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REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to the
EIGHTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC
COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION
Geneva, Switzerland
September 19 - 30, 1960

Submitted to the SECRETARY OF STATE

/s/ Shields Warren

Shields Warren, M.D.
U. S. Representative

November 1, 1960

Prepared by: Thomas F. O'Leary

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REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION

I. Background

The Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation was established by Resolution 913 (X) of December 8, 1955 at the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. It has the following members: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America. Under its terms of reference, the Committee receives and compiles reports and information from member states, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations dealing with the effects of ionizing radiation on man and his environment, and reports its findings and evaluations periodically to the General Assembly. In 1958, the Committee submitted its first Comprehensive Report, A/3838. General Assembly Resolution 1347 (XII) 1959 requested the Committee to continue its useful work and report back as appropriate. Under the approval granted by the General Assembly Resolution 1376 (XIV), the Committee will submit a second Comprehensive Report in 1962. The Eighth Session of the Committee was held at the European Headquarters of the United Nations, Palais des Nations, in Geneva, Switzerland, from September 19-30, 1960.

II. Agenda

The agenda adopted for the Eighth Session of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is as follows:

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Technical discussions:
 - (a) Genetic problems
 - (b) Carbon-14
 - (c) Consideration of fall-out data and associated questions
 - (d) Calculation of doses from environmental contamination and associated questions
3. Consideration of plans for 1962 Comprehensive Report.
4. Report to General Assembly:
 - (a) Annual Progress
 - (b) Response to Resolution 1376 (XIV)
 - (c) United Nations/World Health Organization Seminar on Use of Vital and Health Statistics for Genetic and Radiation Studies

- 5. Pattern of meetings: time and place of next session.
- 6. Other business.

III. Participation

A. Official Delegations

	<u>Representatives</u>
Argentina	1
Australia	3
Belgium	2
Brazil	6
Canada	4
Czechoslovakia	4
France	4
India	2
Japan	4
Mexico	4
Sweden	6
USSR	8
UAR	1
UK	4
USA	8

B. International Organizations Represented by Observers:

FAO	4
WHO	1
WMO	1
UNESCO	2
IAEA	4

C. Non-Governmental Organizations Observers:

International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) - 1

D. U. N. Secretariat Staff

Dr. Raymond Appleyard (Canada)	Secretary of Committee
Dr. Francesco Sella (Italy)	Scientific Advisor
Dr. K. A. Mahmoud (UAR)	" "
Dr. K. Zakrzewski (Poland)	" "
Dr. Daniel Simonenko (USSR)	" "
Dr. Gordon Fergusson (New Zealand)	" "
Dr. D. W. Keam (Australia)	" "

IV. U. S. DELEGATION

- Representative - Dr. Shields Warren, Professor of Pathology, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts
- Alternate - Dr. Austin M. Bruss, Director, Division of Biological and Medical Research, Argonne National Laboratory
- Advisers - Dr. Charles L. Dunham, Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission
- Dr. John H. Harley, Assistant Director, Health and Safety Laboratory, New York Operations Office, Atomic Energy Commission
- Mr. Thomas F. O'Leary, Office of Special Projects, Atomic Energy Commission
- Mr. Charles H. Owsley, Deputy United States Representative at European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations, Geneva
- Dr. William L. Russell, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- Dr. Max R. Zelle, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission

The meeting was not open to the public.

V. Organization of Committee - Eighth Session

- Chairman - Dr. Manuel Martinez Baez
Institute of Health and Tropical Diseases
Mexico
- Vice-Chairman Dr. Ferdinand Hercik
Biological Branch, Academy of Science, Brno
Czechoslovakia

At the Seventh Session of the Committee, two subgroups were established to study appropriate arrangements for stimulating the flow of information and data on the effects of radiation on man and his environment, as requested by General Assembly Resolution 1376 (XIV) and to prepare a draft report to the General Assembly for the consideration by the Committee at its Eighth Session.

Dr. Shields Warren, U. S. Representative, was Chairman of the subgroup dealing with the biological aspects and Dr. W. E. Grummitt, Alternate Canadian Representative, was Chairman of the other subgroup dealing with the physical aspects. Dr. John Harley served as a technical adviser on the physical subgroup. The draft report, prepared jointly by the subgroups, was accepted by the Committee in plenary session. The report, while it did not take a strong position, has some substance and certainly no features objectionable to the U. S. position. It pointed out that the Committee needs to continue to receive information and data of physical and biomedical importance from all nations and emphasized that the Committee will continue to work closely with interested United Nations agencies and certain other groups whose work has been of great assistance to the Committee. The report also contained reference to the failure of some member states to provide desirable information. The USSR Delegation did not raise objection to this reference, even though it was apparent that they have furnished very little data, particularly with regard to fallout levels. The report also emphasized both the kind of data and information needed and the necessity for accuracy of data reported.

Five subgroups were established at the Eighth Session for the purpose of drafting for the Committee's consideration the text of the main chapters and annexes of the 1962 Comprehensive Report. This matter will be discussed in detail under Part VI of this report.

VI. Work of the Eighth Session

At this session, the Committee discussed genetic problems, Carbon-14, fallout and associated subjects, and dose calculations; laid plans for its 1962 Comprehensive Report to the General Assembly; considered and studied, on the basis of reports by its subgroups, certain arrangements as requested by the General Assembly in Parts II, III and V of Resolution 1376, and prepared its Annual Progress Report for 1960. The Committee met in plenary session on the morning of September 19 and again on the afternoon of September 30, and as an informal working group during the intervening time.

A. Opening Plenary Meeting

Topics of discussion at the opening plenary meeting were the agenda and the timetable for topics to be discussed during the session. The provisional agenda prepared by the Secretariat and the suggested timetable were agreed to by the Committee after a short discussion. The Committee then met as a working group until the closing plenary meeting.

B. Technical Discussions

1. Genetics

Approximately two full days were spent discussing various aspects of the genetics consequences from the irradiation of man. The Secretariat had prepared a paper dealing with specific phases of the central

problem to be used as background notes for discussion. A series of informal presentations was given by geneticists from Belgium, Brazil, France, Japan, Sweden, USSR and U. S. dealing with some of the latest experimental work in this field.

The principal points discussed concerned the genetic hazards to man from exposure to low doses of radiation. The USSR Delegation presented data in support of their conclusions that low levels of radiation pose a serious hazard to man. They stated that their data indicated that man is the most sensitive of all species to radiation, that there is no threshold below which man is safe from the effects of radiation, and that the repair mechanism is not a factor to consider. They proposed as the basis of their data that the Committee accept as a concept in preparing its 1962 report a doubling dose rate for man at 6r. Geneticists from the U. S., France and Sweden pointed out that, based on their findings, the Soviet conclusions were oversimplified in several respects. Experiments dealing with sex ratio and the mechanism of gene mutation showed clearly the uncertainty in some genetic assessments. Dr. Russell's presentation, which was well received, contained new data on the relation between mutation frequency and radiation dose rate. Dr. Russell also stressed the fact that there is no one doubling dose. He illustrated the misconceptions that can arise from the use of this term without qualifying what it means and how it was derived. He emphasized that it is often more meaningful to concentrate on the absolute amount of radiation-induced genetic damage rather than on the doubling dose. It was suggested that no one doubling dose be used in the 1962 report, but rather a table be presented showing the various doubling doses experimentally derived and qualified as to the specific cell stage, organism and other factors that affect the significance to the total genetic hazard. The Committee agreed to turn this problem over to the Genetics Subgroup. Dr. Kimura (Japan) discussed the uncertainty in our knowledge as to whether the spontaneous mutation rate is above or below the optimum mutation rate that will harm man as little as possible while still giving him the degree of adaptability that will enable him to adjust successfully to his environment.

In general, these discussions were informative and gave rise to a free exchange of views. In final analysis, they showed the complexity of assessing the genetic hazard from radiation and the need for more information. It was interesting to note that the USSR geneticists, both women, were of the classical school (Mendelian) rather than of the Lysenko (USSR) school which emphasized the influence of environment on heredity.

2. Carbon-14

A report entitled "Radiocarbon from Nuclear Tests" prepared by the Secretariat was reviewed and discussed in detail by the Committee. The report attempted to assess the effects of the added artificial C¹⁴ on mankind. Four informal presentations were given, two by the USSR Delegation, one by the French Delegation, and another by Dr. Zelle of

the U. S. Delegation. The first Soviet presentation supported the thesis that when Carbon-14 is incorporated into the structure of the chromosome, it has a greater efficiency in producing chromosome breaks than other fission products which are external to the chromosome. The biological effect of Carbon-14 was estimated to be ten times greater than that of other radioactive decay products. Calculations were then made by the USSR to estimate the hazards to man if nuclear tests were resumed at the 1958 level for a period of 30 years. For the total population burden, the USSR concluded that in one generation 12 million persons would suffer genetic damage from Carbon-14.

The second USSR presentation dealt with the study of Carbon-14 content in the annular rings of a tree section to measure the level of Carbon-14 following the testing of nuclear devices.

Dr. Zelle presented data from an experiment on somatic mutation in snapdragons in a controlled Carbon-14 atmosphere. The results gave no evidence that transmutations of Carbon-14 to Nitrogen-14 have increased efficiency in mutations. The French Delegate presented experimental data on Carbon-14 produced from the air-cooled reactors which showed that within certain parameters this type of reactor can produce a Carbon-14 level approaching background. The Soviet Delegate also presented a theoretical mathematical model for calculating the dose to man over extended periods of time if testing is resumed. Using the doubling dose concept, assuming no threshold and a straight linear effect, they concluded that for future generations, one percent of all births will have genetic damage. The Committee's response was negative, since information from direct measurements did not support the USSR conclusions. It was pointed out that the dose rate as well as the total dose determines the relevant genetic effect. Dr. Russell again drew attention to the danger of using a single doubling dose rate to estimate genetic damage.

In spite of the effort of the USSR Delegation to dramatize the relative importance of Carbon-14 as a hazard, it was the Committee's considered opinion that the hazards to man contributed by Carbon-14 must be dealt with within the context of absolute hazard in relation to natural levels of radiation and other factors, such as the dose rate, to keep it in its proper perspective.

3. Physical Discussion

The Committee discussed a series of reports prepared by the Secretariat dealing with the physicometeorological aspects of radioactivity of fallout and the computation of doses from various sources of radiation. Dr. L. P. Lemerton, IAEA Adviser, summarized the proceedings of the agency's symposium on Radiation Damage in Bone. The published

proceedings were submitted to the Committee. Dr. Lamerton commented that the symposium pointed up the need to approach the problem with the combined talents of the biologist, the chemist and the physicist. Dr. Leipunsky, USSR Delegate, presented a mathematical model for dose computations, which used as bases for calculation, direct physical measurement of the high levels of contamination as opposed to the average levels and related this computation in terms of biological hazards to man. His proposal to adopt this method in the 1962 report was not supported. Dr. Harley, U. S. Delegate, drew attention to errors in using only high concentration measurement in calculating dose and the importance of using actual measurements to evaluate absolute danger from radioactivity sources. He also emphasized that if only high level contamination levels are used, it should be clearly stated as such in the report.

C. 1962 Comprehensive Report

The Committee spent three days planning its 1962 Comprehensive Report to the General Assembly. The Secretariat submitted a report outlining, as a basis for the Committee's discussion, a possible layout, manner of preparation and program of this report. The discussion dealt primarily with the arrangement and content of the annexes and main chapters, particularly with regard to physical aspects and the computation and comparison of doses from various sources of radiation. The plans finally agreed upon call for a report quite similar to the 1958 report in general form. The main body of the report will be factual and non-technical to the extent possible. The annexes will contain a more detailed account of the present state of knowledge and detailed arguments which support the conclusion presented in the main body. The detailed layout will vary with the 1958 report in form, and to a degree in substance, to conform with scientific advances made since that time. The Committee agreed that the specialized agencies, such as World Health Organization, Foreign Agricultural Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, could make significant contributions to the work of the Committee in preparing the report and instructed the Secretariat to solicit their assistance in specific areas as follows:

- IAEA -- Levels and potential magnitude of water disposal
Occupational dose figures
- WHO -- Vital statistics on population genetics
- FAO -- Dietary data
- ICRP -- Medical doses--bibliography on permissible doses

Five subgroups were established to draft the annexes and the corresponding chapters of the main report. The U. S. Delegation has wide representation on each subgroup, with the exception of the subgroup drafting the Evaluation and Conclusion chapter. The composition of this subgroup is as follows:

Mexico	-- Dr. Martinez Baez (Chairman)	
Czechoslovakia	-- Dr. Hercik (Vice-Chairman)	- for Fundamental Biology
United Kingdom	-- Dr. Pochin	- for Somatic Effects
India	-- Dr. Gopal-Ayengar	- for Genetic Effects
France	-- Dr. Bugnard	- for Physics and Dosimetry

The political composition is thus: 3 pro-West, 1 pro-East, and 1 neutral. Had the U. S. Representative demanded representation on this subgroup, the USSR Delegate would have demanded equal rights. This probably would have shifted the balance to 2 pro-West, 2 Pro-East and 1 neutral.

Since the Committee will not meet again until March 1961, each of the subgroups met separately to begin organizing the distribution of work and planning for the preparation of the annexes so that preliminary drafting can begin following the conclusion of the Eighth Session. The Secretariat will be used as the focal point for the drafting group. The subgroup will meet in March during the Ninth Session to coordinate the work done between sessions and agree on the final content of the proposed draft annexes. Final drafting of both the annexes and the main chapter will be done by the whole Committee as a working group. The agreed upon timetable calls for the report to be submitted to the 17th General Assembly in September 1962.

D. Assembly Report

The Committee drafted its Annual Progress Report for 1960 covering both the Seventh and Eighth Sessions. Appreciation was expressed to WHO, FAO, WEO, and IAEA for their contributions to the work of the Committee during 1960. The Committee made a special comment expressing its satisfaction with the work done by the participants in the seminar on Uses of Vital and Health Statistics for Genetic and Radiation Studies. A report on the Committee's consideration and study of appropriate arrangements for stimulating the flow of information and data, and for encouraging genetic and biological studies as called for in Part V of Resolution 1376 (XIV), was approved and appended to the progress report as an annex.

E. Closing Plenary Session

1. Report of subgroups - Part V of Resolution 1376 (XIV)

The Committee approved a resolution to accept the report of the subgroups for stimulating the flow of information and data and for encouraging genetic and biological studies that will elucidate the effects of radiation exposure on the health of the human population, and to append the report as Annex 1 of the Committee's Annual Progress Report for 1960.

2. Places of Meeting - 1961

The selection of the place of meeting for the Committee's Ninth Session was the most controversial issue before the Committee. Invitations were previously extended to the Committee by the Government of Czechoslovakia and the IAEA to hold the next overseas meeting in Prague and Vienna, respectively. Efforts by the U. S. Representative, during the first week of the meeting, to gather the support of other delegates in favor of accepting the IAEA invitation, met with such strong resistance that further efforts along these lines could only generate sympathy towards Prague. A straw ballot prior to the meeting indicated an 8-7 vote in favor of Geneva. In plenary session, the Representative from Czechoslovakia extended the invitation of his government to hold the Ninth Session in Prague. The Indian Representative then expressed his appreciation and proposed that the Committee accept the invitation. Whereupon the U. S. Representative pointed out the essentiality of the completeness of the 1962 Comprehensive Report and stated that work could be done more efficiently at New York or at the European Headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva. Various representatives then expressed their views on this matter as follows: Sweden, USSR and UAR supported Prague; Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, and U. K. supported the U. N. Headquarters; Belgium, Japan and Mexico made no comments. The USSR Delegate then proposed as a compromise that the Czechoslovakian invitation be kept open after 1961.

At the request of the Czechoslovakian Representative, the Committee recessed for ten minutes. When the Committee reconvened, the Indian Representative supported the adoption of the Soviet Union's compromise proposal to keep the Czechoslovakian invitation open after 1961. The U. S. Representative also supported the Soviet Union proposal but with an amendment that further consideration of the invitation be postponed until after the completion of the 1962 Comprehensive Report. The proposal was then approved by the Committee with 12 votes in favor, no votes against and 3 abstentions. The Committee then approved unanimously a U. K. proposal to request the approval of the General Assembly

to hold its Ninth Session at the U. N. European Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland, from March 13-24, 1961, and its Tenth Session at the U. N. Headquarters, New York, from September 5-15, 1961.

3. Other Matters

The Committee approved the press release prepared by the Secretariat on the Committee's Eighth Session. The Committee also agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that the staff of the Secretariat be increased by one-and-a-half man years to provide technical assistance for the preparation of the 1962 report.

VII. Conclusion

The Eighth Session of the Radiation Committee proceeded smoothly without any political arguments, except for behind-the-scenes maneuvering regarding the meeting place for the Ninth Session. The delegates assembled represented some of the most capable scientists in the field today. The seriousness and enthusiasm with which they approached the work of the Committee was reflected in their dispassionate treatment of problems which have serious political overtones. This was a hard-working session with a very tight agenda, requiring the Committee to meet in full working group during most of the session. The technical discussions were informative and constructive, particularly in terms of preparation for the 1962 Comprehensive Report. The plans laid for the 1962 report were sound and should result in a document which will contribute significantly to world understanding of the effect of radiation on man and his environment.

VIII. Observations

On at least six occasions during the meeting, the USSR Delegation gave the impression that weapons testing may be resumed, but presumably not by them. They made no reference to the disarmament or nuclear testing negotiation, but rather expressed the view that the Committee must, in estimating hazards, consider the effects of future testing. It was also quite evident that the reaction of the Committee towards any Soviet Delegation attempt to exaggerate and highlight the hazards of nuclear tests beyond their proper perspective was negative even to the point of ignoring their comments.

(1a)

DISARMAMENT DOCUMENT SERIES
REF #163
April 19, 1961

DRAFT TREATY TABLED BY THE
U.S.-U.K.

The attached Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons tests was submitted by the delegations of the United States and United Kingdom in Geneva on April 16, 1961. Further revisions in this draft will be circulated as amendments and corrections to this document.

Beatrice R. Puckett
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Ext. 6783

Attachment:

Draft Treaty.

State-~~10~~

~~PRIVATE~~

DRAFT TREATY
ON THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Submitted by the Delegations
of the
United Kingdom and the United States

April 18, 1961

(Note: This draft is based upon an interchange of communications with the U.S. Delegation and not upon the complete tabled draft. Corrections to the text will be issued as necessary.)

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Preamble

The Parties to this Treaty

Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in armaments and in the development of new weapons of war;

Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including the eventual elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions;

Recognizing that the establishment and continuous operation of effective international control is essential to the achievement of this objective;

Hoping that all other countries will also join in undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapon tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation of that control throughout the world;

Confident that a discontinuance of such tests under effective control will make possible progress toward agreement on measures of disarmament

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Obligations to Discontinue

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes:

A. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and

B. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

2. The obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to all nuclear weapon test explosions except those underground explosions which are recorded as seismic events of less than magnitude 4.75.

Article 2

Establishment of Control Organization

1. For the purpose of assuring that the obligations assumed in this Treaty are carried out by the Parties, there is hereby established a Control Organization, hereinafter referred to as "the Organization", upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Treaty and the Annexes thereto.

2. Each of the Parties agrees to cooperate promptly and fully with the Organization established under paragraph 1 of this Article and to assist the Organization in the discharge of its responsibilities pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty and the provisions of any agreements which the Parties shall have concluded with the Organization.

Article 3

Elements of Control Organization

1. The Organization established under Article 2 of this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"; a Detection and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as "the System"; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as "the Administrator"; and a Conference of Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Conference".

2. The Headquarters of the Organization shall be located at Vienna.

Article 4

Composition of Control Commission*

1. The Commission shall consist of the following Parties:

A. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as original Parties to this Treaty; and

B. Eight other Parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference as follows: Three Parties associated with the USSR; two Parties associated with either the United Kingdom or the United States; three Parties not associated with any of the original Parties.

2. The Parties referred to in paragraph 1 B of this Article shall be elected and shall serve for a period of two years; they shall be eligible for re-election.

3. The Parties elected to the first elected Commission shall serve from the time of their election until the end of the third regular session of the Conference. The Parties elected at the third regular session of the Conference, and those elected biennially thereafter, shall serve from the end of the Conference at which they were elected until the end of the Conference which elects their successors.

4. Each member of the Commission shall have one representative.

*The above revised text is submitted in the context of the statements made by the United States and United Kingdom Representatives at the 274th, 286th, and 289th meetings, to the effect that the United States and United Kingdom Governments are prepared to accept the above text provided expressly, and not otherwise, that agreement is reached by this Conference upon a control system which is reliable, rapid and effective - such as is set forth in other articles and annexes of the present draft treaty proposal - and provided that agreement is reached upon all other treaty articles and annexes.

Article 5

Parties or Other Countries

Associated with the Original Parties

The determination whether a Party or other country is at any time to be regarded for the purposes of this Treaty as associated with any of the original Parties shall be made by the Preparatory Commission or the Commission. However, in any case in which advice is jointly tendered by the three original Parties, the determination shall be made in accordance with that advice.

Article 6

Functions of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall establish procedures and standards for the installation and operation of all elements of the System, and shall maintain supervision over the System to ensure its timely installation and effective operation in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its Annexes. The Commission shall determine, after consultation with the Parties concerned, the extent to which existing launching, tracking, and data receiving and transmission facilities should be used in the installation and operation of the satellite systems.

2. A. The Commission shall appoint the Administrator; this appointment shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

B. (i) Subject to the approval of the Commission in each case, the Administrator shall appoint five Deputy Administrators, including one First Deputy Administrator who shall act in place of the Administrator in case of absence or vacancy.

(ii) Approval by the Commission of the appointment of the First Deputy Administrator shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

(iii) Appointment by the Administrator of two Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval, of the Government of the USSR; appointment of the two other Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval, of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

C. The term of office of the Administrator shall be a period of three years. The initial term of office of the First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of two years; subsequently, the term of office of the First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of three years. The term of office of the other Deputy Administrators shall be a period of three years.

D. The Administrator and the Deputy Administrators shall be eligible for reappointment. An Administrator or Deputy Administrator appointed to fill a vacancy which has occurred before the expiration of the term provided for by this Article shall hold office only for the remainder of his predecessor's term but shall be eligible for reappointment.

3. The Commission shall establish procedures for disseminating to all Parties and interested scientific organizations data produced by the System.

4. The Commission shall submit to the Conference an annual report and such special reports as the Commission deems necessary on the operation of the System and on the activities of the Commission and the Administrator in carrying on their respective responsibilities. The Commission shall also prepare for the Conference such reports as the Organization may make to the United Nations.

5. Except for the location of the Headquarters of the Organization, the Commission shall decide upon the location of components of the System. Such decisions shall be taken in agreement with the Party exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the component is to be located. If any location recommended by the Commission should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative location which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

6. The Commission shall lay down permanent flight routes, for use by special aircraft sampling missions, over the territory under the jurisdiction or control of each Party. Such flight routes shall be laid down in agreement with the Party concerned and in accordance with the standards set forth in Article 7 of Annex I. If a permanent flight route which the Commission desires to lay down should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative route which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System.

7. The Commission may conclude agreements with any State or authority to aid in the carrying out of the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

8. The Commission shall ensure that the most effective and up-to-date equipment and techniques are incorporated in the System and, to this end, shall ensure that an adequate research and development program is carried out.

9. The Commission shall establish procedures for the implementation of Article 13 on detonations for peaceful purposes.

10. In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Commission shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 7

Procedures of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

2. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may determine, or within twenty-four hours at the request of any member. All members shall be notified in advance of meetings of the Commission. The meetings shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Commission.

3. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure including the method of selecting its chairman.

4. Any Party to the Treaty which does not have a representative on the Commission may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Commission whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Party are specially affected.

5. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Commission shall be made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote.

Article 8

The Conference

1. The Conference consisting of representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the Administrator at the request of the Commission or of a majority of Parties to the Treaty. The sessions shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Conference.

2. At such sessions, each Party to the Treaty shall be represented by not more than three delegates who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the State concerned.

3. The Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The Conference, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary matters shall be made pursuant to Article 15 and decisions on amendments pursuant to Article 23. Decision on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of the Parties to the Treaty present and voting.

4. The Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this Treaty or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Treaty and may make recommendations to the Parties or to the Commission or to both on any such questions or matters.

