGER

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NAME: Joe Tamp Behrel
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SUBJECT: GILPATRIC COMMITTEE

On December 1, 1964 the Gilpatric Committee met for the first time to hear presentations by several agencies. Commissioner Palfrey attended on behalf of the Commission and was accompanied by myself and Mr. John Downing, Chief of the Safeguards Operations Branch, who was present to answer any questions on the nature of our inspection procedures. Commissioner Palfrey summarized AEC peaceful uses programs, stressing the fact that from the outset safeguards and controls have been required and that these have been--with increasing success--transferred to IAEA administration whenever possible. Commissioner Palfrey also observed that many commitments have been made during the course of this program and that because of these commitments many thousands of kilograms of plutonium will be produced which can be retained under safeguards in cooperating countries for their peaceful programs. The Committee acknowledged that the commitments already made were substantial.

The Committee asked a number of questions, principally on the nature of our safeguards arrangements with Euratom, on the scheduled supply of 350 kg. of plutonium to Euratom and on our means for assuring the adequacy of Euratom and IAEA safeguards. There was no evidence of prejudgment on their part that any particular activities should be discontinued or reduced.

The Committee has been organized into task forces which will consider various aspects of the proliferation problem separately. The subcommittee on peaceful uses consists of Dr. Perkins, Mr. Webster and Dr. York. We expect to be contacted by the subcommittee for further information. The Committee expects to finish its work near the end of January.

CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO (Initials) COORDINATE WITH: [illegible] DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958 BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DOEANI-023 WITH ATTACHMENTS/ENCL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

State Dept Declassification Review
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H. Engelhardt Date 6-21-00

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

12-9-64

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Attached are committee documents outlining the organization of the committee into sub-groups, the supporting papers requested by the Committee and the issues which the Committee expects to consider in the course of their study.

Myron B. Kratzer, Director
Division of International Affairs

Attachments:
Organization of Sub-Groups
List of Supporting Papers
Requested
Selected Issues

cc: GM
AGMIA
Secretariat (2)✓
OGC

OFFICE ▶	IA:D					
SURNAME ▶	MBKratzer:mks	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~				
DATE ▶	12/9/64					

Mr Palfrey

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Problem Areas and Possible Assignments

Problems	Principals	Staff (and Consultants)
1. Problems of Europe and NATO: German nuclear interests; MLF and possible modifications or alternatives; implications for Soviet behavior	McCloy Gilpatric Watson	Garthoff Murray Rathjens
2. Problems of nuclear proliferation outside Europe, especially India and Japan: pressures for and against acquisition; discouraging proliferation by reducing incentives, applying sanctions, restricting trade on critical materials, offering guarantees and other security arrangements	Dulles Kistiakowsky Watson	Garthoff Rivkin Murray
3. Multilateral agreements: comprehensive test ban; non-proliferation agreements; denuclearized zones; reductions and freezes in nuclear weapons and delivery systems	Dean Kistiakowsky Perkins	Garthoff Murray Rathjens
4. Peaceful uses of atomic energy outside US: power and research reactors; Plowshare; inspection, safeguards, sanctions; transfer of technology and availability of fissionable material for weapons development	Perkins Webster York	Rathjens Rivkin (Palfrey)
5. US policies on weapons dispersal: requirements; control; physical security, relationship to incentives for proliferation; spread of operational and technological know-how	Dulles Gilpatric Gruenther	Murray Johnson
6. Policies toward existing nuclear powers: controls of technology to discourage improvements in weapons delivery systems, and testing, including psychological, political, economic and military pressures and incentives	Dean Gilpatric McCloy York	Garthoff Rivkin Johnson

WORKING DRAFT

SELECTED ISSUES

1. The desirability of attempting to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Is it to the U.S. interest in all cases to attempt to prevent the acquisition by other countries of a nuclear capability, or are there special cases where it might be in the U.S. interest for particular nations to acquire such capability? If so, how can such selectivity in proliferation be exercised?

2. Europe, NATO, the German problem and the MLF.

a. Considering possible variations in the MLF,

(1) It is likely in fact to be effective in meeting a potential demand or in reducing the incentives for an independent German nuclear capability? What if other countries, e.g., India or Sweden, go ahead with nuclear weapons programs?