5. The Conference shall:

A. Elect States to serve on the Commission in accordance with Article 4;

B. Consider the annual and any special report of the Commission;

C. Approve the budget recommended by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 15;

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D. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by any relationship agreement between the Organization and the United Nations or return them to the Commission with the recommendations of the Conference;

E. Approve any agreement or agreements between the Organization and the United Nations or other organizations as provided in Article 17, or return such agreement with its recommendations to the Commission for re-submission to the Conference;

F. Approve amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 23.

6. The Conference shall have the authority:

A. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Commission;

B. To propose matters for consideration by the Commission and request from the Commission reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Commission.

Article 9

Administrator and International Staff

1. The Administrator shall be the chief executive officer of the System and the head of the staff of the Organization. He shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision, shall carry out its policy directives. He shall have executive responsibility for the installation and operation of the System under procedures and standards established by the Commission. He shall provide to the Commission such advice, reports and assistance as the Commission may request.

2. The Administrator and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions concerning the performance of their duties from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their status as international officials and employees responsible only to the Organization. Each Party undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Administrator and staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

3. Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Administrator shall appoint, organize and direct the staff of the Organization in accordance with the following provisions:

A. The staff shall include such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to carry out the functions of the Organization with the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity.

B. The staffing of individual components of the System shall be designed so as to ensure maximum operating efficiency.

C. In keeping with the foregoing stipulations, the staff of the Organization shall be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible from personnel recommended by, or acceptable to, the governments of the countries of which they are nationals and acceptable to the Administrator, subject to the following provisions:

(1) The permanent administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization shall, as a whole and at all levels, be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals

of other countries. In cases where deputies, other than the Deputy Administrators, to senior officials of the Organization Headquarters are appointed, a national of the USSR shall have a deputy who is a national of the United Kingdom or of the United States, and a national of the United Kingdom or the United States shall have a deputy who is a national of the USSR.

(ii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries. In the appointment of nationals of other countries, preference shall be given, subject to other provisions of sub-paragraph C of this Article, to nationals of countries exercising jurisdiction or control over territory upon which control posts are to be established.

(iii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties, no more than one-third of the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is situated.

(iv) The supporting and auxiliary staffs of each land control post shall, wherever possible, be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is located.

(v) The scientific and technical staffs of control posts on ships or in areas not under the jurisdiction or control of sovereign states and the members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator for the purposes of paragraph 3C of Article 11 of Annex I shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries.

(vi) The chief or acting chief of each control post shall be a national of a country other than that exercising jurisdiction or control over a territory on which the control post is situated. If the country exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory, is associated with an original Party, the chief or acting

chief of the control post shall be a national of other than such original Party or a country associated with it.

(vii) The chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be a national of the USSR, the chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR shall be a national of the United States or the United Kingdom.

(viii) The scientific and technical staffs of on-site inspection groups shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred. The Party exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory may designate one or more observers to accompany the inspection group.

(ix) The scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR shall be composed of nationals of the United States or the United Kingdom; the scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be composed of nationals of the USSR.

(x) The USSR or the United Kingdom and the United States may authorize the Administrator to depart from the requirements of sub-paragraphs (i) through (ix) above, insofar as they concern the appointment of their respective nationals to scientific and technical staff positions, either in favor of the nationals of another Party or other Parties or without restriction. In each case, the original Party or Parties concerned shall furnish the Administrator in writing with the authorization, including the period of its duration. Notwithstanding the authorization made under this paragraph, the nationals so appointed shall be considered, for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (v) to be nationals of the original Party authorizing the departure.

(xi) In making appointments under sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (v), the Administrator shall ensure that the administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization, and the scientific and technical staff of each control post, shall be so composed that the total number of nationals of the USSR and of countries associated with it shall be equal to the total number of nationals of the United States and the United Kingdom and of countries associated with either of them.

(xii) Any adjustment to the proportions in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (v) above, which may be unavoidable for practical reasons, shall be kept to the minimum, and a compensating adjustment shall, whenever possible, be made elsewhere in the System.

D. Regulations governing the appointment, remuneration and dismissal of staff shall be approved by the Commission.

4. The Administrator shall prepare for the Commission the budget estimates of the Organization,

5. The Administrator shall develop and arrange for the execution of a program of research and development for the continuing improvement of the equipment and techniques used in all components of the System, and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Commission regarding improvements to be incorporated in the System. The program may, with the approval of the Commission, include detonations performed to test the effectiveness of the System. Any nuclear detonations for this purpose shall be conducted under the procedures set forth in Article 13.

6. The Administrator shall prepare recommendations for approval by the Commission regarding:

- A. specific sites for all components of the System
- B. specific flight patterns for routine air sampling flights.
- C. the number and base location of inspection groups
- D. the equipping of all components of the System and the standards and specifications which equipment to be used therein must meet.

7. A. When special aircraft sampling missions are undertaken, the Administrator shall appoint two qualified members of the Organization staff to accompany each aircraft as technical operators. The technical operators shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Annex I, verify the execution of the agreed flight plan; operate the sampling equipment; direct sampling operation; make appropriate arrangements for the safe delivery to the Organization of the samples collected; and report on the mission to the Administrator.

B. (i) The technical operators shall not be nationals of

(a) any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred, or of

(b) any original Party who may be associated with the Party in paragraph 7 B (i)(a) of this Article, or of

(c) any Party who may be associated with any original Party to which paragraphs 7 B (i)(a) or 7 B (i)(b) of this Article may refer;

nor, subject to the provisions of subparagraph B(ii), shall they be nationals of any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in the air space over which samples may be taken.

(ii) On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR, the technical operators shall be nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States. On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom or the United States, the technical operators shall be nationals of the USSR.

C. Any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred or in the air space over which samples are to be taken may designate an observer to accompany the technical operators on the flight.

8. The Administrator shall determine when special aircraft sampling missions are required in accordance with the terms of Article 7 of Annex I and shall have authority to order the despatch of such missions. For missions whose purpose is the collection of samples over the territory of a

Party or Parties, the Administrator shall select routes from among the permanent flight routes laid down by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 6; before despatch of the mission, the Administrator shall notify all Parties over whose territories it will fly and shall inform them of the routes selected.

9. The Administrator shall forward to the Commission within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by inspection teams and special aircraft missions, together with any relevant data and analyses.

10. The Administrator shall encourage and facilitate the participation by personnel of components of the System in programs of basic scientific research, to the extent that such participation would not interfere with their primary duties.

11. In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Administrator shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 10

On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A. The Administrator shall certify immediately by public notice at the Headquarters of the Organization whenever he determines that an event eligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I has occurred. This certification shall include a specification of the time of origin and location of the seismic event, the area eligible for inspection (hereinafter referred to as the "certified area"), and the data and analysis upon which the determination of eligibility was made. The Administrator shall make every effort to make this certification within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event.

B. Whenever the Administrator is informed through the Organization that a seismic event of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above which is located by the system has occurred, and if the event is not immediately rendered ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I, he immediately shall make public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to such a seismic event which could be of assistance

(i) to any Party exercising its right to request an on-site inspection under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, or

(ii) to the Commission in its decision whether to issue a directive under paragraph 4 of this Article.

The Administrator shall make every effort to make this data public within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of all events referred to in this sub-paragraph, except for those events which have subsequently been found ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with sub-paragraphs 3 C and 3 D of Article 8 of Annex I.

2. A. If any portion of the certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the Administrator shall immediately despatch an inspection group to carry out an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area in accordance with Annex I, provided that:

(i) The USSR requests the inspection of such portion of the certified area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom or the United States, and the current annual number of inspections for the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, or

(ii) The United Kingdom or the United States requests the inspection of such portion of the certified

area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR and the current annual number of inspections for the USSR is not exhausted; and

(iii) The request for inspection is made to the Administrator not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public all data relating to the seismic event in question, as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article,

B. An original Party requesting an on-site inspection pursuant to this paragraph shall simultaneously inform the other original Parties.

A. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, any Party may, not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article, request the Commission to direct an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area.

B. The Commission shall consider and decide upon any such request within forty-eight hours after its receipt. If a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of more than one Party, other than an original Party, the Commission shall make a separate decision as to the inspection of that portion of the certified area on the territory of each Party concerned. If the current annual number of inspections of the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, and if the Commission decides that the request to direct an on-site inspection should be complied with, the Commission shall direct the Administrator to carry out an on-site inspection of the certified area lying in that Party's territory in accordance with Annex I.

C. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party represented on the Commission, that Party shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

D. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party associated with an original Party, that original Party and Parties associated with it which are represented on the Commission shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

4. A. If any portion of a certified area lies in an area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, the Administrator shall decide whether to undertake an on-site inspection. The Administrator shall notify the Commission of his decision whether to undertake an on-site inspection and shall make every effort to do so within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event. After the Administrator notifies the Commission that he has decided to undertake an on-site inspection, he shall proceed to have the inspection carried out unless he is otherwise directed by the Commission within forty-eight hours of such notification.

B. The Commission may direct the Administrator to inspect a certified area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, if the Administrator has not already proceeded to do so, not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article.

C. All on-site inspections under this paragraph shall be carried out in accordance with Annex I.

5. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under the jurisdiction or control of each of the original Parties, pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be twenty inspections in each annual period.

6. A. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in each annual period in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, shall be, with respect to each such Party, two, or such higher number as the Commission may, after consultation with the Party, determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

B. Pending the determination of a Party's number by the Commission, the provisional number for that Party shall be one inspection in each annual period for each 500,000 square kilometers or remaining fraction thereof of territory under its jurisdiction or control, except that for each Party the provisional number shall be at least two inspections in each annual period. Inspections carried out under a Party's provisional number shall be deducted from the number subsequently determined for that Party for the annual period in which such inspections were initiated. In the case of acceding Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall, after consultation with such Parties, promptly recommend, for subsequent approval by the enlarged Preparatory Commission, an appropriate number of inspections to be carried out in each annual period within territory under the jurisdiction or control of such Parties.

7. The number of on-site inspections for each Party shall be reviewed by the Commission within three years after this Treaty enters into force and annually thereafter. In light of

each such review, which shall take full account of practical experience in the operation of the System and of measures taken to maintain or improve its effectiveness, the Commission may fix revised numbers, provided that no number:

A. shall be less than two, nor;

B. less than twenty per cent of the average annual number of events of seismic magnitude 4.75 or above which are located by the System in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of Annex I (provided that when criteria for the identification of seismic events eligible for on-site inspections are agreed no less than thirty per cent of the events remaining unidentified after the application of such criteria) occurring in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Party to which the number relates.

Such average annual number shall be based on data from control posts and research programs undertaken by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 for a period prescribed by the Commission.

8. The liability of a Party to on-site inspections pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article shall commence from the date on which the Treaty enters into force for that Party. The annual period in which the number of on-site inspections for each Party may be carried out shall commence on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter on the anniversary of that date in each succeeding year. In the case of a Party which deposits its instruments of ratification or acceptance after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under its jurisdiction or control in the period remaining before the next anniversary of the date of entry into force of the Treaty shall bear the same proportion to its number determined in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, as that period bears to one year, but shall not be less than two. If the number of on-site inspections calculated in accordance with the preceding sentence includes a fraction, that fraction shall, if it is smaller than one-half, be disregarded, or, if it is one-half or greater, be regarded as equivalent to one.

9. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the Commission may direct the Administrator to carry out on-site inspection in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any Party either at the request of such Party or pursuant to an agreement made by such Party prior to or subsequent to signature of the Treaty. Inspections carried out under this paragraph shall not be deducted from a Party's number. Inspections carried out pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall take priority over inspections carried out under this paragraph.

10. The Administrator shall make available to all Parties to the Treaty within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by on-site inspection groups, together with any relevant data and analyses.

Article II

Installation and Operation of the System in Parties' Territories

Each of the original Parties and all other Parties to this Treaty agree to accept on territory under their jurisdiction or control components of the System which is established on the basis of the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group Two Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959, and shall be installed and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 12

Undertakings Concerning Co-operation with the System

1. Each of the Parties undertakes to assure that adequate and expeditious transportation is available from the point of entry, or within its territory, to the site of any element of the System or any area where an on-site inspection is to be conducted.
2. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing meteorological and commercial aircraft flights over ocean areas for routine air-sampling purposes.
3. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission to have aircraft immediately available for special flights, carried out pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 and Article 7 of Annex I, over territory under its jurisdiction or control or to permit such special flights by aircraft forming part of the System.
4. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing weather or geophysical exploration vessels for use as components of the System.
5. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection groups, despatched pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection group and to give such groups the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.
6. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission: for the design, construction, and provision of necessary satellite vehicles; for the provision and use of launching sites and launching vehicles; for the establishment and operation of stations to track satellites and to receive and analyze data from such satellites; and for the establishment and carrying out of a research program to measure background levels in space and to develop the necessary equipment and techniques to put effective space monitoring control systems into operation.

Article 13

Detonations for Peaceful Purposes

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to detonate, or assist others in the detonation of, nuclear devices for peaceful purposes only in accordance with the provisions of this Article. The detonations carried out pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall not be regarded as a violation of Article 1.

2. A Party intending to carry out or assist in such a detonation shall provide the Commission, at least four months in advance of the proposed detonation date, with a plan containing the following information:

A. The date, site and purpose of the proposed detonation;

B. The procedure it will follow to comply with paragraph 4 of this Article;

C. The expected yield of the device;

D. The measures to be taken to ensure that there will be no substantial fallout outside the immediate vicinity; and

E. The measurements to be taken and any experimentation to be conducted therewith.

3. Within two months after the receipt of the plan, the Commission shall authorize the Party to proceed with, or assist in, the proposed detonation, unless the Commission shall find that such detonation would not be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article. If, as a result of observations at the proposed site, the Commission determines that there is a lack of compliance with paragraph 4, it shall immediately so notify the Party planning to conduct or assist in the detonation. The Party shall thereupon refrain from carrying out or assisting in the detonation until notified by the Commission that it has determined that the detonation will be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4.

4. Each of the original Parties shall be given an adequate opportunity at a designated inspection site to inspect externally and internally any nuclear device to be detonated pursuant to this Article and to examine detailed drawings of the device, provided that such detailed drawings may not be reproduced or taken away from the inspection site. The device to be detonated shall, after inspection and reassembly, be under the continual surveillance of members of the Organization staff until detonation.

5. Members of the Organization staff shall, in addition to maintaining surveillance of the device to be detonated, observe all preparation for, and the actual firing of, the device and shall at all times have unrestricted access to the vicinity of the detonation to ensure that the device employed is the one provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.

6. Representatives of the original Parties shall be given adequate opportunity to accompany and to participate with members of the Organization staff in the exercise of their functions under paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article.

7. The Commission may, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, provide for any other system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes are carried out in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.

Article 14

Periodic Review of the System

1. Three years after the coming into force of this Treaty, the Commission shall review the System established under this Treaty in order to:

A. evaluate its effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations set forth in Articles 1 and 13 of this Treaty;

B. determine in the light of experience and scientific progress whether any specific improvements should be made or new elements added to the System;

C. consider such measures to improve or maintain the effectiveness of the System as may be proposed by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the operation of the Treaty.

2. The System may be reviewed by the Commission annually thereafter for the same purpose upon request of the Conference or any of the original Parties.

Article 15

Finance

1. Annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization shall be submitted to the Commission by the Administrator. After receipt of these estimates, the Commission shall submit a proposed budget to the Conference. The Conference may approve the budget as submitted or return it to the Commission with recommendations. If the budget is returned, the Commission shall then submit a further budget to the Conference for its approval.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Parties in accordance with a scale fixed by the Conference on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Commission as part of each annual budget. The annual contributions of the USSR and the United States shall be equal.

3. Any Party desiring to pay its assessments, in whole or in part, by supplying materials, services, equipment or facilities shall make its offer in writing to the Commission. Within ninety days after receipt of the offer, the Commission shall determine whether to accept the offer, in whole or in part, and shall notify the Party of its decision. The Commission shall not accept such an offer unless the materials, services, equipment or facilities offered by the Party meet the standards prescribed by the Commission and are readily usable.

4. Subject to the rules and limitations approved by the Conference, the Commission shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Organization without, however, imposing on the Parties to this Treaty any individual liability in respect of a loan or loans entered into pursuant to this authority.

5. Decisions of the Commission and of the Conference on all financial questions shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. However, decisions by the Commission on the scale of contributions to be recommended and on the total amount of each annual budget shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

Article 16

Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Organization, its staff and the representatives of Parties shall be granted by the Parties, and the legal capacity which the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties, shall be as set forth in Annex II of this Treaty.

Article 17

Relationships with Other International Organizations

1. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Organization and the United Nations.

2. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, shall arrange for the Organization to be brought into an appropriate relationship with any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament and arms control measures.

Article 18

Annexes

The Annexes to this Treaty form an integral part of this Treaty.

Article 19

Parties to the Treaty

1. The essential Parties to this Treaty shall be:

A. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, referred to herein as the "original Parties";

B. Any other State whose adherence is decided by the Commission to be necessary for the achievement of the fundamental Treaty purpose of securing an effectively controlled permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions on a world-wide basis or to permit the installation of elements of control as required by the provisions of Annex I. If any State which is proposed to be the subject of a decision in accordance with the preceding sentence is associated with an original Party for the purposes of this Treaty, that original Party and any State associated with it for the purposes of this Treaty shall abstain from voting in the decision.

2. The signature and ratification or the acceptance of this Treaty by all the States designated in paragraph 1 A and any State whose adherence is decided to be necessary in accordance with paragraph 1 B shall be required for the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article.

3. Any other State desiring to adhere, whose adherence the Preparatory Commission or the Commission decides would contribute to the achievement of the purposes of this Treaty, may become a Party.

Article 20

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance and Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by the States referred to in paragraph 1 A of Article 19. The signatory States shall become Parties to this Treaty by deposit of instruments of ratification.

2. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance by States adhering pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19 shall be deposited with the Government of the _____, hereby designated as Depositary Government.

3. Ratification or acceptance of this Treaty shall be effected by States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

4. This Treaty, apart from Annex III, shall enter into force when all the original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification thereof.

5. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatory States of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each instrument of acceptance and the date of entry into force of this Treaty. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all Parties of the dates on which States become Parties to this Treaty.

6. Annex III of this Treaty shall come into force on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by the original Parties.

Article 21

Registration

1. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Agreements between the Organization and any Party to this Treaty or any other State or public international organization shall be submitted for registration by the Commission with the United Nations.

Article 22

Duration

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

Article 23

Amendments

Amendments to this Treaty and its Annexes shall enter into force for all Parties to the Treaty when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Conference and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including all the original Parties.

Article 24

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States which become Parties to this Treaty pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one.

ANNEX I

DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

PART I -- DESCRIPTION

Article I

The System established in this Treaty shall include the features set forth herein which are derived from the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group II Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959.

Article 2

1. The System shall, when completely established and unless otherwise decided in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, consist of the following components: A headquarters, regional offices, land control posts and shipbased control posts, systems of satellites, radiochemistry laboratories, air and water sampling facilities, on-site inspection facilities, and communications facilities. Upon recommendation of the Administrator, the Commission may decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to add components as may be appropriate for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

2. The general characteristics of the System shall be as follows:

A. The land control posts shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of acoustic waves, seismic waves, electromagnetic signals, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, and cosmic noise absorption.

B. A number of control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall be equipped, in addition to the methods mentioned in paragraph 2 A of this Article, with apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves. Certain control posts in areas not covered by existing weather stations (e.g. Southern Hemisphere) shall include meteorological equipment and personnel necessary to obtain data on air mass movements in order to predict the course of any air mass suspected to contain debris from nuclear explosions.

C. Control posts located on ships, which shall be stationed within specified ocean areas, shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. The methods of recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

D. Aircraft and vessels for air and water sampling operations shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris from the air and from the water.

E. On-site inspection groups shall be appropriately manned and equipped to carry out on-site inspections to determine the nature of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions.

F. Satellites in terrestrial and solar orbits shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for recording delayed and prompt gamma rays, X-rays, neutrons, and electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field.

G. Suitably located ground stations shall be equipped to launch, track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

PART II -- COMPONENTS

Article 3

Headquarters

1. The Headquarters of the System shall include directorates for Administration, for Supply, for Technical Operations and for Field Operations. Technical Operations shall be comprised of

a Research and Development Center and a Data Analysis Center which shall include a Central Radiochemical Laboratory. Field Operations shall be comprised of a Central Inspection Office, a Communications Center and an Operations Center which shall include a Weather Center. Administration shall include offices for Finance and Personnel; and Supply shall include offices for System Construction and for Supply and Maintenance.

2. The Research and Development Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to conduct, either directly or by contract, research and development programs for developing and improving equipment and techniques for detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

3. The Data Analysis Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities for evaluating all data received from components of the System. All data from the components of the System shall be reported directly to the Data Analysis Center, whose functions shall include:

A. To analyze all data received from all components of the System.

B. To determine and report strictly on the basis of this analysis the time and place of occurrence and the magnitude or equivalent yield of:

(i) an event for which the data is sufficient to establish its nature as a nuclear explosion.

(ii) an event which is identifiable on the basis of the data as a natural geophysical disturbance.

(iii) an event which is not identifiable on the basis of the data as natural and which therefore could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion.

C. To examine continuously the work of the components of the System to ensure the maintenance of a high degree of technical proficiency.

4. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to perform radiochemical and physical analyses of samples received from control posts, ships, aerial sampling centers or other components of the System. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall analyze the samples for fission products and other nuclides to confirm the origin of the debris as being from a nuclear detonation as opposed to some other type of nuclear reaction. In addition,

the Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall review for accuracy the findings of these components of the System concerning the characteristics and age of any nuclear debris involved. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall also be responsible for developing test procedures for use at field laboratories as required to ensure uniformity in analysis and measurement techniques throughout the System.

5. The Central Inspection Office shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to direct on-site inspection of events which cannot be identified as natural events and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. The Central Inspection Office shall organize and maintain inspection groups on an alert basis and shall be responsible, when so directed, for the dispatch of these groups to areas designated for inspection as soon as possible following notification by the Administrator. For these purposes the Central Inspection Office shall be responsible for:

A. Rapid development of a plan for movement of the inspection group to the area of the event in consultation with the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the inspection is to take place;

B. Rapid movement of inspection personnel and equipment to the area;

C. Direction of the inspection groups and for the conduct of the inspection in the suspect area, including provisions for additional staff, equipment and supplies deemed necessary by the inspection group.

6. The Communications Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to ensure rapid and reliable communications with control posts, ships, aerial sampling centers, regional offices, and satellite tracking stations. "Rapid and reliable communications" is defined as such a communications network as will ensure an exchange of accurate and complete messages with any of the components of the System within eight hours.

7. The Operations Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to control all field operations, excluding on-site inspection. The Operations Center shall control the launching and positioning of satellites, as well as the movement of aircraft, vessels, equipment and personnel which are deployed for the purpose of conducting air and water sampling operations. It shall maintain complete and current information

on the operational status of each component of the System, including aerial sampling flights over the oceans and over territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties to this Treaty. The Operations Center will ensure that steps are taken to maintain all components of the System at all times in a high state of operational readiness to perform their assigned functions.

8. The Weather Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to prepare forecasts of air mass trajectories from any point at which a nuclear explosion is suspected to have occurred for use in vectoring aerial sampling flights to intercept these air masses. The Weather Center shall be provided by wire or radio with weather data from existing national weather networks under the control of the Parties. Appropriate arrangements shall be made for other national or international networks to supply weather data to the Weather Center by wire or radio. In addition, the Weather Center shall be provided with weather data from special weather detachments established in accordance with paragraph 2 B of Article 2 of this Annex.

Article 4

Regional Offices

1. Regional Offices shall be established as the Commission determines to be necessary for the effective administration and operation of the System.

2. Each Regional Office shall perform the following functions:

A. Provide logistic support to and administrative supervision over components of the System operating in its region;

B. Provide necessary support and administrative assistance to inspection groups operating in its region;

C. Maintain liaison with national and local authorities in its region in connection with its performance of the above functions and in particular to ensure the expeditious transportation and local support of inspection groups.

Article 5

Land Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established include at least 170 land control posts. Unless otherwise determined under paragraph 2 below, the spacing between control posts shall be about 1700 kilometers in continental aseismic areas, about 1000 kilometers in continental seismic areas, and between 1000 and about 3500 kilometers in ocean areas.

2. The number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States shall be as specified in Article 17 of this Annex. Except for the number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States, the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the foregoing standards of spacing, the number of control posts to be installed in other territories under the jurisdiction or control of the original Parties and all territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties to the Treaty. With the approval of the Commission and of the Party concerned, the control posts may be arranged in an alternative distribution within territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party if, in the view of the Commission, such a redistribution will result in an improvement in the capabilities of the System.

3. Specific sites for control posts shall be selected in a manner to give the maximum over-all capability to the System. The siting of individual control posts shall be determined primarily on the basis of the seismic requirement. However, in the event that two or more suitable seismic sites are found in the desired areas, a final selection of the location of the control posts shall be made with due consideration of siting requirements of the other methods of detection set forth in Article 2 of this Annex. In the event that no control post location fulfilling seismic requirements is found that permits satisfactory operation of other detection equipment as set forth in this Annex, the Administrator may direct the installation of such equipment at a more favorable location. In the event that after a control post is established, the background seismic noise increases above acceptable limits due to human or other activity, the Administrator, after consultation with the Party, may direct that the control post may be moved to another location.

4. All land control posts shall maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, cosmic noise absorption, acoustic waves, seismic waves and electromagnetic signals. Control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall, in addition, maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves. In addition, equipment may be operated at certain land control posts to track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

Article 6

Ship-Based Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established, include a system of ship-based control posts, which shall be employed in ocean areas which do not contain suitable islands. There shall be a sufficient number of ships to maintain a capability for continuous operation of four stations each in the North Pacific and South Pacific Oceans and one station each in the North Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

2. Ship-based control posts shall maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. Equipment for recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

Article 7

Air and Water Sampling Operations

1. Daily routine air sampling flights shall be conducted at several different altitudes over ocean areas in approximately a north-south direction near the sides of continents, as well as in the center of remote ocean areas such as the Central Pacific, the Indian Ocean west of Australia and the North Atlantic Ocean, for the purpose of detecting nuclear explosions by the method of collecting radioactive debris.

2. Special aircraft sampling flights shall be conducted to search for a possible radioactive cloud for the purpose of collecting samples of radioactive debris within two to five days after the date of origin of the debris. Special sampling flights shall be initiated whenever fresh radioactive debris has been detected by a routine air sampling flight or by a control post or when acoustic signals recorded at control posts establish the time and position of a possible explosion in the atmosphere. In each instance, the flight routes of the aircraft shall be selected on the basis of meteorological trajectory forecasts from the location of the suspected event, and the aircraft shall search at several different altitudes.

3. Special aircraft flights undertaken over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be conducted, on instruction of the Administrator in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, over permanent flight routes as set out by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty. Such permanent flight routes shall be laid down in advance in such number and geographical location that, according to meteorological data, interception of any cloud containing radioactive debris will be assured within two to five days of the suspected event. Sampling aircraft to be used over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be located in or near permanent flight routes and shall be maintained in a high state of operational readiness to conduct the sampling flights directed by the Administrator.

4. Special aircraft flights over ocean areas shall be conducted from aircraft sampling centers distributed uniformly throughout the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. When the area to be covered by such flights is remote from any one of the centers, operations will be staged out of the nearest air field, and necessary supplies which cannot be procured locally will be airlifted from the nearest center.

5. Water sampling operations, by ships and/or aircraft, shall be conducted for the purpose of collecting samples of water suspected of containing radioactive debris whenever hydroacoustic signals recorded at control posts establish the time and position of a possible underwater explosion. Suitably equipped aircraft and/or vessels shall be deployed in such a manner that water sampling operations can be conducted at the site of the event within four days after such operations are directed by the Administrator.

6. A. Radiochemical laboratories shall be located at each of the aerial sampling centers established in accordance with paragraph 4 above. Laboratories at aerial sampling

centers shall be equipped to carry out all the necessary radiochemical analytical techniques required to determine the presence of fresh debris and to ascertain the date of origin of the debris with a precision consistent with the most modern radiochemical dating techniques. This shall be done by using as many dating techniques as sample-size and age of the debris permit.

B. Upon termination of a sampling flight, samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments, for example gamma spectrometers. Samples shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory, and the other part shall be sent to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for further analysis with an indication as to which are suspected of containing fresh fission products.

C. Water samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments as soon as practicable following sample collection, and those samples suspected of containing fresh fission products shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory and the other to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for analysis.

Article 8

Criteria for On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A seismic event which is located by the criteria in paragraph 2 of this Article and which is determined to be of seismic magnitude 4.75 or greater shall be eligible for on-site inspection unless rendered ineligible for inspection by the fulfillment of any of the criteria in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. A seismic event shall be considered to be located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations, and velocities are consistent with those of the waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of control posts to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. These four consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different control posts.

3. A located seismic event shall be ineligible for inspection if, and only if, it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:

A. its depth of focus is established as below sixty kilometers;

B. its epicentral location is established to be in the deep open ocean, and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustic signal consistent with the seismic epicenter and origin time;

C. it is established to be a foreshock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose, a "foreshock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than forty-eight hours before the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock;

D. it is established to be an aftershock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose, an "aftershock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than one week after the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock.

4. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are available, and where consistent arrival times are available from control posts surrounding the epicenter, that is, from control posts at least one of which lies in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter, the area eligible for inspection will be 200 square kilometers. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are not available, or where data from control posts lying in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter are not available, an area of 500 square kilometers shall be eligible for inspection. The area eligible for inspection shall be chosen so as to have the highest likelihood of containing the epicenter.

5. The basic data for all criteria shall be obtained from control posts.

6. Within three years after the entry into force of this Treaty and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the provisions of this Article. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 23, the Commission may at any time, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, amend the provisions of this Article. Such amendments shall be binding on all

Parties to this Treaty.

Article 9

A Seismic Event Equal to or Greater than Magnitude 4.75

1. "A seismic event equal to or greater than magnitude 4.75" is a seismic event whose apparent magnitude M as measured by the formula M equals Q plus $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$ is equal to or greater than 4.75 at one-half or more of the control posts which measure the quantity "A" and which are located at distances greater than 16 degrees and less than 90 degrees from the epicenter. The symbols in the formula M equals Q plus $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$ are defined as follows:

A. "A" is one-half of the maximum peak positive to negative amplitude (displacement), expressed in microns in the record of the first five cycles of the P-waves made by a short-period, vertical-component seismograph with characteristics which will permit operation of single seismometers at quiet stations with magnification greater than ten to the sixth power at the frequency of peak response. "A" is measured if it exceeds three times the arithmetical mean of the ten greatest peak amplitudes of the noise oscillations recorded during the preceding two minutes. Noises, the periods of which differ from the signal period by not more than one and one-half times, are counted. The noise amplitude and period are determined by the same procedure as for the signal.

B. "T" is the time, measured in seconds, between the first of the peaks used in determining "A" and the next following peak of the same sign.

C. "G" is the steady state magnification of the seismograph at period T.

D. "Q" is given as a function of distance in the following table:

<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>Q</u>
16 Degrees	5.9	41 Degrees	6.5	66 Degrees	7.0
17	5.9	42	6.5	67	7.0
18	5.9	43	6.5	68	7.0
19	6.0	44	6.5	69	7.0
20	6.0	45	6.7	70	6.9
21	6.1	46	6.8	71	6.9
22	6.2	47	6.9	72	6.9
23	6.3	48	6.9	73	6.9
24	6.3	49	6.8	74	6.8
25	6.5	50	6.7	75	6.8
26	6.4	51	6.7	76	6.9
27	6.5	52	6.7	77	6.9
28	6.6	53	6.7	78	6.9
29	6.6	54	6.8	79	6.8
30	6.6	55	6.8	80	6.7
31	6.7	56	6.8	81	6.8
32	6.7	57	6.8	82	6.9
33	6.7	58	6.8	83	7.0
34	6.7	59	6.8	84	7.0
35	6.7	60	6.8	85	7.0
36	6.6	61	6.9	86	6.9
37	6.5	62	7.0	87	7.0
38	6.5	63	6.9	88	7.1
39	6.4	64	7.0	89	7.0
40	6.4	65	7.0	90	7.0

Article 10

Inspection Groups

1. Inspection groups shall be established and maintained to conduct on-site inspections as directed by the Administrator. They shall be based at a number of locations sufficient to insure prompt arrival and logistical support at the site of any unidentified continental or maritime event. Inspection groups shall be responsible for the collection and preliminary evaluation of evidence concerning the nature of the event in question. They shall remain in the inspection area until recalled by the Administrator.

2. Each inspection group shall be staffed with scientific, technical and other personnel qualified to perform the duties required in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

3. Each inspection group shall, when dispatched, conduct any inspection directed by the Administrator in a prompt and efficient manner and shall be authorized to:

A. Establish a local base of operations.

B. Establish and maintain communications with its permanent base, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other components of the System.

C. Consult with local officials and individuals.

D. Conduct low-altitude aerial inspection of the area eligible for inspection, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including, photographic, electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared and radioactivity surveys.

E. Conduct surface and subsurface inspection in the area eligible for inspection for all evidence which may in any way relate to the nature of the event, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including drilling for radioactive samples for scientific analysis.

F. Utilize such other means of investigation on site as would be likely to produce relevant data.

4. Each inspection group shall submit to the Administrator periodic progress reports during the course of any inspection and a final report upon the conclusion of the inspection operation. Copies of these reports shall be sent to the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the inspection is being or has been carried out.

5. Each inspection group shall have available for its use the technical apparatus and facilities necessary for the performance of a prompt and efficient inspection operation. Such apparatus and facilities shall include the following:

A. Portable seismographs for recording after-shocks, geophysical equipment for seismic profiling, detection equipment for locating metallic articles, radiation detectors, equipment for collecting radioactive samples on the surface, drilling equipment for obtaining underground radioactive samples, portable laboratory equipment for field radiochemical analysis, and photographic equipment.

B. Appropriate surface and air transport for rapid movement to an inspection area along routes prescribed by the host country, and for the operation and logistics of the inspection group.

C. Appropriate aircraft for the conduct of low-altitude aerial reconnaissance of the inspection area for evidence of the nature of the event in question.

D. Appropriate vessels for the conduct of inspection of maritime events.

E. Technically suitable and reliable communications equipment to establish and maintain contact with its permanent base of operations, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other System components.

Article 11

High Altitude Systems

1. The high altitude systems, which are based upon the recommendations contained in the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions", of July 15, 1959, are established for the purpose of providing, when in effective operation, a level of capability not less than that estimated by the Technical Working Group in sections A and B of their Report. The techniques and instrumentation for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes shall comprise apparatus installed at control posts and ground stations as specified in Articles 2, 5 and 6 of this Annex, together with satellite systems.

Satellite systems shall be so positioned in orbits as to provide maximum capability for detecting nuclear explosions as follows:

A. One or more satellites (trapped-electron satellites) placed in an appropriate terrestrial elliptical orbit and suitably instrumented with counters for recording electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record or transmit the required data to ground stations.

B. At least six satellites (far-earth satellites) placed in terrestrial orbits at altitudes of more

than 30,000 kilometers so as to be continuously outside the earth's trapped radiation belts. Three of the satellites shall be nearly equally spaced in the same orbital plane, and three satellites shall be similarly placed in a second orbital plane positioned at approximately right angles to the first. Each satellite shall be suitably equipped with instruments for recording prompt and delayed gamma rays, X-rays, and neutrons. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data from any three of the four methods of detection as set forth in this sub-paragraph. In addition, satellites shall be replaced when the System

(i) no longer provides complete surveillance of the earth, or

(ii) no longer provides surveillance in all directions in space lying outside the orbits of the System's component satellites by means of the X-ray detection method from at least three satellites.

C. At least four satellites (solar satellites) placed in appropriate solar orbits and suitably equipped with instruments, including those for recording X-rays. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data on X-ray signals.

2. Each satellite requiring replacement shall be replaced as rapidly as possible.

3. Each satellite shall carry apparatus for verifying the performance of its equipment. Each satellite shall be inspected immediately prior to launching to ensure its instruments meet the detection requirements and that the satellite includes nothing which might interfere with the performance of its equipment. After inspection, the launching of each satellite shall be observed. This inspection and the subsequent observation of the launching of the satellite shall be performed by members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator in accordance with the principles set forth in sub-paragraph 3 C (v) of Article 9.

PART III - DATA REPORTING AND EVALUATION

Article 12

1. All components of the System shall immediately examine all records obtained. When data which meet criteria established by the Headquarters of the System are observed, they shall be reported by wire or radio to the Data Analysis Center. All components of the System shall provide additional data to the Center upon its request. In addition, all original data and records obtained by all components of the System shall be forwarded expeditiously to the Headquarters of the System. Reliable electronic transmission of data and frequent collection of records and materials by aircraft shall be incorporated in the reporting system.

2. The equipment at control posts, ships, satellite tracking and data transmitting and receiving stations, and air and water sampling centers shall be examined periodically by technical personnel from the Headquarters of the System for the purpose of ensuring the validity of the data transmitted from these components to Headquarters.

PART IV -- SUPPORT FACILITIES

Article 13

Communications

The System shall have rapid and reliable communications between its components and Headquarters and shall have the right to install, maintain and operate communications facilities, including radio networks, using existing channels when they are suitable for this purpose. The network must be capable of ensuring an exchange of accurate and complete messages between the Headquarters and any component of the System within eight hours. Provisions shall be made for the receipt of standard time signals by all components of the System which record geophysical data. Provisions shall also be made for transmission to the System Headquarters of all weather data required by the Weather Center as set forth in paragraph 8 of Article 3 of this Annex.

Article 14

Supplies and Services

1. The System Headquarters shall manage resources of the System for supplies and services by such means as: establishing procurement, construction and transportation criteria; publishing instructions for operation and maintenance of equipment; receiving and processing supply and maintenance reports from the elements of the System and establishing specification and performance standards for equipment.

2. The System Headquarters shall ensure that technical equipment meets required performance standards before authorizing acceptance of the equipment for use in the System.

3. Maximum use shall be made of sources of supply of non-technical equipment indigenous to the area where facilities of the System are located. Support equipment and supplies shall be locally procured where possible by the Regional Offices or control posts.

Article 15

System Phasing

The controls provided for in this Treaty shall be progressively extended, and the components of the System installed in three phases, in order to achieve and ensure world-wide compliance with the obligations of this Treaty. The sub-phases of Phase I shall begin within three months after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-Phase I-A shall be completed within two years after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-Phase I-B shall be completed within four years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase II shall begin within one year after the Treaty enters into force, and shall be completed within five years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase III shall begin within two years after the Treaty enters into force and shall be completed within six years after the Treaty enters into force. Each control post and each other facility shall be put into operation, in whole or in part, as it is installed, and the System shall be fully operational within six years after the Treaty enters into force. The Commission may, however, decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to postpone, add to, or refrain from establishing any part of Phases I, II, and III.

Article 16

Phasing of Headquarters

The Headquarters of the System shall be established at the beginning of Phase I and shall be expanded through Phase I and subsequent phases as required to provide effective administration and operation of the System.

Article 17

Control Post Phasing

Land control posts and control posts on ships shall be established as follows:

	<u>Phase I</u>		<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>		
USSR	9	9	-	-
U.S.	6	4	-	-
U.K.	1	-	-	-
Oceanic Islands	20	-	16	24
Ships	10	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	4	3
Asia (Non-USSR)	-	-	21	-
Europe (Non-USSR)	-	-	3	-
North America and Greenland	-	-	14	-
Africa	-	-	7	9
South America	-	-	6	10
Antarctica	-	-	-	4
	46	13	71	50

Article 18

Aircraft Sampling Phasing

Aircraft sampling facilities shall be established and made fully operational within two years after the Treaty enters into force.

Article 19

Satellite Systems Phasing

Subject to the provisions of Article 11 of this Annex, satellite systems shall be installed as follows:

	<u>Phase I</u>		<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>		
Trapped Electron Satellites	1	-	-	-
Far-Earth Satellites	-	6	-	-
Solar Satellites	-	-	-	-
	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>4</u>

Article 20

Inspection Group Phasing

Inspection groups shall be established from the beginning of Phase I. A sufficient number of groups shall be maintained to carry out inspections at any time in the numbers which, in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its Annexes, may currently be required.

Article 21

Communications Phasing

A survey of communications requirements shall be performed at the beginning of each phase. Elements of the communications system shall be timed to be operational so as to ensure rapid and reliable communications for each control post or other component of the System as soon as such post or other component becomes operational.

Annex II

Privileges and Immunities

Article 1 Definitions

In this Annex:

(1) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty" includes representatives on or to any organ of the Organization established under the provisions of this Treaty, including the Conference, together with the members of their official staffs.

(2) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission" includes all members of the official staffs of such representatives except those whose duties are clerical. For the purpose of this Annex such clerical personnel shall be deemed to come within the class of persons referred to in subparagraph (1) of this Article.

(3) The expression "members of the Organization staff" includes the Administrator and all the employees of the Organization.

(4) The term "expert" shall mean an individual performing a mission on behalf of the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party to this Treaty.

(5) The term "host government" shall mean the government of the country in which the headquarters of the Organization is located.

Article 2 Juridical Personality

A. The Organization shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of property, (c) to institute and defend legal proceedings.

B. The Organization may provide for suitable identification of ships and aircraft employed on the official service of the Organization.

Article 3
Property, Funds and Assets

A. The Organization, its property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case the Commission, on behalf of the Organization, has expressly waived this immunity, but such express waiver of immunity shall not extend to any measure of execution or detention of property.

B. The premises of the Organization shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the Organization, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.

C. The archives of the Organization and all documents belonging to it or held by it or by its staff or experts on its behalf shall be inviolable wherever located.

D. The Organization, without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, may, subject to the obligation to give effect as far as is practicable to representations made to it by any Party, exercise the following rights:

- (1) To hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency;
- (2) To transfer its funds freely from, to or within any country Party to this Treaty and convert any currency held by it into any other currency.

E. The Organization, its assets, income and other property shall be:

- (1) Exempt from all direct taxes except those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services;
- (2) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Organization for its official use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in the country into which they are imported except under conditions approved by the Government of that country;
- (3) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publications.

F. The Organization shall be exempt from taxes imposed directly on its expenditure transactions but not exempt from those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services.

Article 4
Communications

A. Each Party shall take appropriate steps necessary to ensure that its domestic and international telecommunication services accord to telecommunications of the Organization treatment at least equal to government telecommunications with respect to priority of transmission, and accord these telecommunications higher priority, i.e. special priority as accorded to the United Nations Organization in emergencies, when requested, and that rates charged shall be no higher than minimum government rates. Postal communications shall be handled in the most expeditious manner possible.

B. No censorship shall be applied to the official correspondence and other official communications of the Organization.

C. The Organization shall have the right to use codes known to all Parties and to dispatch and receive by courier or in sealed bags only official correspondence, other official communications, and objects intended for official use. Such courier and sealed bags shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.

D. Nothing in paragraphs B and C of this Article shall be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate security precautions to be determined by agreement between a Party and the Organization.

Article 5
Representatives of Parties to this Treaty

A. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, in the territory of the host government, the same privileges and immunities as the host government accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

B. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, while present in the territory of another Party in the discharge of Commission duties, the same privileges and immunities as the Party accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

C. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall enjoy, while present in the territory of the host government and while in the territory of another Party in the discharge of their official duties and during their journey to and from the place of meeting, the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in their official capacity;

(2) Inviolability for all their official papers and documents;

(3) The right to use codes, couriers, and sealed bags in communicating with their Governments, their staffs and with the Organization;

(4) The same exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(5) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(6) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(7) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

D. A representative to whom this Article applies shall, during any period when he is present in the territory of another Party for the discharge of his duties, be exempt from taxation on his official salary and emoluments, and where the legal incidence of any other form of taxation depends upon residence, any such period shall, for the purposes of determining his liability to taxation, be treated as not being a period of residence in that territory.

E. The Administrator shall communicate to the Parties concerned the names of the representatives and members of their official staffs to whom paragraph B of this Article applies and the probable duration of their stay in the territories of such other Parties.

F. The privileges and immunities accorded under paragraphs A, B, and C are not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. Consequently, a Party not only has the right, but is under a duty to waive the

immunity of its representatives and their staffs in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which the immunity is accorded.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to E above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national or any person who is its representative or is a member of the staff of such representative.

Article 6
Organization Staff and Experts

A. The Administrator and the deputies of the Administrator shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally accorded to diplomatic envoys.

B. All other members of the Organization staff shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned to a control post, an inspection group, or a routine or special flight; and at all times immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in the performance of their official functions;

(2) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(3) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(4) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(5) The same repatriation facilities in time of international crisis for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them, as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(6) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

G. Every expert performing a mission for the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest or detention;

(2) Immunity from legal process in respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions;

(3) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staff of diplomatic missions;

(4) Immunities and privileges specified in item (2) and (3) of paragraph B of this Article.

D. Every member of the Organization staff and every expert shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to him by the Organization.

E. The Administrator shall keep the Parties currently informed as to each individual to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article is applicable. A Party shall always be entitled to notification of the name and responsibility of any such individual before his arrival for official duties in the territory of that Party, so that it may have an opportunity to comment to the Administrator upon the proposed assignment of such expert or member of the Organization staff.

F. Privileges and immunities are granted to members of the Organization staff and to experts in the interests of the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Administrator shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any such individual in any case where the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization. In the case of the Administrator his immunity may be waived by the Commission provided the Commission finds the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to D inclusive above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national, except:

(1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions for the Organization;

(2) Facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions so far as necessary for the effective exercise of his functions.

Article 7
Abuses of Privileges

A. The Organization shall at all times cooperate with the appropriate authorities of Parties to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations, and prevent the occurrence of an abuse of the privileges and immunities set out in this Annex.

B. If any Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privilege of residence in its territory or of any other privilege or immunity granted by this Annex, the following procedure shall be adopted:

(1) In the case of an abuse by the Administrator, consultations shall be held between the Party and the Commission to determine the action to be taken.

(2) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 1, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Party whose representative is concerned and in accordance with the diplomatic procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the former Party, require the representative to leave its territory.

(3) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs B and C of Article 6, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Administrator and, in the event of disagreement, with the Commission, require the Administrator to arrange for an immediate replacement.

Article 8
Laissez-Passer

A. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be entitled to use a special laissez-passer procedure modeled on the United Nations laissez-passer procedure, to be evolved by the Administrator pursuant to regulations approved by the Commission.

B. Parties shall recognize and accept the Organization laissez-passer issued to members of the staff of the Organization and to experts on missions on behalf of the Organization as valid travel documents.

C. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts travelling on the Organization laissez-passer on the business of the Organization, shall be granted the same facilities for travel as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions.

Article 9
Interpretation and Supplementary Agreements

A. The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted in the light of the functions with which the Organization is entrusted by this Treaty and its Annexes.

B. The provisions of this Annex shall in no way limit or prejudice the privileges and immunities which have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to the Organization by a State by reason of the location, in the territory of that State, of the headquarters or other components and agencies of the Organization. The Organization may conclude with any Party or Parties agreements supplementing the provisions of this Annex, so far as that Party or those Parties are concerned.

Annex III

The Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission, consisting of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty, shall come into existence on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by all the original Parties. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until the Control Commission has been elected in accordance with Article 4 of this Treaty.

B. Except as provided in Section E of this Annex, the Preparatory Commission shall take decisions by agreement among the three original parties, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and determine its own place of meeting. It shall appoint an executive secretary and such staff as shall be necessary, who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Preparatory Commission may determine.

C. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan provided by the United Nations or by advances from governments. The repayment of loans shall be included as an item in the budget for the Control Organization's first financial period. The Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations for repayment of the loan. Advances from governments may be set off against assessments of the governments concerned levied in accordance with the provisions of Article 15.

D. Pending deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall:

1. Conduct preliminary technical studies and consultations with regard to the location, installation, and equipping of control posts and other components of the Control Organization, including:

(a) geological and topographic map studies of the geographical areas of the world where control posts are to be located;

(b) consultations with technical representatives of the original Parties for the purpose of adopting standard construction designs for control posts and regional offices and of choosing types of equipment for each of the methods of detection;

(c) studies of the surveys which will be required for selecting sites for control posts and other components;

(d) studies of communication requirements;

(e) consultations with the original Parties for equipping and utilizing their aircraft for routine flights and vessels to be stationed in accordance with the Treaty and its Annexes;

(f) studies of requirements for standard time transmission and reception to ensure accurate relative time at all control posts and other components of the Control Organization.