(2) Is it likely to strengthen NATO or might the divisive effects be dominant?

b. Does a Germany tightly tied to the U.S. with involvement in control of nuclear weapons as implied in the MLF offer a better long term hope for stability in Europe, for reunification of Germany, and for relaxation of the East-West confrontation than moving toward neutralization and denuclearization of Central Europe, or in the direction of a "third force" Europe?

c. What, if any, modification in the MLF would be acceptable as a price to get the USSR to go along with a non-proliferation agreement? Abandonment of European clause? Perpetual U.S. veto? Non-acquisition pledge by non-nuclear signers?

3. Inhibiting non-European countries from going ahead with nuclear weapons programs.

a. What pressures or sanctions could be applied and what inducements or guarantees might we offer the non-nuclear

powers to get them to agree to a non-acquisition agreement or, more generally, to refrain from going ahead with nuclear weapons programs? What about India and Japan particularly?

b. What can we do to influence other countries to avoid helping non-nuclear powers in nuclear weapons programs?

c. Would arrangements similar to the MLF be desirable and effective as a means of meeting potential demands for nuclear capabilities in other areas: the Pacific, South Asia?

4. Multilateral treaties or agreements.

I. Comprehensive test ban

a. Should we accept a comprehensive test ban treaty without Chinese and/or French accession?

b. Is there any price that would be acceptable to us that might induce either or both to accede?

c. Considering the potential gains with respect to halting proliferation of nuclear capabilities and changes in technical capabilities, should we modify our position regarding a comprehensive test ban? Could we accept:

(1) a reduced number of on-site inspections, or

(2) a no-on-site inspection treaty?

II. A non-proliferation agreement.

a. Should we go ahead with a non-dissemination agreement without Chinese, French, and/or Soviet participation?

b. How much and what kind of pressure and inducements would be appropriate to get France and/or China to agree to a non-dissemination proposal?

c. Is it at all realistic to attempt to get a non-acquisition agreement to which the non-nuclear powers would

subscribe without the nuclear powers agreeing to a non-dissemination agreement (or other constraints on what they do in the nuclear area)?

5. Peaceful uses.

a. Does the Atoms for Peace Program as currently conceived serve our non-proliferation interests by increasing U.S. influence and control over foreign nuclear programs or does it have the net effect of accelerating the capabilities of Nth countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons?

b. Are there countries, presently or potentially involved in Atoms for Peace where such programs should be curtailed or prohibited because of political instability or possible interest in attaining an independent nuclear capability?

c. Are present safeguards and controls (bilaterals, IAEA, EURATOM) on fissionable material transfers, reactors, and other technology adequate? If not, what improvements could be made?

d. Are present rights and procedures in both our bilateral and multilateral agreements adequate to permit us to repossess fissionable materials and facilities in the event they are not used for peaceful purposes or safeguards are not observed?

e. Do contingency plans exist to deal with situations arising when a country simply takes over Atoms for Peace fissionable materials or facilities for use in developing an independent nuclear weapons program or refuses to honor rights for repossession?

f. How would a Plowshare program operate under a comprehensive test ban? What would be the risk that such an arrangement to continue Plowshare would defeat the purposes of such a Treaty by contributing to nuclear proliferation or to the improvement of the weapon capabilities of existing nuclear powers?

g. What constraints should we impose on our domestic and overseas Atoms for Peace programs (i.e. transfer of fissionable material, reactors, critical equipment, information and personnel exchange) in the interest of inhibiting proliferation of nuclear weapons technology?

6. Dispersal of U.S. nuclear weapons and controls.

a. Do present and contemplated arrangements provide adequate safeguards against seizure, unauthorized use, and compromise of design information?

b. Should the U.S. cut back on deployment of nuclear weapons for use abroad with delivery systems of our allies?

c. Should the U.S. cut back on its deployment of nuclear weapons overseas for use with U.S. forces? Is our present nuclear weapons deployment consistent with U.S. strategic and tactical policies?

d. Is the U.S. currently presenting the best "image" on nuclear weapons? For example, what are the negative implications of sending nuclear submarines on visits to ports of non-nuclear powers such as Japan?

e. Is U.S. intransigence on the questions of overseas basing and of transit rights for nuclear weapons unnecessarily limiting us in reaching agreements on, or in responding to, proposals for nuclear free zones, etc.? Could we live with some restrictions in these areas?

7. Policies toward existing nuclear powers.

a. What measures can the U.S. take to inhibit improvement by nuclear powers in their weapons or their delivery systems?

b. What measures might we take, or encourage others to take, to make difficult or to frustrate French testing in the Pacific?

c. What are the military possibilities and what are likely to be the political consequences of eliminating the Chinese nuclear capability?