2. Draw up detailed requirements and regulations for the staffing of the Organization and invite applications for posts to be filled during the initial operations of the Organization;

3. Draw up requirements and invite applications for the post of Administrator;

4. Recommend the site in Vienna of the permanent headquarters of the Organization; draw up recommendations for the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the status of the Organization and its rights and relationship with the host country;

5. Draw up detailed plans for the day-to-day technical and administrative operations of the Organization;

6. Draw up for submission to the Conference the budget for the Organization's first financial period and a recommended scale of assessment in accordance with Article 15 of this Treaty;

7. In conjunction with the United Nations, initiate the preparation of a draft agreement which would be in accordance with Article 17 of this Treaty;

8. Make arrangements for the convening of the first Conference, to be held not later than six months from the date instruments of ratification have been deposited by all the original Parties.

9. In the case of acceding Parties, promptly recommend, after consultation with such Parties, for subsequent approval by the enlarged Preparatory Commission, an appropriate number of inspections in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, to be carried out annually within territory under the jurisdiction or control of such Parties.

E. 1. On the day after deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, or as soon thereafter as possible, the Preparatory Commission shall be enlarged, to consist of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty and one representative from eight other states, chosen by agreement between the three original Parties from among those states which at that time have deposited instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

2. The Preparatory Commission thus enlarged shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Control Commission by the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures therein specified for the Control Commission. After the Preparatory Commission has been enlarged and pending the appointment of the Administrator, the executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Administrator by the Treaty.

3. Pending the enlargement of the Preparatory Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Section, the Preparatory Commission shall continue to exercise only those functions listed in Section D of this Annex.

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No. 8 of 13 Copies, Series AEC-6

WORKING DRAFT:

PROPOSALS FOR STUDY BY CONSULTANTS GROUPS

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE:	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DC <input type="checkbox"/> DD	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>230, 234 not below</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>8/20/61</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
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NAME: <u>[Signature]</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
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April 14, 1961

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 BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DOENM-523

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WORKING DRAFT:

PROPOSALS FOR STUDY BY CONSULTATIVE GROUPS

[Note: This papers includes some proposals which do not have the approval of USIA. All are thought to be sufficiently deserving of consideration to justify including them for study by the Consultative Panels.]

I. The Ultimate Goal

The ultimate goal is a secure, free, and peaceful world in which there shall be general (world-wide) disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. In order to make progress toward that goal, concrete and demonstrable progress must be made in limiting and reducing national armaments and armed forces.

II. Governing Principles

1. Disarmament shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament. Hence, as the levels of national forces and armaments are progressively reduced, the rights and powers of the international inspection and peace-keeping machinery will be progressively increased.
2. Disarmament shall be effectively verified through objective and workable controls, impartially administered.
3. Disarmament shall proceed by balanced and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international control organ set up within the framework of the United Nations.

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4. Transition from one stage to the next shall take place when all the measures in that stage have been fully implemented and the control organization has been expanded as necessary to verify the measures in the next stage.

III. Task of the Negotiating Parties

1. The task of the negotiating parties is to achieve and to implement in the shortest possible time the widest area of agreement possible on measures directed toward achieving the ultimate goal. The parties will not cease their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

IV. General Disarmament Measures

The following constitutes an outline program for general disarmament. It is proposed that this program should form the basis for a joint declaration or heads of agreement paper to serve as a guide for the negotiating parties.

The measures in each stage are presented for negotiation as a program of balanced and inter-related steps. Additional stabilizing measures may also be put into effect, either in advance of or as part of stage I, as may be agreed.

Stage I

A. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. Complete information on numbers of forces, conventional armaments, and military expenditures, as well as the conventional

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armaments by major category of armaments to be retained at the end of Stage I, shall be furnished the international control organ by each participating State within one month after the treaty has come into force.

2. Force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be reduced to 2.1 million each and those of certain other states to agreed levels.

3. There shall be deposited in internationally supervised depots at agreed locations the major types of conventional armaments, by agreed categories, that become surplus as force levels are reduced. When, at the end of the Stage I transfers, the powers concerned have agreed that armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

B. Measures to Reduce and Eliminate
the Nuclear Threat

1. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped. All production plants except those, as may be agreed, for producing for peaceful purposes shall be closed.

2. Following the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons, equitable transfers of fissionable materials from past production in agreed ratios and in successive increments shall be made to non-weapon purposes.

3. A Nuclear Experts Commission shall be established to recommend formulae for achieving equitable future reductions of nuclear weapons stocks as well as to make recommendations for obtaining accurate accounting of past production and otherwise determining the possibilities of verifying reductions of nuclear

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stockpiles to the point where nuclear weapons have been eliminated; the Commission shall also consider the question of verifying the prohibition of nuclear weapons transfers between countries.

4. Nuclear free areas:

[Note: There exists today a nuclear-free area in Antarctica. Consideration should be given to the question of whether this precedent can and should be extended to other areas.]

5. Use of Nuclear weapons:

[Note: Last formal U.S. proposal was: "Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense."]

C. Measures to Reduce Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

1. All parties will furnish the control organ complete information on the numbers of their delivery vehicles by agreed categories. The information will include location of vehicles by agreed areas--but not by specific location within the area. Delivery capabilities either in naval units or based on land outside the territory of the state will also be covered by this provision.

2. Delivery vehicles by agreed category shall be reduced to 50 per cent of the difference between the declared level and the level, to be agreed, to be reached at the end of the second stage. The reduction shall be accomplished by depositing the vehicles in internationally supervised depots.

3. The production of agreed categories of delivery vehicles shall be discontinued except those needed for replacement purposes.

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4. The testing of missiles of agreed types shall be halted, except as part of joint or coordinated national programs subject to appropriate inspection to confirm that firings are for peaceful scientific purposes.

D. Regional Disarmament Measures

1. There will be limitation on armed forces and armaments in agreed areas where opposing sides confront each other.
2. Certain foreign bases will be abolished and certain others de-nuclearized.
3. Demilitarized zones in potential conflict areas will be established.

E. Control and Peace-Keeping Machinery Measures

1. A control organization shall be established within the framework of the United Nations and shall have the powers needed to verify compliance with all agreed obligations in Stage I. This organization shall be coordinated with any organization which may have been established in connection with any transitional stabilizing measures and its functions shall be progressively expanded as required by the implementation of Stage I measures.
2. The parties shall initiate efforts within the United Nations to strengthen its capability to maintain peace and facilitate pacific settlement of disputes.

* * * * *

Transition from the first stage to the second stage shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures in the first stage have been fully implemented and the control organization has been expanded as necessary to verify

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the measures in Stage II.

Stage II

A. Measures for Reduction of
Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. Levels of forces for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be reduced to 1.7 million each and the forces of other states to agreed levels.

2. Armaments that become surplus as force levels are further reduced shall be placed in the international depots and at the end of Stage II shall, upon a decision of the powers concerned, be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

B. Measures to Reduce and Eliminate
the Nuclear Threat

1. As a result of the work of the Nuclear Experts Commission, agreed further reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles shall take place.

2. [Note: A formula, appropriate to Stage II, dealing with the use of nuclear weapons, should be considered.]

3. Agreed arrangements to enforce a prohibition of nuclear weapons transfers between countries.

4. Additional agreed nuclear free zones or other zones of arms limitation.

C. Measures to Reduce Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

1. Nuclear delivery vehicles shall, by transfers to international depots, be reduced by the remaining 50 per cent required to attain the levels agreed upon for Stage II.

2. Following the completion of Stage II transfers of delivery vehicles, the vehicles transferred to depots in Stage I, shall, upon

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a decision of the powers concerned, be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, or transferred to the peace-keeping machinery.

D. Regional Disarmament Measures

1. Additional zones of regional arms limitation shall be considered.
2. Additional air and ground inspection zones shall be considered.
3. Further reduction of foreign bases.

E. Measures to Cope with the Threat of CBR

1. A permanent Scientific Commission shall be established at the beginning of Stage II, to which the parties shall furnish complete official data on the nature and amount of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons facilities remaining in their forces. The Scientific Commission shall, during Stage II, develop plans for the reduction of such facilities as well as for the pooling of all basic and applied knowledge of novel weapons and military research and development programs.

F. Other Measures

1. If an international space surveillance system has been initiated either as a separate measure or as part of Stage I, national space surveillance systems will be phased out.
2. The expansion of such other measures which may have been incorporated in Stage I.

G. Control and Peace-Keeping Machinery Measures

1. The powers and responsibilities of the control organ should be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.
2. The international peace-keeping machinery shall continue to

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be strengthened in keeping with the progressively increasing importance of its responsibilities.

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Transition from the second stage to the third stage shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures of the second stage have been fully implemented and effective verification will continue.

Stage III

By the time the second stage is completed, the development of the peace-keeping machinery and confidence in the system of inspection and controls should have developed to a point where the nations of the world could look forward to the third stage. The third stage would be a stage in which progressive general disarmament would proceed to a point where no nation had a military capability which could challenge the international security forces established to preserve the peace.

1. At the end of this stage, the forces, armaments, and military establishments of nation-states would be maintained only for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contingents of forces to the international security forces.

2. As part of this process, weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery should be destroyed or converted to peaceful use.

3. The manufacture of arms should be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used for national police forces or by the international security forces.

4. The exploration of outer space would continue, but solely for peaceful purposes.

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5. as part of this process, the capability of our international institutions to maintain international security and to provide fair methods for the settlement of disputes would be further strengthened to a point required for a world in which there is general disarmament.

6. The strengthening of these international institutions might take the form of changing the political relationships between them and nation-states and this change might, to some degree, supplant the type of inspection system which is necessary under the relationship which is envisaged under Stages I and II.

V. Immediate Measures to Achieve an Arms Truce

The United States believes that certain important and immediate steps can be taken independently or in conjunction with the foregoing general disarmament program. These measures would have as their purpose the achievement of an arms truce, the stabilization of the military environment, and building confidence and gaining experience in the implementation of disarmament measures. The proposed measures are not a prerequisite for the general disarmament program; neither is agreement to the general disarmament program a prerequisite for undertaking these immediate steps. In some cases, these measures concern subjects dealt with in Stage I of the general program but in a somewhat different framework. The measures set forth below, however, are those which the U. S. believes can be implemented quickly and separately and proposes for consideration on that basis.

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A. Measures to Limit Conventional Arms

1. Ceilings of 2.5 million shall be placed on the armed forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and agreed ceilings on the armed forces of other states.

2. Shipments of conventional armament and military equipment to countries not members of present alliance systems will be prohibited except where, by agreement, such shipments support internal security requirements. Only agreed types of weapons and equipment may be transferred. All transactions and shipments will be registered with the international control organ.

B. Measures to Contain the Nuclear Threat

1. Any materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards. Any production for peaceful purposes shall be carried on under the IAEA safeguards system.

2. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

3. In conjunction with the previous measures, the nuclear powers will each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer to non-nuclear powers nuclear materials, know-how, or the ownership of weapons. Non-nuclear powers will, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to receive such assistance.

4. An agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests shall be concluded.

C. Measures to Minimize the Danger of
Surprise Attack

1. An international space surveillance system, including surveillance satellite systems, will be established to provide warning

against a surprise attack. The data obtained by this space surveillance system will be furnished as rapidly as is technically possible to participating states as well as to an international center.

2. On-site inspection at mutually agreed air bases and missile launching pads will be instituted to ensure that such bases and pads will not be employed for a surprise attack.

3. There will be an agreed limitation on the deployment of missile-capable submarines, aircraft carriers, and other naval vessels capable of launching aircraft or missiles with nuclear weapons. Inspections will be established at major ports to verify compliance with the limitation provided for herein. Likewise, there will be agreed restrictions on the deployment of aircraft and other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

4. There will be established control posts at such locations as large ports, railway centers, main motor highways, and airports to report upon concentrations of military forces.

5. Zones of aerial and ground inspection will be established in agreed areas.

B. Measure to Keep Outer Space Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction shall be prohibited and effective verification of this prohibition shall be established, including means of inspecting, prior to launch, of agreed types of vehicles.

E. Measures to Minimize the Danger of War by Accident or Miscalculation

1. States capable of launching missiles and satellite vehicles agree to furnish each other and the control organ with advance notification of all launchings of missiles, space vehicles, or other devices intended to rise above an altitude of 100 miles, as well as with their projected tracks.

2. States capable of launching rockets, missiles, and space vehicles above an altitude of 100 miles agree to limiting such launching to _____ per day.

3. States agree to make advance notification to each other and to the control organ of all major military maneuvers, test firings of missiles of agreed range, and major military movements. The above activities will be confined to special previously announced geographic areas and to fixed, previously announced periods of time.

4. Arrangements will be made for rapid communications between and among heads of government, in the first instance between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

5. There will be established international air, sea, and space safety centers on the model of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) to check on any agreed limitation on deployment and to receive notification of all movements of military forces, military aircraft, naval vessels, and missile and space activities beyond national boundaries. The function of the safety centers will be to inform other states of such movements in order to avoid accidental encounters and misinterpretation of the

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intentions of the state conducting the movements. The safety centers will also supervise the adherence of all states to agreed standards for aircraft flight lanes, sea channels, space tracks, and radio and telemetry frequencies.

6. An international institute for the study of measures to minimize the danger of war by accident or miscalculation will be established at a site or sites to be mutually agreed. States agree to assign to the institute well-qualified technicians and to furnish the institute such needed information and data as it may from time to time request.

7. Agreed states shall establish on a reciprocal basis at agreed points observer teams to be on call at the discretion of the host state in the event the host state wishes to give reassurance that preparations for initiation of hostilities are not under way.

F. Measures to Minimize the Danger of Local War

1. There will be created permanent observation teams, composed equitably from all geographic areas of the world, for dispatch to areas in danger of imminent military conflict or in which actual military conflict is occurring. These teams will be dispatched at the request of either any party involved in imminent or actual conflict, or by a Security Council vote requiring unanimous approval of the permanent members, or by a recommendation of the General Assembly, or by a decision of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

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2. In conjunction with the provisions of paragraph 1, there will be established a skeleton international police force and regional police forces (composed only of states not members of major alliance systems.) These forces may be dispatched to an area of actual or imminent conflict upon the request of a party to the conflict, or upon Security Council decision, or upon General Assembly declaration or upon a decision of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the purpose of enforcing cease-fire orders by the United Nations and/or of interposing itself between the conflicting parties.

3. Steps will be taken to establish limited, supervised, demilitarized or partially demilitarized zones or strips in chronic or potential conflict areas. Apart from limitations on military forces there will be no abridgement of the sovereignty of a state over a zone or strip except as may be specifically agreed.

4. An agreement embodying appropriate means of verification, limiting the introduction of foreign military material, foreign military personnel, and foreign military technology and techniques into chronic or potential areas of military conflict. A protocol to the convention will list the geographic areas and their precise delimitation as well as the types of material, personnel, technology, and techniques covered by the convention.

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Attachments to memos to Comm. from Dr. English 6-9-61

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Final Action Report
May 31, 1961

This document contains of 27 pages.
Number 10 of 15 copies, Section SEC-10

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

1. SET NUMBER DATE	2. DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER)
APPROVED 5-20-80	1. DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRED
NAME: <u>See above</u>	2. DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPT TO:
3. OLD REFERENCE: <u>824/4</u>	3. CO-ORDINATE WITH:
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5. NAME: <u>824/4</u>	5. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED:
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DAVID CAMPBELL

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W. Campbell Date 6-25-00

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Final the witness goal of material is a world of fear and war

material which is free from the purview of war and the danger and
burden of communism in which the use of force has been replaced by
the rule of law, and international agreements for a changing world are
enforced peacefully in which peace and security are maintained in
concordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

Comments: Although a powerful world free of the danger of war
and with peace founded upon the principles of the U.N. Charter
is a worthy ultimate goal of mankind, it may be rather sweeping
to identify it as the only one. The June 27, 1960 provision
provided the path to a world "of free and open markets", and
this goal of the Russian world is worthy of continued evaluation
in any discussion of principles by those governments. Such a
world goal would be in keeping with President Kennedy's special
message to Congress on May 25, 1961, in which he reiterated the
principle that "America's enduring concern is for both peace
and freedom."

B. International Organization

As an essential contribution to the ultimate goal, various treaties
and agreements are necessary to:

Notes: Data items are indicated by brackets and deleted by underlining.

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COORDINATE WITH: ACDA
DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY: LE L.L. Ferguson 11/21/98 DOBNSI-623

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1. Eliminates the chance of war through ~~mutual attack~~, accident, miscalculation, or misinformation.

2. Eliminates the capabilities of nations to launch armed attack against other nations.

3. ~~Eliminates the mobilization of nations to support internally~~
~~other nations.~~

B 4. Eliminates the requirements for nations to divert resources to defense needs.

Comment: ~~Security goals~~ is inserted to be consistent with the resources in Steps One and the thinking by the Consultative Group on these subjects. It is clear from the President's address of June 6, 1961, that the greatest threat to the free world's security is subversion. In view of this, the disarmament objectives, aimed at improving world-wide security, must take cognizance of this threat and its ultimate elimination. No general comment is made on the objectives found but attention is drawn to the rather more specific description of objectives provided in the June 27, 1960 document.

C. Guiding Principles

1. Disarmament should proceed in such a manner that at no time would its progress adversely affect the security of any state. ~~These~~
~~principles. Individual disarmament measures shall be conditional upon~~
~~each other to ensure that the measures in force at any time do not~~

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within ever-all military operations to one of the parties. As the
level of national forces and resources are progressively reduced,
the rights and powers of the international governmental machinery will
be progressively increased. Furthermore, the executive and control
machinery must at all times be capable of providing evidence to satisfy
all participants that disarmament is being carried out. The level of
confidence required will depend upon the political climate existing at
the time.

Summary: The addition to this section is a direct quote from the
language recommended by the Generative Group as Nuclear
Armaments for this section. The intent is to make clear that a
minimum of relative effort on national security requires
appropriate interdependence among individual nations and to
emphasize that the extent of disarmament must be verified to pro-
tect the security of the participants.

2. Disarmament shall proceed through stages containing balanced,
phased, and safeguarded measures with such measures being carried out
in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international
control organization set up within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations must be
effectively verified throughout by the control organization to ensure
that compliance with these obligations is verified from their entry
into force. Such verification should include implementation of

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measures in any stage shall depend on evidence of effective controls at the time measures are later verified. Compliance with all disarmament obligations must be effectively verified by the control commission in a manner that includes the capability to ascertain not only that reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Comment: The suggested change is an attempt to provide, in a manner consistent with the earlier policy and with the specific recommendations of the Panel of Experts, an assurance that effective controls will be in existence as the time disarmament measures become effective.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall take place when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all accepted the measures in the preceding stage, including other measures in such well identified stages, have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

Comment: The suggested change is to make clear that Stage One is indeed to be a first stage in general disarmament, and not a selection of a few isolated measures.

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3. The program of disarmament should be related to measures to strengthen international institutions for maintaining peace so that an disarmament of national military establishments proceeds unless and only on effective international institutions for peace and security and justice.

D. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and to implement as rapidly as feasible the widest area of agreement possible on measures directed toward achieving the ultimate goal and to continue their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

Summary: This rather general statement of the terms of the negotiating process might be compared with the much more specific task laid out on June 27, 1946 for the four nation committee. It would appear desirable to set forth the task of the negotiating committee in a manner similar to that in the June 27 document.

II. THE PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following is submitted as an outline program for general disarmament. It is proposed that this program should form the basis for a joint declaration to serve as a guide for the negotiating states, 7 the negotiations.

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Comment: The joint declaration proposed in the draft seems rather close to the conditional Soviet tactic of asking for an armistice agreement, with details of control to be specified later after the armistice was in force. It is suggested that no such joint declaration be specifically contemplated to include the Soviets. If a joint declaration of the West is intended, the entire paper would presumably be the declaration and the references would still be unnecessary.

SECTION 2

Section 2 provides for measures which can be undertaken promptly and which would protect positions, lessen the danger of war, and begin the curtailment of national military capabilities:

A. Measures to Reduce the Danger of War by Accident, Miscommunication and Surprise Attack

1. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of launchings of missiles, space vehicles, or other devices intended to rise above an agreed altitude, together with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.

2. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of such major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or alarm and hence to hostilities. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time zone of the event. 7

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Comment: If this proposal is implemented after items 4 and 5 below, it might have some more possibility of verification than what possibly arranged for separately. Perhaps even then it is not appropriate for Stage One. What would be the effect of the proposed arrangement on the inherent capabilities of Poland-carrying submarines? This particular measure in its relation to items 4 and 5 provides a clear example of the importance in arranging for an appropriate interdependence among individual measures. While this may be a desirable informal, voluntary measure, as suggested by the Group on War by Accident, Minimization of Surprise Attack, we should not be committed to it by agreement unless it is tied to 4 and 5 below.

3. States shall consult with each other regarding the establishment in each other's territory of establish wherever comes in with other's territory to be on call at the discretion of the host state in the event the host state wishes to give information regarding its military activities and posture.

Comment: The revision is intended to cast the proposal as a measure rather than an invitation to consult.

4. There shall be established control points at such locations as major ports, railway centers, major highways, and airbases to report on concentrations of military forces.

5. Such means of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

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B. Measures to Contain and Reduce
the Nuclear Threat

1. Those states which have not already adhered to the treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests shall do so.

Comment: Events already indicate that the test treaty will not be concluded at the time disarmament negotiations are intended to commence. Therefore, it is undesirable, as has been generally agreed, to allow these negotiations of long standing to become enmeshed in the general disarmament negotiations. It is suggested that the determination to keep the test negotiations separate not be relaxed at this time, particularly if the issue on resumption of testing has not been resolved.

2. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(Note: This measure was tied to progress on conventional disarmament in the June 27 paper but not in President Eisenhower's September 23, 1950 U.N. speech. The question of whether such a link should be recommended for consideration in the current U.S. position is still under study.)

Comment: It is strongly felt that there should be a link with conventional disarmament and that such link should be a part of the general interdependence contemplated in language recommended for the introductory parts of the paper. If these are not included, it is suggested that the terminology here and for

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scientific activities he that used in the June 27, 1950 policy as follows: "The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped upon installation and effective operation of the control system found necessary to verify this stop by prior technical study, and agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapon use, including stockpiling for peaceful purposes, conditioned upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament."

3. Following the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapon purposes.

Comment: If not part of a generally interdependent program, this provision also should have the condition of relation to conventional disarmament set forth in the preceding paragraph. It is noted that the Group on Nuclear Armaments recommended that there be an agreement for transfer in Stage I beyond the already recommended 50,000 lbs of U^{235} . It is also noted that any Stage I agreement on transfer of fissionable materials is assumed to have provisions for verification of the amount transferred but not for either declaration or verification of the total amount remaining in national stockpiles, which will become crucially important as stockpiles are reduced in later stages.

4. A Nuclear Reports Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear powers shall be established (a) to recommend formulas

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for achieving equitable future reductions of national fissionable materials stockpiles, and (b) to study and determine the possibilities of verifying such future reductions and of eventually eliminating such stockpiles.]

Comment: The Nuclear Group recommended that the corresponding paragraph in the draft be deleted. It may be pointed out that the recommendation of future under (a) is in such a political as a technical problem and cannot be approached without discussion of relative existing stockpiles, which would otherwise presumably not be covered during Stage I. The problem of verifying the nature of future reductions as indicated in (b) does not represent a serious technical problem but that of finding out how much is left by stockpiles requires complex action and is even then an extraordinarily difficult one which must be worked out by the individual parties first. It is suggested that these problems be the subject of negotiation, when providing for the later phases but that there is not an appropriate problem for a Working Experts Committee as a part of Stage I.

3. Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

4. The nations possessing nuclear weapons shall each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer nuclear weapons, materials for production of nuclear weapons, or technology required to produce nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons. Nations

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not now possessing nuclear weapons shall, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to seek or receive such weapons.]

Comment: This provision is not enforceable or verifiable. The Nuclear Group expressed strong reservations about such provisions. In addition, this provision goes against the U.S. relations with NATO, in particular provisions to other NATO members part of the NATO defense. Any claim that the wording was cleverly drafted to exclude NATO would properly be regarded publicly as a subterfuge.

7. [Such nuclear weapon free areas as may be agreed shall be established.]

Comment: This provision is also regarded as unenforceable. The Nuclear Group was not aware that particular areas could be found which would not result in a net disadvantage to U.S. security.

C. Measures to Reduce Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1. All parties shall furnish the control organization complete information on the numbers of their strategic delivery vehicles by agreed categories. The information shall include numbers of vehicles and their location by defined areas, including sea and foreign land based units, but not specific individual vehicle locations within areas.

2. Reduction of strategic delivery vehicles to agreed levels shall be achieved by agreed steps with progressive verifications of declared levels and reductions. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers

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to internationally supervised depots of vehicles that become damaged during such tests. Upon the attainment of agreed historic levels during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under international supervision shall be destroyed, transferred to the United Nations, or converted to peaceful uses.

7. Production of agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be discontinued.

8. Testing agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be halted, pending the start of progress subject to appropriate and mutually agreed inspection to verify that efforts are for peaceful applications.

9. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

Comment: It is noted that items 2, 3, 4 and 5 will require forceful control and inspection arrangements. Item 4 provides substantial danger of interference with the peaceful development of space vehicles by a way perhaps even more dramatic than the impact of the weapons test suspension on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Is it intended that nuclear propulsion research would be included in the agreed categories mentioned here?

D. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces and Other Armaments

1. Complete information on peacetime numbers of troops, conventional armaments by major category, and military expenditures shall be furnished to the control organization within one month after an agreement comes into force.

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2. Force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be reduced by agreed steps to 2.1 million each; concurrently, force levels of certain other areas shall also be reduced to agreed levels.

3. Major types of armaments, by agreed categories, shall progressively be deposited in internationally supervised depositories; the amounts to be deposited during each step within the Stage I reduction process shall be a portion of the difference between the initial levels and the agreed final levels for Stage I and shall be in relationship to the force level reductions for each step. When at the end of the Stage I transfers the parties have agreed that residual armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depositories shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. While the composition of the final levels of armaments for Stage I need not be identical for each party, they shall be stipulated by each party in an agreed manner to the Agreement.

4. Limitation of armaments and armed forces in agreed areas may be negotiated with the agreement of the countries affected.

5. An international study group of qualified experts shall be established for the purpose of working the technical issues for the design of inspection systems applicable to the development, construction, and stockpiling of CBE armaments.

II. Machinery for Securing the Peace and the
The Financial Well-being of Mankind

1. The parties shall support in the United Nations the creation of a U.N. relieving peace force, international in character, for use by appropriate organs of the U.N. to help maintain the peace. Members

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of this force shall be available to support the central organization in the conduct of its operations.

2. The parties shall promote studies by the U.N., and cooperation in implementation of these studies, so that the U.N. will have available, for later stages of development, a peace force capable of maintaining international peace and security against the threat of aggression by any power or probable combination of powers.

3. The parties shall promote peace by refraining from any use or threat of force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter, and by exerting every influence against international use of force by any nation.

4. The parties shall contribute to peaceful development and change in other countries in accordance with the desires of such other countries, by refraining from: (a) indirect aggression and subversion against these countries; (b) providing military support to promote internal change by force of arms; and (c) otherwise interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

5. The parties shall use existing machinery in and out of the U.N. for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall support within the United Nations studies and the development of additional international peace-keeping arrangements.

6. The parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

F. Control Organization

1. An international control organization shall be established upon entry into force of the agreement with the powers needed to verify compliance with the obligations undertaken in Stage I. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of these obligations. The control organization shall have an appropriate relationship to the United Nations which does not subject its operations to veto in the Security Council.

2. The control organization shall have an impartial director with authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

3. The control organization shall also have a control commission consisting of representatives of parties to the treaty, including the representatives of all the Big Powers, the function of which shall be to give the director such guidance as may be necessary and to determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of the treaty.

4. The International Court of Justice shall be available to the director or to the control commission for advisory opinions, and to a party in controversy with another, in regard to issues arising out of the application of the treaty and the operation of the control organization.

5. While Stage I is being implemented, the control organization shall study and approve the changes in personnel, equipment, and finances

and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

G. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

1. Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated when the Security Council verifies that: (a) all agreed/ the measures constituting the first stage, including major measures in each proposed area of agreement, have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing; and (b) the control organization is ready to begin verification of compliance with the agreed measures in the second stage.

Comment: This is inserted to confirm the interdependence suggested under Implementing Principles.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in G.I. above has been accomplished.

A. Measures to Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. Further applicable transfers to non-weapon uses of fissionable materials from past production shall be made. As weapon materials stockpiles are reduced, control machinery shall be set up to verify past production and existing stockpiles to a degree consistent with the reductions in order to insure that no party is left with a disproportionate nuclear capability at any stage.

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and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

C. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

1. Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) all agreed measures constituting the first stage, including major measures in each proposed area of agreement, have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing; and (b) the control organization is ready to begin verification of compliance with the agreed measures in the second stage.

Comment: This is inserted to confirm the interdependence suggested under Implementing Principles.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in C.1. above has been accomplished.

A. Measures to Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. Further equitable transfers in non-weapon uses of fissionable materials from past production shall be made. As weapon materials stockpiles are reduced, control machinery shall be set up to verify past production and existing stockpiles to a degree consistent with the reductions in order to insure that no party is left with a disproportionate nuclear capability at any stage.

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Comment: This addition is to provide specifically for a most important control provision.

2. [States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable. It suggested at all it would be difficult to hold it back to Stage II in view of previous actions and pressures for such declaration. It is not consistent with our public NATO defense policy.

3. [Agreed arrangements to enforce a prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles between countries shall be instituted.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable.

4. [Additional agreed nuclear free zones shall be instituted.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable.

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B. Minimum Air Traffic Admission to Scientific Exhibit System

1. Further reduction in the frequency of scientific displays should be implemented in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage 1. The levels of reduction during Stage II would be related to the degree of equipment and technical confidence in the scientific show system, it being recognized that no low traffic and overhead conditions in the effectiveness of the verification system must be greater than that acceptable for Stage I.

C. Minimum Air Traffic Admission of Armed Forces and Civil Aeronautics

1. Levels of access for the U.S. and F.O.B.A. shall be further reduced, by agreed steps, to 1.7 million each (alternatively, to agreed levels). Some levels of the above system limited in Stage I as well as of certain additional weapons shall also be reduced to agreed levels in so far as access of nonhostile believed program of reduction.
2. More types of armaments by agreed categories shall be further reduced in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage 1.
3. Further limitation on armed forces and armaments is agreed upon may be implemented with the agreement of the countries affected.
4. Additional air and ground inspection upon an air to agreed shall be established.
5. A Scientific Commission on this subject shall be established under the general supervision by design effective means for controlled illustration to the armaments and to personnel in effective contact with reliable intelligence for the armaments.

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D. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for the
Efficient Settlement of Disputes

1. During Stage II the parties shall cooperate to develop further the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, so that during the development of Stage III the United Nations will effectively be able to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

Therefore, during Stage III

(a) An international peace force shall be established under a United Nations command responsible to the political organs of the United Nations.

(b) Nations would agree upon such necessary changes in the structure and operation of the United Nations to assure that the United Nations will be able to operate more effectively to protect nations against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(c) Nations would also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

4. Control Organization

1. The powers and responsibilities of the control organization shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

V. Transition from Stage II to Stage III

1. Transition from the second stage to the third stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) all measures

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to the present stage have been fully implemented; (2) the national armaments are ready to begin verification of appropriate measures in the third stage; and (3) the international machinery is effectively operating and continues to be capable of maintaining international peace and security under conditions of Stage III.

Stage III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program and the development of domestic and international peacekeeping machinery should have reached a point where the nations of the world are more prepared to a third stage in which progressive general disarmament would proceed to a point where no nation would have the military capability which would challenge the progressively strengthened international security forces. The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) The foreign, domestic, and military armaments of states would be reduced to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed armaments of forces to control the international peace force.

(b) Weapons capable of producing mass destruction or lethal mass casualties, and their means of delivery would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used for national security forces or by the international peace force.

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(c) The psychological capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all nations under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to ensure peace and the just settlement of differences in a divided world.

APPENDIX TO
DOCUMENT 9. 2. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

I. Introduction

1. This paper constitutes a supplement to the Document 9. 2. Disarmament Negotiating Proposal and is not intended for formal review in negotiation with the U.S.S.R. The approach and measures outlined herein do not lend themselves to formal discussion in the kind of disarmament negotiations that have traditionally been held since 1945, because much of what is suggested here is designed to induce modification in military posture and relations that are not susceptible to formal agreement. However, the U.S.S.R.'s traditional objection to weapons of mass destruction which is regarded as "outrageous", together with its obvious intent to continue to pursue the sort of "rational" disarmament policy exemplified by its proposals for CD, which is virtually certain that any semi-public or formal branching of the type of "non-control" measures suggested below would be rejected out-of-hand by the Soviets. In fact, Soviet rejection of private, informal approaches is only slightly less likely. Nevertheless, if there is any chance at beginning a dialogue with the U.S.S.R. on the subject mentioned in this proposal, it is through informal dealings essentially outside the usual framework of disarmament negotiations.

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1. The manner in which the numerous suggested topics should be taken up with the Soviets should be flexible. Informal bilateral talks commencing with very broad discussions are one way, though perhaps not the best in view of past Soviet attitudes. An alternative worth looking at is to use the potential new channel of initiative of the U.S. Military Staff Committee, whose members may be the military attaches in Moscow and Washington or in some other capitals, or the military missions in contact in Germany.

II. Nature of Initiatives

1. The basic purpose of the various suggestions made is (1) to improve communication between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and hence to reduce the risk of misinterpretation of military activities, (2) to reduce the danger that accidental or unpermitted operations will lead to the unleashing of strategic strike forces, (3) to reduce the need for rapid response, especially in the face of ambiguous indicators, and (4) to reduce the likelihood, temptation or compulsion to initiate general nuclear war.

2. Now, if any, of the proposals proposed are suitable for formal agreements requiring ratification by constitutional procedure or even by Executive Agreement. This is so not only because there is virtually no chance that the Soviets would accept such agreements; it is due also to the fact that formally binding agreements may be unworkable even if acceptable. Many of the proposals are based on temporary strategic situations, others may be essential or tentative and still others simply involve the development of new

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productive and frank verbal exchanges.

3. It goes without saying that the measures or actions suggested are not intended to be packaged; each, in and of itself, would have merit if implemented separately.

4. Finally, the approach outlined herein is thought to be responsive to the desire of both sides to avoid general nuclear war. Hence it should probably be pursued regardless of whether U.S. - Soviet relations are relatively tranquil or relatively turbulent; indeed, it has been suggested that it could be more urgent to pursue it in times of crisis to avoid escalation.

III. General Measures, Involvement, or Actions

1. Information Exchange

The U.S. would make available to the Soviets at an early date and in a suitable opportunity present itself a compilation of measures which the U.S. was in taking, or plans to take unilaterally to make its forces less accident-prone, more truly of mutual-defense character, and otherwise more stable. The document should be made available without a request for a similar document in return, though the inference that we would release one could be left. The document would indicate where the U.S. would be able to do more if certain unilateral actions by the Soviets occurred but this should be done solely in view of Soviet sensitivity to "intelligence-gathering." To avoid difficulties with the Allies, the document should probably be made available to NATO together with an indication that it has been given the Soviets. It should not, however, be published as an

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not to compromise the privacy of the channel. We would, of course, have no control over Soviet publication perhaps even with a propaganda blast that it proves U.S. opposition to disarmament. But this should not distract us since the main purpose is to get the Soviets to read it.

2. Radio Telephone

For a variety of reasons the establishment of rapid communication between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR, is, in balance, desirable. Various ways of bringing this about have been proposed, including a direct Kremlin-White House line, a line between U.S. and Soviet command posts, and the use of communication satellites. The most practical ones would appear to be a unilateral U.S. telephone line between the Department of State and the Embassy in Moscow similar to that now in existence between London and the British Embassy in Moscow. Installation of such a line probably requires approval of the Soviet authorities. If this is readily obtained (there may be difficulty over whether messages could be used over landlines through Soviet territory), the President could then notify Khrushchev when the line is installed and indicate that it is available should the need arise to clarify each other's intentions in times of crisis or incident. If the Soviet authorities give trouble, the President might at that point ask Khrushchev's intervention and explain the advantages of the system.

3. Military Attachés

We might possibly suggest to the Soviets an increase in respective attaché staffs to set up an avenue for professional military contacts

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and possibly for use if either side wishes to reassure the other of its benign intent in the event of some accidental occurrence or if it became apparent that the side was misconstructing some particular action, (e.g. an exercise or alert). We might also consider using the Soviet personnel attached to the U.S. Military Staff Committee in this way, in which case it would be desirable to urge the Soviets to assign well-qualified personnel.

As a variant of the above suggestion, we could propose the establishment of emergency observation posts in each other's capitals for use in case either side feels the need to reassure the other.

4. Advance Notification of Soviet Launchings

Although a proposal on this is included in our formal disarmament proposal, it may nevertheless be desirable, especially if the Soviets continue to reject it, to undertake a private effort to explain to the Soviets the advantages of such a program for reducing misunderstandings and misperceptions. We might suggest that if they are agreed to a formal agreement, we simply begin the practice of advance notification (already adopted to for the most part by us and in the case of the Soviet Pacific missile alerts by the Soviets) without saying that it was part of an agreement. It might be suggested to the Soviets that in time the R-12 type systems of both sides might be used to check on these advance notifications.

5. Advance Notification of Aircraft Flights in Certain Regions

We might broach the notion of private advance notification to each other of bomber flights in the Arctic Region above 60 or 65 degrees

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north latitude. National warning systems could detect violations of the understanding and also whether the arrangements reflect any differences in terms of the response made by the respective defenses to such flights.

6. Non-Interference Pact in Space

The U.S. should begin a gradual campaign of seeking to impress on the Soviets the stabilizing nature of various types of satellite observation systems. Such a campaign might culminate in a tacit understanding not to interfere with each other's satellite systems. Such a "non-aggression pact" in space could be a forerunner to a formal agreement not to station vehicles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons in space. In connection with such a "pact" there might also be an arrangement for sharing the data gathered by various kinds of satellite systems, especially of the KH-11 type.

7. Exchange of Information on Communications and Electronic Intelligence

The U.S. might touch the desirability of exchanging information not consisting in terms of communications intercepts of various sorts. (Communications "penetration" are covered by history.) More delicately, and depending on Soviet receptivity to the general approach of this proposal, there might be an exchange about the state of intelligence collection that each society had gone through about modifying these practices.

8. Limitations on Space Launches

The U.S. could suggest to the Soviets that as both sides enter the period when they are capable of multiple space and missile shots on a given day, it would be prudent to limit such launches to a

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relatively small number, and to allow intervals between them. The purpose would be to prevent any concern on the other side that (1) an actual attack was in progress, (2) efforts were being made to degrade the other side's detection system preparatory to an attack, or (3) salvo firing was being practiced.

9. Limitations on Movements of Strategic Missiles and Nuclear Forces

Even if the U.S. decides not to deploy ICBM's on the ground in Europe or to withdraw ICBM's presently stationed in Europe, we might indicate to the Soviets that we are contemplating these actions, that we would have a much earlier time implementing them if they refrained from deploying missiles capable of striking Western Europe, and that we cannot guarantee that we will always refrain from deploying strategic missiles to Western Europe unless we see that the Soviets do not threaten Western Europe with their missiles.

We might also indicate to the Soviets that we would monitor pulling back tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for a certain distance if (1) we were reasonably certain they had none with their forces or those of their allies in Western Europe, and (2) they otherwise were in a visibly defensive posture in East Germany.

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Draft Working Paper

This document consists of 22 pages.
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May 31, 1961

RECOMMENDED U.S. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL *

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Goal

[The] An ultimate goal of mankind is a world of free and open societies which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been replaced by the rule of law, and international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully; in which peace and security are maintained in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

Comment: Although a peaceful world free of the danger of war and with peace assured under the principles of the U.N. Charter is a worthy ultimate goal of mankind, it may be rather sweeping to identify it as the only one. The June 27, 1960 preamble provided for peace in a world "of free and open societies", and this goal of the Western World is worthy of continued inclusion in any declaration of principle by these governments. Such a stated goal would be in keeping with President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on May 25, 1961, in which he reiterated the principle that "America's enduring concern is for both peace and freedom."

B. Disarmament Objectives

As an essential contribution to the ultimate goal, nations should seek agreement on measures to:

* NOTE: Deletions are indicated by brackets and underlining indicating the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

State Dept. Interests/Equities
Declassified & Released by A/RPS IPS/CN/SKP
Date 6-23-00
H. Engelhardt

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DATE		2 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO	
2ND REVIEW DATE		3 NOT TAKEN NO DATE CLASSIFIED INFO	
AUTHORITY		4 COORDINATE WITH	
DATE		5 CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED	
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CG-1P-1 TOPIC: [initials]
BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE, DOENN-629

attached to the McNamara report

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1. Eliminate the threat of war through surprise attack, accident, miscalculation, or misinformation.

2. Eliminate the capabilities of nations to launch armed attack against other nations.

3. Eliminate the capabilities of nations to subvert internally other nations.

3.1 4. Eliminate the requirements for nations to divert resources to defense needs.

Comment: Surprise attack is inserted to be consistent with the measures in Stage I and the thinking by the Consultative Group on these subjects. It is clear from the President's address of June 6, 1961, that the greatest threat to the free world's security is subversion. In view of this, the disarmament objectives, aimed at improving world-wide security, must take cognizance of this threat and its ultimate elimination. No general comment is made on the objectives format but attention is drawn to the rather more specific description of objectives provided in the June 27, 1960 document.

C. Implementing Principles

1. Disarmament should proceed in such a manner that at no time would its progress adversely affect the security of any state. Where appropriate, individual disarmament measures shall be conditional upon each other to assure that the measures in force at any time do not

produce over-all military advantage to one of the parties. As the levels of national forces and armaments are progressively reduced, the rights and powers of the international peace-keeping machinery will be progressively increased. Furthermore, the inspection and control machinery must at all times be capable of providing evidence to satisfy all participants that disarmament is being carried out. The level of confidence required will depend upon the political climate existing at the time.

Comment: The addition to this section is a direct quote from the language recommended by the Consultative Group on Nuclear Armaments for this section. The intent is to make clear that a minimizing of relative effect on national security requires appropriate interdependence among individual measures and to emphasize that the extent of disarmament must be verified to protect the security of the participants.

2. Disarmament shall proceed through stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international control organization set up within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations must be effectively verified throughout by the control organization to ensure that compliance with these obligations is verified from their entry into force. Such verification should include/ Implementation of

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measures in any stage shall depend on existence of effective controls at the time measures go into operation. Compliance with all disarmament obligations must be effectively verified by the control organization in a manner that includes the capability to ascertain not only that reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Comment: The suggested change is an attempt to provide, in a manner consistent with the earlier policy and with the specific recommendations of the Nuclear Panel, an assurance that effective controls will be in existence at the time disarmament measures become effective.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall take place when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that [all accepted] the measures in the preceding stage, including major measures in each area identified below, have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

Comment: The suggested change is to make clear that Stage I is indeed to be a first stage in general disarmament, and not a selection of a few isolated measures.

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5. The progress of disarmament should be related to measures to strengthen international institutions for maintaining peace so that as disarmament of national military establishments proceeds nations can rely on effective international institutions for peace and security and justice.

D. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and to implement as rapidly as feasible the widest area of agreement possible on measures directed toward achieving the ultimate goal and to continue their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

Comment: This rather general statement of the intent of the negotiating nations might be compared with the much more specific task laid out on June 27, 1960 for the ten nation committee. It would appear desirable to set forth the task of the negotiating committee in a manner similar to that in the June 27 document.

II. THE PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following is submitted as an outline program for general disarmament. It is proposed that this program should form the basis for a joint declaration to serve as a guide for the negotiating states. The negotiations.

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Comment: The joint declaration proposed in the draft comes rather close to the traditional Soviet tactic of asking for an immediate agreement, with details of control to be specified later after the measures come into force. It is suggested that no such joint declaration be specifically contemplated to include the Soviets. If a joint declaration of the West is intended, the entire paper would presumably be the declaration and the reference would still be unnecessary.

STAGE I

Stage I provides for measures which can be undertaken promptly and which would promote confidence, lessen the danger of war, and begin the curtailment of national military capabilities:

A. Measures to Reduce the Danger of War by Accident, Miscalculation and Surprise Attack

1. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of launchings of missiles, space vehicles, or other devices intended to rise above an agreed altitude, together with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.
2. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of such major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time span of the event.

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Comment: If this proposal is implemented after items 4 and 5 below, it might have some more possibility of verification than when possibly arranged for separately. Perhaps even then it is not appropriate for Stage I. What would be the effect of the proposed arrangement on the deterrent capabilities of Polaris-carrying submarines? This particular measure in its relation to items 4 and 5 provides a clear example of the importance in arranging for an appropriate interdependence among individual measures. While this may be a desirable informal, voluntary measure, as suggested by the Group on War by Accident, Miscalculation or Surprise Attack, we should not be committed to it by agreement unless it is tied to 4 and 5 below.

3. States shall consult with each other regarding the establishment in each other's territory of establish observer teams in each other's territory to be on call at the discretion of the host state in the event the host state wishes to give reassurance regarding its military activities and posture.

Comment: The revision is intended to cast the proposal as a measure rather than an invitation to confer.

4. There shall be established control posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airbases to report on concentrations of military forces.

5. Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

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B. Measures to Contain and Reduce
the Nuclear Threat

1. Those states which have not already adhered to the treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests shall do so.

Comment: Events already indicate that the test treaty will not be concluded at the time disarmament negotiations are intended to commence. It is suggested that the determination to keep the test negotiations separate not be relaxed at this time, particularly if the issue on resumption of testing has not been resolved.

2. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(Note: This measure was tied to progress on conventional disarmament in the June 27 paper but not in President Eisenhower's September 22, 1960 U.N. speech. The question of whether such a link should be recommended for consideration in the current U.S. position is still under study).

Comment: It is strongly felt that there should be a link with conventional disarmament and that such link should be a part of the general interdependence contemplated in language recommended for the introductory parts of the paper. If these are not included, it is suggested that the terminology here and for

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stockpile reduction be that used in the June 27, 1960 policy as follows: "The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped upon installation and effective operation of the control system found necessary to verify this step by prior technical study, and agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons use, including stockpiling for peaceful purposes, conditioned upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament."

3. Following the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes,

Comment: If not part of a generally interdependent program, this provision also should have the condition of relation to conventional disarmament set forth in the preceding paragraph. It is noted that the Group on Nuclear Armaments recommended that there be no agreement for transfers in Stage I beyond the already recommended 30,000 kgs of U²³⁵. It is also noted that any Stage I agreement on transfer of fissionable materials is assumed to have provisions for verification of the amount transferred but not for either declaration or verification of the total amounts remaining in national stockpiles, which will become crucially important as stockpiles are reduced in later stages.

4. A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear powers shall be established (a) to recommend formulae

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for achieving equitable future reductions of national fissionable materials stockpiles, and (b) to study and determine the possibilities of verifying such future reductions and of eventually eliminating such stockpiles.]

Comment: The Nuclear Group recommended that the corresponding paragraph in the draft be deleted. It may be pointed out that the recommendation of formulae under (a) is as much a political as a technical problem and cannot be approached without discussion of relative existing stockpiles, which would otherwise presumably not be revealed during Stage I. The problem of verifying the amounts of future reductions as indicated in (b) does not represent a serious technical problem but that of finding out how much is left in stockpiles requires complete access and is even then an extraordinarily difficult one which must be worked out by the individual parties first. It is suggested that these problems be the subject of negotiation when providing for the later phases but that there is not an appropriate problem for a Nuclear Experts Commission as a part of Stage I.

5. Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

6. [The nations possessing nuclear weapons shall each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer nuclear weapons, materials for production of nuclear weapons, or technology required to produce nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons. Nations

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not now possessing nuclear weapons shall, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to seek or receive such assistance.]

Comment: This provision is not enforceable or verifiable. The Nuclear Group expressed strong reservations about such provisions. In addition, this provision goes against the U.S. relations with NATO, in particular provisions to make Polaris submarines part of the NATO defense. Any claim that the wording was cleverly drafted to exclude NATO would properly be regarded publicly as a subterfuge.

7. [Such nuclear weapon free areas as may be agreed shall be established.]

Comment: This provision is also regarded as unenforceable. The Nuclear Group was not aware that particular areas could be found which would not result in a net disadvantage to U.S. security.

C. Measures to Reduce Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1. All parties shall furnish the control organization complete information on the numbers of their strategic delivery vehicles by agreed categories. The information shall include numbers of vehicles and their location by defined areas, including sea and foreign land based units, but not specific individual vehicle locations within areas.

2. Reduction of strategic delivery vehicles to agreed levels shall be achieved by agreed steps with progressive verification of declared levels and reductions. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers

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to internationally supervised depots of vehicles that become excess during each step. Upon the attainment of agreed interim levels during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under international supervision shall be destroyed, transferred to the United Nations, or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Production of agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be discontinued.