8. Reducing the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.

a. Is stimulation of prestigious non-weapons technology achievements in the space, atomic energy, or other fields likely to prove feasible and effective in diminishing incentives to acquire nuclear capabilities in countries where a major component of the demand is the desire to demonstrate technical proficiency? What might we do in this area? What dangers might there be in indirectly building up technical capacity for later programs for nuclear weapons or delivery systems?

b. Would the deployment of an effective anti-ICBM system by the principal nuclear powers, i.e., USA, USSR and UK, serve to deter the nuclear aspirations of "have not" nations?

c. How far should we go in trying to inhibit proliferation of nuclear delivery system technology as an adjunct to inhibiting proliferation of nuclear weapons technology?

d. What importance should we attach to other (than nuclear non-proliferation) measures in reducing the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons? For example, would negotiation of the U.S. proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles

or of an agreement to transfer fissionable material from weapons to peaceful uses programs be interpreted by others as indicative of movement toward a world where nuclear capabilities may be of less military and/or political significance? Are the priorities we are giving to such measures and our evaluation of the risks implicit in them commensurate with the importance they may have in the medium and long term in reducing incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons?

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Supporting Papers for Task Force

1. Present and planned dispersal of U. S. nuclear weapons to (a) U. S. forces and (b) non-U. S. forces. DOD (Howard)

2. Controls and safeguards for dispersed U. S. weapons to U. S. and non-U. S. forces. DOD (Howard)

3. Estimates of present and projected nuclear weapon programs of other nuclear powers, including status of dispersal and control. DIA (Chamberlin)

4. Estimates of capabilities of Nth countries to develop independent nuclear weapons programs. CIA

5. Political incentives and pressures in Nth countries to undertake independent nuclear weapons programs. State

6. Critical commentaries on 4 and 5. (Informal governmental and non-governmental)

7. U. S. overseas programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy (bilateral, IAEA, and Euratom), including amounts of fissionable materials, potential production capacity of facilities, applicable safeguards, and history of implementation of safeguards. AEC

8. Non-U. S. overseas programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy, including kind and amounts of fissionable material, potential production capacity of facilities, applicable safeguards, and history of implementation of safeguards. CIA

9. Summary of independent peaceful atomic energy programs indicating extent to which they are not subject to IAEA or other safeguards. CIA/AEC

10. Feasibility of using dirty plutonium and low enrichment U-235 from peaceful programs for weapon purposes. AEC -- See insert.

11. Estimate of strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of France, China, and potential Nth countries. CIA

12. U. S. policy and procedures export of equipment directly and/or indirectly useful for (a) fissionable material and weapon production or (b) weapon testing, and (c) strategic delivery systems. State/(DOD)/(AEC)

13. Policies and procedures of other nuclear powers and major industrial powers regarding export of equipment directly and/or indirectly useful for (a) fissionable material and weapons production or (b) weapons testing. History of U. S. attempts to influence such policies.

CONFIDENTIAL

Insert:

10. Technical feasibility of using power reactors for weapons purposes, feasibility of using dirty plutonium and low enrichment U-235 from peaceful programs for weapon purposes. AEC

10a. Future nuclear technology affecting proliferation - new production techniques, radically new weapons.

14. Status of capability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests. DOD (Frosch)

15. Comparative weapon development capabilities under present limited test ban and comprehensive test with and without evasion. DOD (Brown)

16. Summary and status of U. S. Soviet and other governmental proposals on non-proliferation. ACDA

17. Summary of potential proposals on non-proliferation under consideration within the government. ACDA

18. Summary of non-governmental proposals on non-proliferation. Fisher

19. Status of MLF negotiations. State

20. Summary of allies on non-proliferation problem (including MLF). State

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Res. & Status Br. - GTN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : File

DATE: November 17, 1964

FROM : W. B. McCool, Secretary

SUBJECT: ATOMS FOR PEACE POLICY

SECY:JCH

1. At Information Meeting 426 on November 16, 1964, the Commissioners reviewed Mr. Kratzer's memorandum regarding the Atoms for Peace policy and the Chairman requested elaboration of material in the memorandum for possible use by him at a meeting next week. Commissioner Palfrey will try to arrange a luncheon meeting with Mr. Roswell Gilpatric.

2. It is our understanding that the Division of International Affairs is taking the required action.

cc:
Chairman
Commissioner Palfrey
General Manager
Deputy General Manager
Assistant General Manager
Asst. Gen. Mgr. for IA
General Counsel
Director, IA

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*-filed in date order-11-13-64

11-17-64

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