4. Testing agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be halted, except as part of programs subject to appropriate and reciprocal inspection to confirm that firings are for peaceful applications.

5. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

Comment: It is noted that items 2, 3, 4 and 5 will require far-reaching control and inspection arrangements. Item 4 provides substantial danger of interference with the peaceful development of space vehicles in a way perhaps even more dramatic than the impact of the weapons test suspension on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Is it intended that nuclear propulsion research would be included in the agreed categories mentioned here?

D. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces
and Other Armaments

1. Complete information on existing numbers of forces, conventional armaments by major category, and military expenditures shall be furnished the control organization within one month after an agreement comes into force.

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2. Force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be reduced by agreed steps to 2.1 million each; concurrently, force levels of certain other states shall also be reduced to agreed levels.

3. Major types of armaments, by agreed categories, shall progressively be deposited in internationally supervised depots; the amounts to be deposited during each step within the Stage I reduction process shall be a portion of the difference between the initial levels and the agreed final levels for Stage I and shall be in relationship to the force level reductions for each step. When at the end of the Stage I transfers the parties have agreed that retained armaments and armed forces are at proscribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. While the composition of the final levels of armaments for Stage I need not be identical for each party, they shall be stipulated by each party in an agreed annex to the agreement.

4. Limitation of armaments and armed forces in agreed areas may be negotiated with the agreement of the countries affected.

5. An international study group of qualified experts shall be established for the purpose of seeking the technical bases for the design of inspection systems applicable to the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of CBR armaments.

E. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. The parties shall support in the United Nations the creation of a U.N. volunteer peace force, international in character, for use by appropriate organs of the U.N. to help maintain the peace. Members

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of this force shall be available to support the control organization in the conduct of its operations.

2. The parties shall promote studies by the U.N., and cooperate in implementation of those studies, so that the U.N. will have available, for later stages of disarmament, a peace force capable of maintaining international peace and security against the threat of aggression by any power or probable combination of powers.

3. The parties shall promote peace by refraining from any use or threat of force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter, and by exerting every influence against international use of force by any nation.

4. The parties shall contribute to peaceful development and change in other countries in accordance with the desires of such other countries, by refraining from: (a) indirect aggression and subversion against these countries; (b) providing military support to promote internal change by force of arms; and (c) otherwise interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

5. The parties shall use existing machinery in and out of the U.N. for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall support within the United Nations studies and the development of additional international peace-keeping arrangements.

6. The parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

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F. Control Organization

1. An international control organization shall be established upon entry into force of the agreement with the powers needed to verify compliance with the obligations undertaken in Stage I. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of these obligations. The control organization shall have an appropriate relationship to the United Nations which does not subject its operations to veto in the Security Council.

2. The control organization shall have an impartial director with authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

3. The control organization shall also have a control commission consisting of representatives of parties to the treaty, including the representatives of all the Big Powers, the function of which shall be to give the director such guidance as may be necessary and to determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of the treaty.

4. The International Court of Justice shall be available to the director or to the control commission for advisory opinions, and to a party in controversy with another, in regard to issues arising out of the application of the treaty and the operation of the control organization.

5. While Stage I is being implemented, the control organization shall study and approve the changes in personnel, equipment, and finances

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and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

G. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

1. Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) [all agreed] the measures constituting the first stage, including major measures in each proposed area of agreement, have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing; and (b) the control organization is ready to begin verification of compliance with the agreed measures in the second stage.

Comment: This is inserted to confirm the interdependence suggested under Implementing Principles.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in G.1. above has been accomplished.

A. Measures to Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. Further equitable transfers to non-weapon uses of fissionable materials from past production shall be made. As weapons materials stockpiles are reduced, control machinery shall be set up to verify past production and existing stockpiles to a degree consistent with the reductions in order to insure that no party is left with a disproportionate nuclear capability at any stage.

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Comment: This addition is to provide specifically for a most important control provision.

2. [States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable. If suggested at all it would be difficult to hold it back to Stage II in view of previous actions and pressures for such declaration. It is not consistent with our public NATO defense policy.

3. [Agreed arrangements to enforce a prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles between countries shall be instituted.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable.

4. [Additional agreed nuclear free zones shall be instituted.]

Comment: This provision is felt to be unenforceable.

B. Measures for Further Reduction of Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1. Further reductions in the inventories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure outlined

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in Stage I. The levels of reductions during Stage II would be related to the degree of improvement and increased confidence in the verification system, it being recognized that as low levels are achieved confidence in the effectiveness of the verification system must be greater than that acceptable for Stage I.

G. Measures for Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Other Armaments

1. Levels of forces for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be further reduced, by agreed steps, to 1.7 million each (Alternative: to agreed levels); force levels of the other states limited in Stage I as well as of certain additional states shall also be reduced to agreed levels so as to assure a continued balanced program of reductions.

2. Major types of armaments by agreed categories shall be further reduced in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

3. Further limitations on armed forces and armaments in agreed areas may be negotiated with the agreement of the countries affected.

4. Additional air and ground inspection zones as may be agreed shall be established.

5. A Scientific Commission on CBR weapons shall be established under the control organization to design effective means for controlled limitation on CBR armaments and to recommend an effective system with reliable safeguards for CBR disarmament.

D. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. During Stage II the parties shall cooperate to develop further the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, to the end that during the development of Stage III the United Nations will effectively be able to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

Therefore, during Stage II:

(a) An international peace force shall be established under a United Nations command responsible to the political organs of the United Nations.

(b) Nations would agree upon such necessary changes in the structure and operation of the United Nations to assure that the United Nations will be able to operate more effectively to protect nations against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(c) Nations would also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

E. Control Organization

1. The powers and responsibilities of the control organization shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

F. Transition from Stage II to Stage III

1. Transition from the second stage to the third stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) all measures

in the second stage have been fully implemented; (b) the control organ is ready to begin verification of appropriate measures in the third stage; and (c) the international machinery is effectively operating and continues to be capable of maintaining international peace and security under conditions of Stage III.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program and the development of strengthened international peacekeeping machinery should have reached a point where the nations of the world can move forward to a third stage in which progressive general disarmament would proceed to a point where no nation would have the military capability which could challenge the progressively strengthened international security forces. The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contingents of forces to assist the international peace force.

(b) Weapons capable of producing mass destruction or lethal mass casualties, and their means of delivery would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used for national security forces or by the international peace force.

(d) The peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all nations under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

SUPPLEMENT TO
RECOMMENDED U. S. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

I. Introduction

1. This paper constitutes a supplement to the Recommended U. S. Disarmament Negotiating Proposal and is not intended for formal tabling in negotiations with the U.S.S.R. The approach and measures outlined herein do not lend themselves to formal discussion in the kind of disarmament negotiations that have traditionally been held since 1946, because much of what is suggested here is designed to induce modifications in military posture and practices that are not susceptible to formal agreement. Moreover, the U.S.S.R.'s traditional aversion to measures or approaches which it regards as "espionage", together with its obvious intent to continue to pursue the sort of "radical" disarmament policy exemplified by its proposals for GCD, makes it virtually certain that any semi-public or formal broaching of the type of "arms control" measures suggested below would be rejected out-of-hand by the Soviets. In fact, Soviet rejection of private, informal approaches is only slightly less likely. Nevertheless, if there is any chance of beginning a dialogue with the U.S.S.R. on the matters mentioned in this supplement, it is through informal soundings essentially outside the normal framework of disarmament negotiations.

2. The manner in which the measures suggested herein should be taken up with the Soviets should be flexible. Informal bilateral talks concurrent with more formal disarmament discussions are one way, though perhaps not the best in view of past Soviet attitudes. An alternative worth looking at is to use the personnel now essentially inactive at the U.N. Military Staff Committee; other means may be the military attaches in Moscow and Washington or in some other capitals, or the military missions in contact in Germany.

II. Nature of Measures

1. The basic purpose of the various suggestions made is (1) to improve communication between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and hence to reduce the risk of misinterpretations of military activities, (2) to reduce the danger that accidental or unpremeditated occurrences will lead to the unleashing of strategic strike forces, (3) to reduce the need for rapid response, especially in the face of ambiguous indicators, and (4) to reduce the incentive, temptation or compulsion to initiate general nuclear war.

2. Few, if any, of the measures proposed are suitable for formal agreements requiring ratification by constitutional processes or even by Executive Agreements. This is so not only because there is virtually no chance that the Soviets would accept such agreements; it is due also to the fact that formally binding agreements may be undesirable even if obtainable. Many of the measures are keyed to transitory strategic situations, others may be experimental or tentative and still others simply involve the development of more

productive and frank verbal exchanges.

3. It goes without saying that the measures or actions suggested are not intended to be packaged; each, in and of itself, would have merit if implemented separately.

4. Finally, the approach outlined herein is thought to be responsive to the desire of both sides to avoid general nuclear war. Hence it should probably be pursued regardless of whether U.S. - Soviet relations are relatively tranquil or relatively turbulent; indeed, it has been suggested that it would be more urgent to pursue it in times of crisis to avoid escalation.

III. Suggested Measures, Approaches, or Actions

i. Information Exchange

The U.S. would make available to the Soviets at an early date and if a suitable opportunity presents itself a compendium of measures which the U.S. now is taking, or plans to take unilaterally to make its forces less accident-prone, more truly of second-strike character, and otherwise more stable. The document should be made available without a request for a similar document in return, though the inference that we would welcome one could be left. The document could indicate where the U.S. would be able to do more if certain reciprocal actions by the Soviets occurred but this should be done subtly in view of Soviet sensitivity to "intelligence-gathering." To avoid difficulties with the Allies, the document should probably be made available to NATO together with an indication that it has been given the Soviets. It should not, however, be published so as

not to compromise the privacy of the channel. We would, of course, have no control over Soviet publication perhaps even with a propaganda blast that it proves U.S. opposition to disarmament. But this should not disturb us since the main purpose is to get the Soviets to read it.

2. Purple Telephone

For a variety of reasons the establishment of rapid communication between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR, is, on balance, desirable. Various ways of bringing this about have been proposed, including a direct Kremlin-White House line, a line between U.S. and Soviet command posts, and the use of communication satellites. The most practical means would appear to be a unilateral U.S. telephone link between the Department of State and the Embassy in Moscow similar to that now in existence between London and the British Embassy in Moscow. Installation of such a line probably requires approval of the Soviet authorities, if this is readily obtained (there may be difficulty over whether scramblers could be used over landlines through Soviet territory), the President could then notify Khrushchev when the line is installed and indicate that it is available should the need arise to clarify each other's intentions in times of crisis or accident. If the Soviet authorities give trouble, the President might at that point ask Khrushchev's intervention and explain the advantages of the system.

3. Military Attaches

We might usefully suggest to the Soviets an increase in respective attache staffs to open up an avenue for professional military contacts

and possibly for use if either side wishes to reassure the other of its benign intent in the event of some accidental occurrence or if it became apparent that the side was misconstruing some particular action, (e.g. an exercise or alert). We might also consider using the Soviet personnel attached to the U.N. Military Staff Committee in this way, in which case it would be desirable to urge the Soviets to assign well-qualified personnel.

As a variant of the above suggestion, we could propose the establishment of emergency observation teams in each other's capitals for use in case either side feels the need to reassure the other.

4. Advance Notification of Missile Launchings

Although a proposal on this is included in our formal disarmament proposal, it may nevertheless be desirable, especially if the Soviets continue to reject it, to undertake a private effort to explain to the Soviets the advantage of such a program for reducing miscalculations or misplaced anxieties. We might suggest that if they are opposed to a formal agreement, we simply begin the practice of advance notification (already adhered to for the most part by us and in the case of the Soviet Pacific missiles shots by the Soviets) without saying that it was part of an agreement. It might be suggested to the Soviets that in time the MIDAS-type systems of both sides might be used to check on these advance notifications.

5. Advance Notification of Aircraft Flights in Certain Regions

We might broach the notion of private advance notification to each other of bomber flights in the Arctic Region above 60 or 65 degrees

north latitude. National warning systems could detect violations of the understanding and also whether the arrangement makes any difference in terms of the responses made by the respective defenses to such flights.

6. Non-Aggression Pact in Space

The U.S. should begin a gradual campaign of seeking to impress on the Soviets the stabilizing nature of various types of satellite observation systems. Such a campaign might culminate in a tacit understanding not to interfere with each other's satellite systems. Such a "non-aggression pact" in space could be a concomitant to a formal agreement not to station vehicles capable of delivering mass-destruction weapons in space. In connection with such a "pact" there might also be an arrangement for sharing the data gathered by various kinds of satellite systems, especially of the MIDAS type.

7. Exchange of Information on Communications and Strategic Indicators

The U.S. might broach the desirability of exchanging information and consulting in times of communications failures of various sorts. (Communications "standdowns" are sources of anxiety.) More delicately, and depending on Soviet receptivity to the general approach of this supplement, there might be an exchange about the sort of intelligence indicators that cause anxiety and some beginnings about modifying those practices.

8. Limitations on Space Launches

The U.S. could suggest to the Soviets that as both sides enter the period when they are capable of multiple space and missile shots on a given day, it would be prudent to limit such launches to a

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relatively small number, and to allow intervals between them. The purpose would be to prevent any concern on the other side that (1) an actual attack was in progress, (2) efforts are being made to degrade the other side's detection system preparatory to an attack, or (3) salvo firing was being practiced.

9. Limitations on Deployments of Strategic Missiles and Nuclear Weapons

When and if the U.S. decides not to deploy MRBM's on the ground in Europe or to withdraw ICBM's presently stationed in Europe, we might indicate to the Soviets that we are contemplating these actions, that we would have a much easier time implementing them if they refrained from deploying missiles capable of striking Western Europe, and that we cannot guarantee that we will always refrain from deploying strategic missiles to Western Europe unless we see that the Soviets do not threaten Western Europe with their missiles.

We might also indicate to the Soviets that we would consider pulling back tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for a certain distance if (1) we were reasonably certain they had none with their forces or those of their allies in Eastern Europe, and (2) they otherwise were in a visibly defensive posture in East Germany.

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Dear Mr. McTigue:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft working paper for the disarmament negotiating proposal. I know that this represents a great deal of work by your staff and by the many consultative groups that you have called upon for assistance in this difficult area. We appreciate the opportunity you have given to our staff to participate in formulating these proposals.

In making up our comments we have examined the new proposals against the background of the last formal policy, set forth in the June 27, 1960 document, and have given serious thought to consideration of those matters by the consultative groups you have appointed to work in the important disarmament areas. We have internally been most concerned with the work of the Group on Nuclear Armaments. Our general comments on the most important areas are included in this letter but I have thought it worthwhile to attach a copy of the draft working paper with our specific comments included at appropriate places. These have, in general, been related to previous positions and to the work of the Nuclear Group, whose conclusions appear in a number of cases not to have been taken very seriously.

Interdependence of Arms Control Measures.

The first implementing principle in the working paper, that disarmament should proceed with no adverse effect on the security of any state, describes a condition that can be reached only if measures to be put in effect in any stage are carefully interrelated so that there is a mutually relative effect on the security of the individual states. Design of such relationships requires very careful and serious study going far beyond what has already been done; I am sure that your organization is undertaking such studies. It would be desirable to provide specifically in the policy statement that the desirability of maintaining the relative effect on security will be taken seriously and will be implemented through careful design of the collection measures making up each stage.

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2. Existence of Effective Control.

There is general agreement that the implementation of disarmament measures must be accompanied by effective control arrangements. The Consultative Group on Nuclear Armaments stated, and we agree, that this important principle should be strengthened in the proposed declaration, and we have made several specific suggestions to this effect.

3. Restrictions of Flexible Material Stockpiles.

The Nuclear Group recommended that such restrictions be confined in Stage I to the offer to transfer 30,000 kgs of U-235. It is not clear in the proposals whether the U.S. would be committed in Stage I to transfer greater quantities than this.

4. Measures to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

There are a number of proposals, including those for transfer of weapons between nations, nuclear free zones and limitations on use of nuclear weapons, that were felt by the Nuclear group to be untransferable and unverifiable, in effect to be declarations of intent with no force. We have reservations about including these in a serious arms control system and have so indicated in the draft where such measures are proposed.

5. Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.

The present draft seems to assume that the nuclear test negotiations will be successfully concluded by the time this document is needed. This expression of encouraging optimism at this late date is not realistic. It urges that reference to the long continuing test negotiations be kept out of this document, in line with U.S. policy to maintain these negotiations separate from the disarmament negotiations.

6. Timing of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

We are somewhat concerned that a test ban on strategic delivery vehicles would be rather difficult to separate from work on the peaceful exploration of space. Our particular concern is with Soviet but we feel this general question should be clarified.

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I hope these general comments as well as the specific suggestions in the attachment will be useful to you in reviewing the paper in preparation for a Principals' discussion on the subject. We appreciate the continuing opportunity to participate in your deliberations.

Sincerely,

Chairman

The Honorable John J. McCloy
Advisor to the President
on Disarmament
U. S. Department of State

Attachment:
Draft Working Paper,
as annotated.

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Draft Paper
June 24, 1961

This document consists of 15
pages. Number 62 of 100
copies, Series A.

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RECOMMENDED U.S. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

I. BASIC CONSIDERATION

A. The Goal

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The ultimate goal is a secure, free and peaceful world of independent nations in which the use of force has been replaced by the rule of law, and international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peaceably under the U.N.

B. Disarmament Objectives

As an essential contribution to the ultimate goal, nations should seek agreement on measures to:

1. Eliminate the threat of war by any means including surprise attack, accident, miscalculation, or misinformation.
2. Eliminate the capabilities of nations to launch armed attack against other nations.
3. Eliminate the dangers which require nations to divert resources to defense needs.

C. Implementing Principles

1. Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out progressively in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty, obtain military advantage over other States

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Attachment to memo to Comm from English - 7-5-61
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as a result of the progress of disarmament.

2. Disarmament shall proceed through stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international control organization set up within the framework of the United Nations. The arrangements and procedures necessary for effective verification and inspection shall be instituted so as to be capable of ensuring compliance with each measure at the time it is put into effect.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified and inspected throughout by the international control organization to ensure that compliance with these obligations is verified and inspected from their entry into force; such verification and inspection shall include the capability to ascertain not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage. Provisions in respect of international verification and inspection shall form an integral part of any agreement on disarmament.

4. As the levels of national forces and arms are progressively reduced the international institutions for maintaining peace shall be progressively strengthened so that as disarmament of national military establishments proceeds, nations can rely on effective international institutions for peace, security and justice.

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5. Transition from one stage to the next shall be initiated by a procedure which confirms that all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that the additional arrangements, procedures, and capacity required for verification and inspection of compliance with measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively on an immediate and continuing basis.

D. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and to implement as rapidly as feasible the widest area of agreement possible on measures by stages directed toward achieving the ultimate goal and to continue their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

II. THE PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following is submitted as an outline program for general disarmament. It is proposed that this program governed by the foregoing principles should form the basis for a joint declaration to serve as a guide for the negotiating states.

STAGE I

Stage I provides for measures which can be undertaken promptly and which would promote confidence, lessen the danger

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of war, and begin the curtailment of national military capabilities:

A. Measures to Reduce the Danger of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack

1. Signatory states shall make advance notification to participating states and to the control organization of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.

2. Signatory states shall make advance notification to participating states and to the control organization of such agreed types of major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

3. There shall be established control posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airbases to report on concentrations of military forces.

4. Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

B. Measures to Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped. (NOTE: Defense prefers to have the cut-off measure conditioned upon and following verification of 2.1 million force level).

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2. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

3. A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear powers shall be established for the purpose of developing information for use by the nuclear powers in formulating proposals to accomplish the reduction and eventual elimination of such stockpiles except as they are used for peaceful purposes under effective controls.

4. Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

5. The nations possessing nuclear weapons shall each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer nuclear weapons, materials for production of nuclear weapons, or technology required to produce nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons. Nations not now possessing nuclear weapons shall, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to seek or receive such assistance. (NOTE: To be redrafted by Defense in accordance with June 24 Defense - USDA meeting).

C. Measures to Reduce Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

1. All parties shall furnish the control organization complete information on the numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles

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by agreed categories. The information shall include numbers of vehicles and their location by defined areas, including sea and foreign land based units, but not specific individual vehicle locations within areas.

2. Reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to agreed levels shall be achieved by agreed steps with progressive verification of declared levels and reductions. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers to internationally supervised depots of vehicles that become excess during each step. Upon the attainment of agreed interim levels during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under international supervision shall be destroyed, transferred to the United Nations, or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Production of agreed categories of nuclear delivery vehicles shall be discontinued.

4. Testing of agreed categories of nuclear delivery vehicles shall be halted.

5. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited. (NOTE: Defense prefers to have the delivery vehicle measures, except for No. 5 in Stage II or, if in Stage I, after verification of the 2.1 million force level).

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D. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces
and Other Armaments

1. Upon the accession of all militarily significant states, force levels of 2.1 million shall be established for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels shall be established for other militarily significant states. In the event that the initial verification of the force levels shows that the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. is substantially above the force level of the other, the state with the higher force level shall first reduce its forces to the level of the other state and when this is accomplished, the force reductions shall proceed thereupon on a balanced basis. A similar relationship shall exist between reduction of forces by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other militarily significant states.

2. Agreed types of armaments, by major categories and in agreed quantities, shall be deposited in internationally supervised depots. When at the end of the Stage I transfers, the parties have agreed that retained armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. A C.B.R. Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the C.B.R. powers shall be established for the purpose of developing information for use by the C.B.R. powers in formulating proposals for the design of inspection systems applicable to the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of C.B.R. armaments.

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E. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. The parties shall support in the United Nations the creation of a U.N. peace force, for use by appropriate organs of the United Nations to help maintain the peace. Members of this force shall be available to support the control organization in the conduct of its operations.

2. The parties shall promote studies by the U.N., and cooperate in implementation of these studies, so that the U.N. will have available, for later stages of disarmament, a peace force capable of maintaining international peace and security against the threat of aggression by any power or probable combination of powers.

3. The parties shall promote peace by refraining from any use or threat of force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter, and by exerting every influence against international use of force by any nation.

4. The parties shall contribute to peaceful development and change in other countries in accordance with the desires of such other countries, by refraining from: (a) indirect aggression and subversion against these countries; (b) providing military support to promote internal change by force of arms; and (c) otherwise interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

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5. The parties shall use existing machinery in and out of the U.N. for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall support within the United Nations studies and the development of additional international peace-keeping arrangements.

6. The parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

F. Establishment of Control Organization

1. An international control organization shall be established upon entry into force of the agreement with the powers needed to verify compliance with the obligations undertaken in Stage I. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of these obligations in accordance with the foregoing principles. The control organization shall have an appropriate relationship to the United Nations which does not subject its operations to veto in the Security Council.

2. The control organization shall have an impartial director with authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

3. The control organization shall also have a control commission consisting of representatives of parties to the treaty, including the representatives of all the Big Fowers,

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the function of which shall be to give the director such guidance as may be necessary and to determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of the treaty.

4. The International Court of Justice shall be available to the director or to the control commission for advisory opinions, and to a party in controversy with another, in regard to issues arising out of the application of the treaty and the operation of the control organization.

5. While Stage I is being implemented, the control organization shall study and recommend the changes in personnel, equipment, and finances and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

G. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

1. Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated by a procedure which confirms that: (a) all agreed measures constituting the first stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing; and (b) the control organization is ready to begin

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verification of compliance with the agreed measures in the second stage on an immediate and continuing basis.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in G.I. above has been accomplished.

A. Measures to Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. Further equitable transfers to non-weapons uses of fissionable materials from past production shall be made.
2. Agreed arrangements to enforce a prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles between countries shall be instituted.
3. States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction. (NOTE: This measure has been kept in this draft for the purpose of further consideration).

B. Measures for Further Reduction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

1. Further reductions in the inventories of nuclear delivery vehicles shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I. The levels of reductions during Stage II would be related to the degree of improvement and increased confidence in the verification system, it being recognized that as low levels are achieved confidence in the effectiveness of the verification system must be greater than that acceptable for Stage I.

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C. Measures for Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Other Armaments

1. Levels of forces for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be further reduced, by agreed steps to agreed levels; force levels of all militarily significant states shall also be reduced to agreed levels so as to assure a balanced program of reductions.

2. Agreed types of armaments by major categories that become surplus as force levels are reduced shall be placed in depots under international supervision and at the end of Stage II shall, upon a decision of the powers concerned, be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. The C.B.R. expert commission shall develop information for use by the C.B.R. powers in formulating proposals for an effective means of controlling limitations on C.B.R. armaments and an effective system of C.B.R. disarmament.

D. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. During Stage II the parties shall cooperate to develop further the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations, to the end that during the development of Stage III the United Nations will effectively be able to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

(a) An international peace force shall be established within the framework of the United Nations.

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(b) Nations shall agree upon any changes in the structure and operation of the United Nations necessary to assure that the United Nations will be able to operate more effectively to protect nations against threats to or breaches of peace.

(c) Nations shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

E. Control Organization

1. The powers and responsibilities of the control organization shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

F. Transition from Stage II to Stage III

1. Transition from the second stage to the third stage should be initiated by a machine which confirms that: (a) all measures in the second stage have been fully implemented; (b) the control organ is ready to begin verification of appropriate measures in the third stage on an immediate and continuing basis; and (c) the international machinery is effectively operating and continues to be capable of maintaining international peace and security under conditions of Stage III.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program and the

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development of strengthened international peace-keeping machinery within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the nations of the world can move forward to a third stage in which progressive controlled universal disarmament would proceed to a point where no nation would have the military capability which could challenge the progressively strengthened international security forces. The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which

(a) The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force.

(b) The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces would be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other armaments including weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, which are excess to the agreed requirements of the international peace force and agreed contingents of national armed forces would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

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(c) The manufacture of armaments would be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used by the international peace force and the agreed remaining contingents of national armed forces.

(d) The peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all nations under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

(Defense has some drafting points which, after consideration, have not been accepted. It is believed, however, that in all cases where there is disagreement on any matter which USDA considers to be a matter of substance, the disagreement has been stated).

D:lt June 24, 1961

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United States Disarmament Administration

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June 5, 1961

US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON DISARMAMENT

Washington, June 19, 1961

Background Paper

UK Paper on Future Strategy on
Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons Tests

British Ambassador Caccia handed the attached paper on future strategy on disarmament and nuclear tests to Mr. McCloy on May 25, 1961.

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Beatrice R. Puckett
Staff Assistant for Communications
U.S. Disarmament Administration
Room 5672-B NS
Ext. 6783

Attachment:

UK Paper on Strategy.

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[Signature] Date 6-23-00

20-1351-4-8

Attachments to memo to Comm. from Dr. English - 6/5-61

FUTURE STRATEGY ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS

I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET TROIKA PROPOSAL

1. By proposing to substitute "troikas", first for Mr. Hammarskjold, and now for the neutral Administrator (chief international executive) of the nuclear tests Control System, the Soviet Government imply that they are rejecting the whole concept of impartial arbitration in international affairs. For the international approach to solution of world problems the proposal substitutes a strictly nationalistic approach; it implies a refusal to contemplate even the smallest surrender of national sovereignty.

2. Another essential feature of the proposal is its cynicism towards the whole idea of neutrality. It is based frankly on the proposition that no man can be impartial, and that there can therefore be no such thing as an impartial, international executive, free of direct government influence, such as the Charter requires the United Nations Secretariat to be. The place in the troika assigned to a representative of the neutral states is in fact mere window-dressing; the neutral would have no real influence, and the Soviet Government seems to aim at bringing about a period in which world affairs will be regulated by agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. Statements by Soviet spokesmen support this.

3. Hitherto all attempts at disarmament have been founded on the international approach. So have the complex of organisations within the United Nations framework and many other international activities. If the troika represents a new and universal Soviet philosophy, and if it prevails, it will mean the end of the United Nations as conceived in the Charter. It will also obviously do away with the basic concepts underlying disarmament plans hitherto: the concept of relying for security on the control of an impartial international body over disarmament; the concept of a disarmed world governed by an impartial peace-keeping body answerable to the whole concert of nations; the concept of settling all disputes through arbitration of a greatly strengthened International Court. These have up to now been accepted as the only concepts offering a tolerable world order in the long run.

II. DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

4. Two considerations stand out:

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(1) We do not know how far the Russians mean to go with their troika approach. There is a strong presumption that they intend to apply it to disarmament and in due course to everything. But we should be unwise to act publicly on this presumption until it is proved. So far in the strict context of disarmament it has only been introduced, and then partially withdrawn, in proposals for the composition of the next negotiating body - a very different matter from the executive organ to supervise implementation of a negotiated agreement. To the world at large Western and Soviet disarmament plans now look much alike; e.g. the Russians recently accepted the idea of peace-keeping machinery. We should not seem to be expecting, or inviting, them to bring the troika into disarmament.

(ii) Besides not knowing the answer to (i), world opinion and the majority of the United Nations are not yet fully aware of the implications of the troika proposal as set out above (this is true even of some intelligent Western opinion). Our immediate aim must be to make these implications fully and universally understood.

5. Meanwhile we must cater for two possibilities:

(a) there is still a chance that if the West reacts strongly against the troika approach, and if it is strongly enough condemned in the United Nations, where it has received practically no support hitherto, the Soviet Government may modify or withdraw it;

(b) it is, however, much more likely that the Soviet Government will feel able, and be able, to persist with it whatever we may do.

6. If (b) is right, we can expect a space of up to a year or longer, during which genuine and productive disarmament negotiation will be impossible. Our task in this period will be to resist the troika approach; to make everyone aware of its real meaning; and to see what play of force results. This will take us at least until the end of the 1961 General Assembly, and possibly through another round of disarmament negotiations thereafter, should this not have taken place before the Assembly meets.

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7. Until this stage is over it will be premature to decide whether any form of agreement may be possible or desirable on the troika basis, i.e. whether, and if so to what extent, effective reciprocal control could be substituted for international control. We may find the international approach ruled out for years and we may see no alternative to temporary acceptance of the reciprocal approach. We may be led to suspend efforts at disarmament altogether and concentrate on other means of increasing Western security. We cannot see our way so far ahead, and we should stand by our existing principles whilst there is a chance of the Russians giving way.

III. DISARMAMENT TACTICS

8. We can do a certain amount in the Nuclear Test talks towards finding out where the Russians stand. But we are unlikely to discover much more than we know already; and these talks are too complex and command too little attention to be of much use in educating world opinion. To bring the Russians clearly into the open we shall almost certainly need another round of substantive disarmament talks. Even in the General Assembly, unless disarmament talks had taken place, the Russians might be able to conceal their hand if they wished, because the Assembly is not capable of any profound substantive debate. Thus, if for some reason no substantive discussion takes place before the autumn Assembly this year, the "moment of truth" may have to wait for substantive disarmament discussion in 1962.

9. But the General Assembly is where we must complete the education of world opinion as to the true nature of the Soviet stand, and where we must finally assess world reactions to it.

10. Both in order to smoke the Russians out and to ensure support for the Western line of conduct (especially if this involves radical action on testing; see below) it is essential for the West to have a clear, positive line on disarmament for the Assembly. This means having an imaginative plan for general disarmament, providing from the first for disarmament as well as control, and also containing much more concrete proposals on control and peace-keeping machinery than hitherto. The plan would be international in approach, and by providing specifically for a genuinely international control organisation and peace-keeping machinery under impartial direction it should aim at forcing the Russians to show their hand.

11. The

11. The next Western plan ought to be bold and imaginative and it need not be too detailed on the technical side. It is the political framework within which disarmament is to take place which will be the vital ground upon which the debate with the Soviet Union must take place. If as seems certain the Russians maintain their insistence on a troika basis there will be not the slightest prospect of their accepting the Western plan. However, this in no way diminishes the need for really imaginative proposals from the West.

12. From the above it is clear that we need another round of substantive disarmament talks as soon as practicable; but that the world will not be fully educated to the true position before the coming autumn at best; and that we need time to prepare the necessary positive disarmament proposals for a show-down in the General Assembly.

13. Hence it follows that, should the U.S./U.S.S.R. bilateral talks on procedures in June and July open the way to renewed multilateral negotiations, and should the West decline to proceed with such negotiations this summer, the justification for their refusal would still not be nearly well or widely enough understood. We could not even show with certainty that the troika was to be applied to disarmament. To refuse to talk disarmament, still more to walk out of talks in being, weakens one's case in any circumstances. It is possible that the Russians may not want to begin multilateral, substantive talks before the General Assembly; or they may seek to introduce substance into their bilateral talks with the United States on procedure. We must deal with these possibilities as they come. But we shall be best served by letting arrangements go forward and trying to smoke out the Russians as soon as possible.

14. It also follows that we shall not be ready for a show-down in the Assembly at least until the regular autumn session; and that we shall therefore do better to avoid a special session. A special session might conceivably be limited to the nuclear tests problem and leave our major strategy to be pursued as above. Nevertheless, we shall be better off without it; there must be a danger that our reactions to the test problem would provoke the Assembly's censure and thereby weaken our general case.

IV. NUCLEAR TESTS TACTICS

15. Our tactics on nuclear tests must be compatible with the requirements of larger strategy on disarmament and

the future

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the future of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the nuclear tests situation imposes certain requirements of its own.

16. Although the Russians may fear a general resumption of testing in the long run, because of the nth-country problem, it is highly probable that the Soviet Government will not at present modify its major positions in the Nuclear Tests Conference sufficiently to permit an agreement this year; almost certainly not on the troika proposal and probably not on "self-inspection", the quota, moratorium, etc. This being so, things will be easier for us if the Russians remain completely rigid; if they do make some concessions, we should be prepared to cap them with counter-concessions (we still have a few). While the Conference lasts, we must do our best to publicise, explain and profit from Soviet intransigence.

17. The Soviet aim is probably to entangle the test ban with disarmament: to get it treated as an hors d'oeuvre to disarmament, requiring no control, or to make it an item in the first stage of disarmament with minimal special controls apart from those for disarmament measures. We can show, of course, that this would mean delaying an actual agreement on tests indefinitely. In view of the French and Chinese problems, we have a strong case for arguing that the nuclear test ban must be kept separate from disarmament; the negotiations must be confined at first to the three Powers; and the Treaty should be founded on the work already done. We should keep firmly to this line.

18. But we must recognise that two-thirds of the Assembly would probably now vote for cessation of all tests regardless of control. There would be a two-thirds majority against resumption of testing in almost any circumstances (probably regardless of whether testing were kept underground). Many of our difficulties with the Russians over control are incomprehensible to the uninitiated. Thus the Soviet hand on nuclear tests is in this respect strong.

19. Nevertheless, the threat to resume testing is the main Western card, and we must soon decide whether and how to play it. It is questionable whether this threat, or even its execution, would actually alter Soviet policy; probably not in the sense of bringing the Russians to conclude an acceptable test-ban Treaty, on the present basis, in the near future. They are more likely to try and exploit Western testing politically to force a change of Western policy. They may even welcome a chance to test themselves. The

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military arguments for an against testing seem evenly balanced. The strongest argument for resuming is that of "credibility" (we have always said that we cannot give up testing without an agreement assuring adequate control; if this is to be believed, and we are denied an agreement, we must therefore test). This argument does not prejudice our stand on disarmament directly, because disarmament requires the positive act of destroying armaments, unlike the purely negative act of not testing. But if the West allows it to be seen that Soviet manoeuvres and the pressure of uninformed world opinion can force it to give up necessary defence measures, without controls, there is no doubt that our credibility will be affected and our stand on disarmament will be indirectly weakened. Further, the prospect of resumed testing would do much to wake up the world to what is happening.

20. It may thus be necessary for the United States to declare that it is preparing to resume, the declaration making it clear implicitly (if not explicitly) that testing will in fact be resumed as soon as practicable if the situation does not improve. In this declaration, and at all times, the West should of course offer the alternative of a Treaty such as we tabled in Geneva on April 18. Nor should the declaration be made before the West has appealed to Khrushchev to accept such a Treaty and has given him reasonable time to reply. This implies that the declaration would be made not before the end of June.

21. "Credibility", however, also means that either a threat must be carried out, or there must be a graceful way of withdrawing it. World-wide pressure, fanned by the Russians, will probably make it impossible for the West to test indefinitely, perhaps even to resume military testing at all. Moreover, the Russians would have strong support for themselves refusing disarmament talks while the West were actually testing, and the blame would then be placed largely on us. There is therefore considerable risk in declaring the resumption of testing. This risk must no doubt be accepted, but it must also be made as small as possible.

22. The world will anyhow not tolerate testing for testing's sake, or out of spite; it must be for a valid and necessary purpose. Nor does it seem desirable, on balance, to carry out a test immediately after the declaration. This would make it look as if the United States had simply been preparing and waiting to test all the time. There is

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advantage in assessing the world reaction to the threat before actually carrying it out; the reaction may, after all, be unacceptably strong. These factors combine to suggest that actual tests should be delayed until late autumn, after the regular Assembly debate. If a decision to test is taken in July, we believe that only two types of tests could be made ready before the end of the year: either (a) underground explosions for seismic research; or (b) underground detonation of weapons fully developed but not yet actually proved by testing.

23. Type (a), the research explosions, looks the best to start on. The advantages are that the explosions would be for peaceful, not military, purposes; this could be demonstrated by inviting the Russians and the United Nations to observe them under the old Western safeguards procedure (not involving internal inspection of devices); the Russians would doubtless refuse but the United Nations or others could accept, and most people would accept the experiments for what they were. The Russians, who have threatened to regard all explosions without their participation as military explosions, would then be in something of a dilemma: if they did nothing, their bluff would be called; if they countered with military explosions themselves, they would incur their share of the odium for resumption of military testing. Finally, the experiments might actually clear up some of the uncertainties about nuclear controls; in particular, if one or two small, decoupling experiments could be included we might come nearer resolving the decoupling problem one way or the other, and this would be a real advantage.

24. The disadvantage is that such explosions would not be necessary for national security and might be condemned as a purely political manoeuvre. But the initial declaration would cover all testing, and it could be made clear that military testing was meant to follow. The fact that research experiments came first could be attributed to the preparations already made for them.

25. If the United States Government decides against actual testing, or prefers to postpone this decision, it would still be justifiable (assuming an unfavourable reply from Khrushchev) to make a declaration reaffirming the West's freedom to test. For the United States this would amount to a reaffirmation by the new Administration of President Eisenhower's announcement of December 29, 1959. For the United Kingdom the declaration would mark the end of the self-

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imposed moratorium "whilst useful negotiations continue" which Mr. Butler announced in July, 1959. If no test ban or disarmament agreements are attainable for a long time (which is quite probable) the West may well ultimately want to test; there will then be advantage in having declared the right to do so whilst the justification for it was still fresh and clear. It is also desirable at least to make the United Nations understand that the Soviet attitude deprives the world of any assurance that testing will not be resumed.

26. Once the declaration were made, we should continue to stress our willingness to negotiate and should do nothing to break off the Nuclear Tests Conference; but the Conference would probably have to go into cold storage. Either token delegations could remain in Geneva or the West could propose a recess sine die, making clear its willingness to resume whenever the Russians were prepared to negotiate.

27. At the General Assembly the Western line would be to resist substantive discussion of the test ban or its absorption in disarmament, whilst at the same time clarifying and emphasising for the uninitiated the reasons why negotiations at Geneva had foundered. The West would maintain its Treaty offer and its willingness to resume the Nuclear Tests Conference whenever the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate seriously. There would still be a danger of some disadvantageous resolution on testing, but at least the West will be in as strong a position to take this line as it is ever likely to be.

28. There is some risk that even the declaration on testing in July would cause the Russians to break off the disarmament discussions; but provided no testing were in progress, the Russians would probably not receive too much support for this, and the risk could be accepted.

UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

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D/B-4
June 6, 1961

US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON DISARMAMENT

Washington, June 19, 1961

Background Paper

Soviet Aide-Memoire dated June 4, 1961

The attached Soviet Aide-Memoire was handed to United States officials at the conclusion of the conference on June 4, 1961 between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

Beatrice R. Puckett
Staff Assistant for Communications
U.S. Disarmament Administration
Room 5672-B NS
Ext. 6783

Attachment:

Soviet Aide-Memoire.

State-RD.

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State Dept Declassification Review
Declassified & Released by A/RPS/IFM/CR/SRP
H. Engelbrecht Date 6-23-01

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Text of Soviet Aide-Memoire
dated June 4, 1961 on
Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons Tests

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to set forth its views on the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. As is known, negotiations between the Representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in Geneva have been going on for more than two and a half years. However, great difficulties still lie in the way of an agreement.

For its part, the Soviet Union has been doing its utmost to come to an agreement with the USA and Great Britain as soon as possible regarding a treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The Soviet Union is known to have made substantial concessions to its Western partners in negotiations by accepting a number of their proposals in order to remove obstacles in the way to an agreement.

The position of the Soviet Government at the Geneva negotiations is plain and clear. The Soviet Union is seeking to bring about the cessation of all kinds of nuclear weapons tests everywhere and forever. The Soviet Government, however, cannot and never will agree to a treaty on the cessation of tests becoming a mere scrap of paper serving as a screen for further experiments with nuclear weapons for the purpose of their destruction. There can be no exceptions from the treaty; all kinds of nuclear weapons tests must be prohibited; in the air, under water, under ground and in outer space.

In connection with the unsatisfactory situation now obtaining at the Geneva Conference the Soviet Government would like to restate its position on the major issues, which still remain unsettled.

The question of the moratorium. As is known, the Soviet Government has accepted the American proposal that for the time being the treaty should not provide for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests below a certain magnitude. Now we have to come to agreement on a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions which temporarily remain outside the scope of the treaty. It goes without saying that agreement on the moratorium should be of such a nature that no state could violate it arbitrarily and resume test explosions of nuclear bombs.

Proceeding

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Proceeding from this, the Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the ending of the duration of the moratorium on which the parties concerned will come to an agreement should not automatically relieve the states of the obligation not to carry out underground nuclear explosions.

The question of control. The Soviet Union, like the United States, believes that strict international control should be established over the cessation of tests. It is quite evident, however, that this control can be effective only if it is based on the mutual agreement of the parties and not on the desire to use the control mechanism for the purpose of imposing the will of one group of states upon another group.

The Soviet Government has comprehensively examined the question of ensuring the equality of the parties in exercising control and has come to the firm conclusion that the staffing of the control bodies should be based on the equal representation of the sides. It is in accordance with this principle that the Soviet Union suggests that agreement should be reached on the composition of the administrative council, the main executive organ.

Refusal to accept the proposal to establish an administrative council composed of three equal representatives - one from each main group of states: the Socialist States, the Member States of the Western Military Blocs and the Neutral States - is supported by assertions that the Soviet Union is allegedly seeking to gain some special rights in the control organization. These assertions have certainly no foundation whatsoever. What is the real meaning of the proposal of the Soviet Union? Its actual meaning is to rule out any possibility for one side to gain some particular advantages or prejudice the security of one or another group of states. What we wish to ensure is not formal but genuine equality of the sides in carrying out the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

The Control Commission in which all the main groups of states will be represented can take good and just decisions with regard for the interests of all states. However, it is not sufficient to adopt such decisions. It is necessary to ensure their impartial implementation.

But

But impartiality cannot be guaranteed if the implementation of the decisions is entrusted to only one person.

The history of modern international relations knows quite a number of examples when one person, being under the influence of a group of states or acting in its interests, wrongly carried out the previously agreed decisions. This was certainly to the advantage of but one group of states whose interests were served by that person, but it harmed other states. It is indeed well known that there exist neutral states but that there do not and cannot exist any neutral persons.

Agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests directly affects the security interests of states and the Government of the United States will undoubtedly agree that in taking decisions on questions of this sort it is necessary to observe the maximum precaution. Under the present circumstances, when the world is divided into military blocs, when massive armies are maintained, and when the threat of atomic conflict is still looming over the world it is inadmissible to have questions affecting the security interests of states and destinies of nations depend on the decision of a single person.

Moreover, the appointment of one person to implement adopted decisions on control can be considered as a diktat and an attempt to impose one's will. Indeed, it can hardly be expected that the Western Powers would agree to this person being chosen from a Socialist country.

They will most likely nominate for this post a person from a neutral country. But are there any guarantees that even such a person would take a neutral, impartial stand with regard to the Socialist countries? We cannot agree to such an approach. The Soviet Union cannot allow any side to exercise its diktat. We want to provide equal conditions for all and we shall never agree to being put into an unequal position.

We are confident that the United States Government shares the view that any international agreement must contain guarantees precluding ill-intentioned and unjustified actions against any state party to the agreement. This is the inalienable and legitimate right of every state and

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every government. In proposing to establish a collective executive body of equal representatives of the three groups of states, the Soviet Union proceeds from the desire to guarantee states the possibility to exercise this very right.

In objecting to the Soviet proposal concerning the composition of the Administrative Council, the Representatives of the United States and Great Britain at the Geneva Conference affirm that it is allegedly tantamount to introducing the "veto" with regard to the inspection. But such assertions cannot be viewed otherwise than as the continuation of the old line aimed at distorting the USSR position on the questions of control.

It can be recalled in this respect that as far back as May 1959, when explaining its proposal on the establishment of an inspection quota, the Soviet Government stressed that the dispatch of on-site inspections within the limits of the agreed quotas must be undertaken at the demand of a side interested in such inspection, without any voting in the Control Commission or in any other body. It is necessary only to have the objective readings of the instruments at the Control Posts testifying that in some region of a certain country a phenomenon occurred which can be suspected of being a nuclear explosion. If there are such objective readings, then, as provided for in the Soviet proposal, neither the Control Commission, nor any other body of the Control Organization can prevent a demand of a party for an inspection from being met.

Consequently, the Administrative Council can erect no obstacle in the way of the inspection to which the United States Representatives refer when they speak of the so-called "veto".

Certainly, there are other questions, many of which will inevitably arise in the course of implementing the treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and on which the executive body will have to take decisions. A situation in which one-sided decisions are taken and conditions for arbitrary action are created, cannot be allowed. With one Administrator the danger of an arbitrary action increases manifold. In case the framework of the executive body proposed the Soviet Government is accepted, the possibility

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of an arbitrary action and of one-sided decisions is completely ruled out. This proves that the "veto" question has been artificially created.

The Soviet Government is confident that the adoption of the proposal of the Soviet Union on the composition of the Administrative Council would remove one of the major obstacles in the way of reaching complete agreement on the treaty.

There is one more point on which there still exist differences. This is the question of an inspection quota. The Soviet Government hopes that the United States Government will display a realistic approach to the question of the number of on-site inspections as well. Our proposal to conduct three annual inspections on each of the territories of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain provides sufficient guarantees against violations of the treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The insistence by the United States and Great Britain on an excessive number of inspections cannot but provoke the thought that in this instance concern is being displayed for anything but the establishment of effective control. In appraising the positions of the states on the questions of inspection, one cannot, of course, disregard the fact that as long as military groupings exist in the world, the exercise of inspection may be used for intelligence purposes.

Such is the situation with regard to the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

With all frankness we have set forth our considerations on the ways of overcoming the existing difficulties. This approach of ours provides a good basis for the conclusion in the near future of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

At the same time, while objectively evaluating the obtaining situation with regard to the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests one should obviously recognize that at present it is difficult for the participant in the Geneva Negotiations to come to agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. Is it not better than for our countries to start with the main, cardinal question, i.e. the question of general and complete disarmament? In this connection we welcome President Kennedy's statement in his latest message to Congress, to the effect that the conclusion of a treaty on the effective prohibition of nuclear tests would be a first important step towards disarmament. Indeed, let us solve both problems

inter-dependently

interdependently and then the main obstacle which the Western Powers now see in the Soviet proposal on the creation of a 3-member Administrative Council will disappear.

The Soviet Government is known to have repeatedly stressed, that, provided the Western Powers accept the proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government is, for its part, prepared to unconditionally accept any proposals of the Western Powers on control. The Soviet Government reiterates this readiness and is prepared in this case to sign a document which would include the proposals of the Western Powers on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests.

We shall be able to take this step because, under general and complete disarmament, the question of the security of states will assume a different aspect: there will be no armies, nor will there be a threat of an attack by one state against another.

When all states will have disarmed and will have no means to attack other nations, then, indeed, conditions will be created under which each country will have proper safeguards of its security. No state will have an opportunity to create Armed Forces in secret which would threaten some other state or group of states. In these circumstances we are ready to accept any control proposed by the Western Powers.

But at present, when the armaments race is going on in the world and there exist two opposing military groupings, we are compelled to maintain our Armed Forces in the interests of the security of our country and that of our allies. As long as states maintain their Armed Forces, no control can be free from intelligence. When the Armed Forces are abolished, and armaments destroyed, then only control will not be connected with intelligence. Then comprehensive control will really be necessary so that no state or group of states could manufacture weapons secretly or arm in preparation for an aggression against other states. One cannot dispense with strict and effective control against the arming of states. At the same time one cannot but admit that in the present circumstances control does not at all guarantee that some country will not be attacked by another country, since armaments and Armed Forces are not only maintained, but are being increased and strengthened, particularly in the field of Atomic Weapons, as was admitted

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by the United States President himself. The cessation of nuclear weapons tests does not imply the cessation of their manufacture or stockpiling, and the danger of war does not decrease. In these circumstances any state has all grounds to suspect that the intention is to set up intelligence agencies under the guise of control.

After general and complete disarmament is carried out states will have at their disposal only agreed and limited contingents of militia or police to safeguard internal order and the personal security of citizens. These forces cannot constitute a danger of an attack on other countries. If necessary, these contingents could be used thru the security council, if aggression is nevertheless committed by some state. All the main groups of states should, of course, be equally represented on the command of such international forces, that is to say, it should be a truly international command.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that the most practicable way to solve the disarmament problem at present is the way of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This has been recognized by most states of the world which is attested to by both the resolution of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly and the discussion of disarmament questions at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the United States Government will take into consideration the views set forth in this aide-memoire and, for its part, will promote the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, including the task of the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests for all time.

United States Disarmament Administration

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D/B-12
June 8, 1961

US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON DISARMAMENT

Washington, June 19, 1961

Background Paper

United States Disarmament Proposal

July 15, 1960

The attached paper contains amendments to the June 27, 1960 U.S. proposal.

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Attachment:

7/15/60 U.S. Proposal.

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BY: ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DOENN-523

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Program for General and Complete Disarmament
under Effective International Control Submitted by
the Delegation of the United States of America
to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
on June 27, 1960

(Contains amendments to June 27 U.S. paper, suggested by U.K., Canadian and Italian Delegations and referendum to their Governments, and by U.S. State Department.)

Introduction

The ultimate goal is a secure, free and peaceful world in which there shall be general and complete disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament in a secure, free and peaceful world requires:

1. The disbanding, through progressive stages, of all armed forces of all States and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever, except for those contingents of agreed size required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for agreed contingents for an international peace force.

2. The cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, including all means for delivering weapons of mass destruction, and their complete elimination from national arsenals, through progressive stages, except for those armaments agreed upon for use by an international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

3. Strict and effective international control, from beginning to end, to verify compliance with all agreed obligations in the program, to ensure that there are no violations.

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4. The establishment of effective means for ensuring observance of international agreements and for the maintenance of peace.

Governing Principles

1. Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament.*

2. General and complete disarmament shall proceed through three stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time, under supervision of an International Disarmament Control Organization, within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Each measure within each stage shall be initiated by all participating States simultaneously, and, except as may be otherwise provided, upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies and upon establishment of the arrangements and procedures necessary for the immediate and continuing verification of the measure by the International Disarmament Control Organization.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and effective verification is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and

* While not now provided for explicitly, any agreement or treaty must contain a withdrawal clause to cope with violations or unsatisfactory implementation.

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procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

5. The International Disarmament Control Organization shall comprise all participating States whose representatives shall meet as a conference periodically as required. There shall in addition be a control commission and a director general. The specific responsibility and authority of the conference, control commission and the director general, the staffing arrangements, the responsibilities of participating States to the organization, and provisions for any necessary preparatory or interim group to aid in the establishment of the organization shall be specified in the international agreement or treaty.

6. The specific arrangements, procedures and means required for effective immediate and continuing verification by the International Disarmament Control Organization of satisfactory compliance with each obligation shall be specified in the international agreements. These shall provide for all necessary means required for effective verification of compliance with each step of each measure. Verification of the carrying out of each agreed disarmament measure shall be accomplished in such a manner as to be capable of disclosing, to the satisfaction of all participating States, any evasion of the international agreements. In particular, from the moment when implementation of each agreed disarmament measure begins, there shall be effective verification by the International Disarmament Control Organization; verification shall not rely alone upon declarations by States for its effectiveness; verification shall insure that not only do reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Task of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament

The task of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to work out a treaty for general and complete disarmament under effective international control governed by the foregoing principles.

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1. In particular, the Committee shall:

a. Negotiate and agree upon measures in the first stage of a program to be included in an international agreement, which shall, in the first instance, be acceded to by and be binding upon the States represented on the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee and which shall thereafter be open for accession by any other State. This stage shall consist of: (1) those initial and controllable measures which can and shall be undertaken without delay by the States participating in the Committee pending accession to the agreement on Stage One by other States; and (2) those further measures which can be undertaken following accession to the agreement by other militarily significant States.

b. After agreement on the first stage, prepare detailed drafts of the second and third stages of the program outlined below for submission together with the text of the first stage, to a world disarmament conference in the form of an agreed draft treaty.

c. Thereupon, arrange for a world-wide conference of all States, to be held at the earliest possible time, for consideration of and accession to the treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2. In the course of working out the program, the Committee shall arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies of measures and the corresponding effective control arrangements. These studies shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with implementation of the measures studied in the appropriate stage. Among the early studies shall be a technical examination of the measures necessary to verify reduction and elimination of agreed categories of means for delivering nuclear weapons, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery.

STAGE ONE

1. An International Disarmament Control Organization shall be established within the framework of the United Nations, and expanded as required by the progressive implementation of general and complete disarmament.

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2. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction shall be prohibited.

3. To reduce the danger of surprise attack there shall be: (a) prior notification to the International Disarmament Control Organization of all proposed launchings of space vehicles and missiles and their planned tracks; (b) the establishment of aerial and ground inspection in the U.S. and USSR and such other areas as may be agreed; (c) the placing of observers at agreed military bases.

4. On-site inspection shall be established at mutually agreed operational air bases, missile launching bases, and submarine and naval bases in order to establish a basis for verification of reductions in and eventual elimination of means for delivering nuclear weapons in subsequent stages.

5. Levels of forces and armaments shall be reduced in this stage as follows:

a. Force levels shall be limited initially to 2.5 million each for the US and USSR and to agreed levels for certain other States; agreed types and quantities of armaments shall be set aside by participating States within their own territories and placed under the supervision of the International Disarmament Control Organization pending their destruction or conversion to peaceful uses.

b. Upon acceptance of initial limitations on their force levels by all other militarily significant States, and after the initial limitations on the force levels of all participating States have been verified, the force levels of the US and USSR shall be limited to 2.1 million each and to agreed appropriate levels for other militarily significant States. When forces have been reduced to these levels and this fact has been verified, quantities of agreed categories of armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses so that remaining quantities of these armaments shall bear an agreed relation to the established force levels.

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6. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped upon installation and effective operation of the control system necessary to verify this step; thereupon, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling for peaceful purposes. The foregoing is conditioned upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament.

7. Participating States shall submit to the International Disarmament Control Organization data relating to the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditures, the amount of their military expenditures, and the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditures. The data to be submitted shall be drawn up in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

Stage Two

1. Levels of forces and armaments shall be further reduced in this stage as follows:

a. Force levels shall be progressively reduced to 1.7 million each for the US and USSR and to agreed appropriate levels for other States.

b. All categories of armaments shall be reduced and the excess shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses in the following manner:

(1) Armaments of conventional types, including automatic weapons, artillery and armored combat vehicles, shall be reduced in agreed relation to the agreed force levels.

(2) Means for delivering weapons of mass destruction including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be reduced to agreed levels.

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2. Agreed quantities of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Expenditures for military purposes shall be reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

4. An international peace force, within the United Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved.

5. Further agreed progressive reductions in force levels and armaments shall take place as the capabilities of the international peace force are increased.

Stage Three

1. Forces and military establishments of all States shall be finally reduced to these levels required for the purposes of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and of providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force.

2. The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces shall be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other remaining armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery and conventional armaments, shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Expenditures for military purposes by all States shall be further reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

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4. There shall be no manufacture of any armaments except for agreed types and quantities to be used by the international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

5. Outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes only.

6. International arrangements within the United Nations to preserve world peace shall be further improved and completed.

Following completion of Stage Three, the program for general and complete disarmament shall continue to be adhered to and verified, in accordance with the governing principles.

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July 6, 1961

PROPOSAL FOR UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT IN A PLACEFUL WORLD
(Brackets indicate unresolved issues as the result of the July 5 Principal's Meeting)

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Goal

The goal is a secure, free and peaceful world of independent nations in which the use of force has been replaced by the rule of law, international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peaceably under the U.N., and universal disarmament has been carried out under effective international control.

To achieve this goal, nations must seek the following objectives:

1. Elimination of the threat of war by any means including surprise attack, accident, miscalculation, or misinformation; elimination of capabilities of nations to launch armed attack against other nations; elimination of the dangers which require nations to divert resources to military purposes.

2. Adherence to agreed principles governing international behavior; adherence to affective procedures within the U.N. for settling disputes and for making adjustments in the changing world according to the agreed principles.

B. Universal Disarmament

Universal disarmament in a secure, free, and peaceful world requires:

1. The disbanding, through progressive stages, of all armed forces of all States and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form

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whatsoever, except for those contingents of agreed size required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for agreed contingents for the international peace force.

2. The cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, including all means for delivering weapons of mass destruction, and their complete elimination from national arsenals, through progressive stages, except for those armaments agreed upon for use by an international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

3. Strict and effective international control, from beginning to end, of the carrying out of all disarmament measures, to ensure that there are no violations.

4. The establishment of effective means for enforcement of international agreements and for the maintenance of peace.

C. Implementing Principles

1. Disarmament

a. Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out progressively in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament.

b. Disarmament shall proceed through stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures with each measure being

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carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international control organization set up within the framework of the United Nations.

e. Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified and inspected from their entry into force by the international control organization. Such verification and inspection shall include the capability to ascertain not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage. Provisions in respect of international verification and inspection shall form an integral part of any agreement on disarmament.

2. Peace-keeping Institutions

As the levels of national forces and arms are progressively reduced the international institutions for maintaining peace, for settling disputes, and for making adjustments to a changing world shall be progressively strengthened so that as disarmament of national military establishments proceeds, nations can rely on effective international institutions for peace, security, and justice.

3. Transition

Transitions from one stage to the next shall be initiated by a procedure which confirms:

a. Disarmament

That all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that the additional arrangements, procedures, and

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capacity required for verification and inspection of compliance with measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively on an immediate and continuing basis; and

b. Peace-keeping Institutions

That international institutions have been strengthened as specified.

D. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and to implement as rapidly as feasible the widest area of agreement possible on measures by stages directed toward achieving the ultimate goal and to continue their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

II. THE PROGRAM FOR UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following is submitted as an outline program for universal disarmament under effective international control in a free, secure, and peaceful world. It is proposed that this program for transition to a world in which differences are resolved by law and not by force should be governed by the foregoing principles and should form the basis for a joint declaration which will serve as a guide for the negotiating states in drawing up a disarmament treaty.

STAGE I

Stage I provides for measures which can be undertaken promptly and which would promote confidence and lessen the danger of war.

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States... the... of national capabilities... international conduct in a changing world... of effective peace-keeping machinery under the United Nations.

4. Disarmament

1. States... capabilities...

a. Signatory states shall make advance notification to participating states and to the control organization of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.

b. Signatory states shall make advance notification to participating states and to the control organization of such agreed types of major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time span of the event.

c. There shall be established control posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airbases to report on concentrations of military forces.

d. Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

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2. MEASURES FOR REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS:

a. Upon the accession of all militarily significant states, force levels of 2.1 million shall be established for the U.S. and the USSR and agreed appropriate force levels shall be established for other militarily significant states. In the event that the initial verification of the force levels shows that the U.S. or the USSR is substantially above the force level of the other, the state with the higher force level shall first reduce its forces to the level of the other state and when this is accomplished, the force reductions shall proceed thereupon on a balanced basis. A similar relationship shall exist between reduction of forces by the U.S., the USSR, and other militarily significant states.

b. Agreed types of armaments, by major categories and in agreed quantities, shall be deposited in internationally supervised depots. When at the end of the Stage I transfers, the parties have agreed that retained armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

c. A (Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles.

3. MEASURES TO CONTAIN AND REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT:

a. Upon the implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 above 7 the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

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b. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapon purposes.

c. A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear powers shall be established for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

d. Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

e. Transfers of nuclear weapons, technology, and materials. The binding nature on any one nation of the following undertakings is conditioned upon continuation in force of this treaty and upon compliance with this paragraph by all other nations.

(1) Nuclear weapons. Nations owning nuclear weapons undertake to retain in their own hands such control over the weapons as is required effectively to prevent their use by nations not now owning nuclear weapons. Nations not owning nuclear weapons undertake not to develop or manufacture them or to obtain control of the use of those belonging to other nations.

(2) Nuclear technology and materials. Nations possessing technology or materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing such technology or materials. Nations not possessing such technology or materials undertake

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not to seek or receive such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons.

4. MEASURES TO REDUCE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY VEHICLES:

a. Upon implementation of the measures in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the following three measures shall be undertaken:

(1) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to internationally supervised depots of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under international supervision shall be destroyed, transferred to the United Nations, or converted to peaceful uses.

(2) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be discontinued.

(3) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be halted.

b. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

5. ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL ORGANIZATION:

a. An international control organization shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement with the powers needed to verify compliance with the obligations undertaken in Stage I. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of these obligations in accordance with the foregoing principles.

b. The control organization shall have a control commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers plus certain other parties to the treaty on a rotating basis. The Commission will give the director such guidance as may be necessary and will determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of the treaty.

c. The control organization shall have an impartial director with authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

d. The International Court of Justice shall be available to the director or to the control commission for advisory opinions, and to a party in controversy with another, in regard to issues arising out of the application of the treaty and the operation of the control organization.

e. While Stage I is being implemented, the control organization shall study and recommend the changes in personnel, equipment, and finances and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

B. Institutions for Keeping the Peace

1. The parties shall promote peace by refraining from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the

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U.N. Charter and by exerting every effort to prevent such threat or use of force by any nation.

2. The parties shall contribute to peaceful development and change in other countries in accordance with the desires of such other countries, by refraining from: (a) indirect aggression and subversion against these countries; (b) providing military support to promote internal change by force of arms; and (c) otherwise interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. As an interim step, the parties shall support in the United Nations the establishment of a U.N. peace force as provided for under Article 43 in the U.N. Charter.

4. The parties shall conduct studies within the U.N., and cooperate in implementation of these studies, so that the U.N. will have available for the later stages of the program a permanent peace force capable of maintaining international peace and security against the threat of aggression.

5. The parties shall use existing machinery in and out of the U.N. for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall support within the United Nations studies and the development of additional international peace-keeping arrangements.

6. The parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

C. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated by a procedure which confirms:

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a. Disarmament. That all agreed disarmament measures in the first stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that the additional arrangements, procedures, and capacity required for verification and inspection of compliance with the agreed disarmament measures in the second stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively on an immediate and continuing basis.

b. Peace-keeping Institutions. That progress has been made toward the development of a U.N. peace force, of comprehensive rules of international conduct, and of effective international institutions and procedures for settling disputes.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in paragraph C, Stage I, above has been accomplished.

A. Measures of Disarmament

1. MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS:

a. Levels of forces for the U.S. and USSR shall be further reduced, by agreed steps to agreed levels; force levels of all militarily significant states shall also be reduced to agreed levels so as to assure a balanced program of reductions.

b. Agreed types of armaments by major categories that become surplus as force levels are reduced shall be placed in depots under international supervision and at the end of Stage II shall, upon a decision of the powers concerned, be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

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c. In light of the findings of the CBR Experts Commission CBR weapons of mass destruction shall be systematically reduced and the resulting excess material shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

d. Agreed military bases and facilities, both foreign and domestic, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

2. MEASURES TO FURTHER REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT:

a. In the light of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission nuclear weapons of mass destruction shall be systematically reduced and the resulting excess shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

b. States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction.

3. MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY VEHICLES:

Further reductions in the inventories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I. The levels of reductions during Stage II would be related to the degree of improvement in the international political environment and increased confidence in the verification system of peace-keeping institutions during Stage II.

4. CONTROL ORGANIZATION

The powers and responsibilities of the control organization shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

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B. Institutions for Keeping the Peace

During Stage II the parties shall develop further the rules of international competition and the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations, to the end that during the development of Stage III there will be a comprehensive body of principles governing peaceful international behavior and the United Nations will effectively be able to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

a. The permanent international peace force shall be progressively established within the framework of the United Nations.

b. Nations shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able to operate more effectively to protect nations against threats to or breaches of peace.

c. Nations shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

C. Transition from Stage II to Stage III

Transition from the second stage to the third stage should be initiated by a procedure which confirms:

a. Disarmament. That all agreed disarmament measures in the second stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing and that the control organ is ready to begin verification of compliance with the agreed disarmament measures in the third stage on an immediate and continuing basis.

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b. Peace-keeping Institutions. That the international machinery is effectively operating and will be fully capable of maintaining international peace and security under conditions of Stage III.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping machinery within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the nations of the world can move forward to a third stage. In the third stage progressive controlled universal disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no nation would have the military capability which could challenge the progressively strengthened international security forces and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

A. Measures of Disarmament

1. The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force.

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2. The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces would be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

3. The manufacture of armaments would be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used by the international peace force and the agreed remaining contingents of national armed forces.

B. Institutions for Keeping the Peace

The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all nations under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world,

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July 14, 1961
(Revision 1)*

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE:	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DC <input type="checkbox"/> DD	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <i>See stamp below</i>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
2ND REVIEW DATE:	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: <i>AS/</i>	4. COORDINATE WITH:
NAME: <i>A. Hall</i>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY):

JOINT DECLARATION

A PROGRAM FOR UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT

IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The states represented at the Conference of _____ submit the following proposals as a basis for agreement on total and universal disarmament under effective international control.

I. The Goal

The goal is a secure, free and peaceful world of independent states which in their relations with each other adhere to common standards of justice and reject the use of force; a world in which adjustments to changes in international life are achieved peaceably in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world in which total, universal, guaranteed disarmament has been achieved for all time.

II. Requirements for Total and Universal Disarmament

Universal disarmament in a secure, free and peaceful world requires:

- (a) Elimination of the ability of states to attack other states by surprise or any other form of direct or indirect aggression;
- (b) Elimination of the possibility of war occurring as a result of accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication;
- (c) Elimination of the conditions which impel states to divert massive resources to military purposes;

* Note: The July 14 draft was circulated on July 15 ad referendum to the five governments participating in the Washington working session. This Revision 1 is a cleaned-up copy of the July 14 draft.

State Dept Declassification Review
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~~BY ADAM R. HORNBUCKLE DODENN-628~~

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Forwarded by memo. 7-25-61

(d) The disbanding, through progressive stages and under strict international control, of all armed forces of all states and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever, except for those required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(e) The cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, and their complete elimination from national arsenals, through progressive stages, except for those armaments for use by a U.N. Peace Force and remaining national forces;

(f) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the United Nations to ensure compliance with all disarmament obligations;

(g) Fully effective means for enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

III. Guiding Principles

A. Disarmament will proceed in such a manner that at no time will its progress adversely affect the security of any state.

B. Disarmament shall proceed as rapidly as possible through stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization.

C. Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively inspected and verified from their entry into force by the International Disarmament Organization. Inspection and verification shall establish not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

D. United Nations processes for maintaining peace, for settling disputes, and for making adjustments in a changing world shall be progressively strengthened so that as disarmament of national military establishments proceeds, states can rely on effective international institutions for peace, security, and justice.

E. Transition from one stage to the next shall take place when all measures required in the preceding stage have been fully carried out, inspected, and verified; and when any additional arrangements for inspection and verification required for measures in the next stage have been agreed and are ready to operate and when United Nations processes for the maintenance of peace have been appropriately strengthened in the preceding stage.

IV. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date and to continue

their efforts without interruption until agreement on the total program has been achieved. To the extent possible, specific disarmament measures and accompanying measures of verification on which agreement has been reached should be put into effect immediately without waiting for completion of agreement for all stages.

V. Program

A. First Stage

1. Measures to Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall make advance notification to the International Disarmament Organization of types of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations of military forces.

(c) Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

(d) An international Commission shall be established immediately to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

2. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and USSR and to appropriate levels for all other militarily significant states. In the event that the initial verification of the force levels shows that the U.S. or the USSR is substantially above the force level of the other, the state with the higher force level shall first reduce its forces to the level of the other state and when this is accomplished, the force reductions shall proceed thereafter on a balanced basis. A similar relationship shall exist between reduction of forces by the U.S., the USSR, and other militarily significant states.

[Alternate language responsive to July 12 request for redraft:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and USSR and to appropriate levels for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable and balanced steps.]

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types and quantities shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the First Stage reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are

at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be halted or limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

3. Measures to Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) Upon the implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 above the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(b) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(c) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to

appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States possessing nuclear weapons undertake to retain in their own hands such control over the weapons as is required effectively to prevent their use by states not now possessing nuclear weapons. States not now possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to develop or manufacture them or to obtain control of the use of those belonging to other states. States possessing technology or materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons to states not now possessing such technology or materials. States not possessing such technology or materials undertake not to seek or receive such technology or materials for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons.

4. Measures to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery

Vehicles:

[Upon implementation of the measures in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the following three measures shall be undertaken:]

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed

upon for each step. At specified periods during the first stage reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be halted.

5. Measures to Insure Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

(a) States shall make advance notification to participating states and to the International Disarmament Organization of launchings of space vehicles and ballistic missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

(b) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

6. Establishment of an International Disarmament Organization:*

(a) An International Disarmament Organization shall be established within the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of the obligations in the agreement in accordance with the foregoing principles.

* It was agreed that this section would be studied further by the various governments.

(b) The responsibilities of the IDO shall be: (1) to ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by the states party to the agreement and to verify the execution of the measures to be carried out during the First Stage; (2) to develop and agree on further measures for the progressive implementation of disarmament and the achievement of the total program.

(c) In discharge of these responsibilities, the IDO will: (1) determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of disarmament agreements; (2) establish and administer the machinery necessary to verify the First Stage measures; (3) give continuous study to the problems of disarmament, including any proposals submitted to it, setting up for this purpose such expert study groups as may be required; (4) provide a forum for negotiations aimed at securing acceptance of further disarmament measures; (5) work out requirements for the control and verification of such further disarmament measures and determine whether the necessary machinery is effective and ready to operate; (6) authorize the implementation of further disarmament measures; (7) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and determine the transition from one stage of disarmament to the next.

(d) The IDO shall consist of: (1) A Conference of all the states party to the agreement; (2) a Commission consisting

of representatives of all the major powers plus certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) a Director who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(e) While the First Stage is being implemented, the IDO shall study and recommend the changes in personnel, equipment, and finances and other measures which may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before the Second Stage begins. During the progress of the First Stage, the disarmament organization shall also consider and propose to the states party to the agreement any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for the Second Stage.

7. Measures for Keeping the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force, including nuclear or conventional, contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations arrangements for the further development of peace, including arbitration, conciliation, and the development of international law.

(d) States shall seek in the United Nations to promote the establishment in the Second Stage of a permanent U.N. peace force.

(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate a given situation immediately upon request by one of the states party to the agreement to a dispute.

B. Second Stage

1. Measures for Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., USSR, and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps to agreed levels.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types and quantities shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Second Stage reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Depending upon the findings of the Expert Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Agreed military bases and facilities located on national territory or abroad shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

2. Measures to Reduce Further the Nuclear Threat:

(a) Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(b) States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction.

3. Measures for Further Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in the First Stage. The levels of reductions during the Second Stage would be related to the efficacy of the verification system and peace-keeping institutions.

4. International Disarmament Organization:*

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in the Second Stage.

5. Measures for Keeping the Peace:

During the Second Stage states shall cooperate to develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations will effectively be able in the Third Stage to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able more effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The permanent international peace force shall be established within the United Nations and progressively strengthened so that at the end of the Second Stage it shall be able effectively to maintain international peace and security.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

C. Third Stage

By the time the Second Stage has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of

* Subject to further study

rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to the Third Stage. In the Third Stage progressive controlled universal disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened United Nations Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

1. The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to the lowest levels required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contributions to the U.N. Peace Force.
2. The U.N. Peace Force and remaining national forces would be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
3. The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities, to be used

by the U.N. Peace Force and the agreed remaining units of national armed forces.

4. The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

VI. Accession to the Agreement

Any disarmament agreement or agreements shall stipulate the conditions of accession thereto by states other than the original negotiating parties. When a program for disarmament covering the widest area of agreement possible has been negotiated, a disarmament conference will be called by the U.N. General Assembly for the purpose of seeking the adherence of other states to the agreement.