Openness Press Conference

Fact Sheets

December 7, 1993

DOE FACTS

SUMMARY

The Department of Energy is firmly committed to the President's goal of openness in Government. We are now on an aggressive course that will ultimately make fundamental changes to our classification policies and operations. We believe that with the end of the Cold War, it makes little sense to continue to spend taxpayer dollars to classify and protect information of significant value to the public the release of which would have little or no national security consequences. It is our hope that the release of this information might also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

Today, as one of the initial steps in this important process, the Secretary of Energy is publicly releasing a variety of information to the Department's stakeholders. The attached Fact Sheets summarize the information declassified in such areas as unannounced tests at the Nevada Test Site, the quantity of weapon-grade plutonium produced, plutonium inventories, and inertial confinement fusion experimental data. In addition, the Fact Sheets also outline the Department's plans for expediting document declassification reviews, developing public input mechanisms for the declassification process, and improvements in access to the Department's facilities.

This is just the beginning. The Secretary is investing in the tools necessary to facilitate public access to Department of Energy information and we anticipate substantial progress in the coming year. The Secretary intends to move the Department of Energy from the secrecy of the past to an era where the watchword for the Department will be openness.

DOE FACTS

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DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF UNANNOUNCED NUCLEAR TESTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE

The Department of Energy has declassified the total number of tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site including all previously unannounced tests. Nuclear weapon tests are defined by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as follows:

- The term "underground nuclear weapon test," hereinafter "test," means either a single underground nuclear explosion conducted at a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometers and conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second. The yield of a test is the aggregate yield of all explosions in the test.

- The term "explosion" means the release of nuclear energy from an explosive canister.

- The term "explosive canister" means, with respect to every explosion, the container or covering for one or more nuclear explosives.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **There were 925 nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site of which 204 were previously unannounced.**

- **The total number of tests conducted by the U.S. worldwide is 1,051.**

- These tests include a number of locations other than the Nevada Test Site which were previously announced; e.g., other sites in the United States as well as in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

- Additional aspects related to these tests such as specific yields, number of devices, etc., will be reviewed for future release and further review will be carried out to refine the accuracy of the historical test information.

(MORE)

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BACKGROUND:

- Both underground and atmospheric tests have been conducted at the Nevada Test Site since 1951. In the past, 204 of the underground tests were not announced and their existence was classified to inhibit Soviet monitoring of United States activities.

- With the end of the Cold War era and the Administration's renewed emphasis on openness in Government, the Department of Energy considers release of this information important to more fully inform the public of the U.S. nuclear testing program.

- Historically, all tests in which radioactivity was detected offsite were announced. However, some of the unannounced tests released small quantities of radioactivity onsite. Information on these releases is provided in the attachment.

- The precise geographical locations of all tests at the Nevada Test Site are available upon request for environmental restoration studies.

- Considerable data pertaining to fallout studies is already available to the public.

BENEFITS:

- The public will have access to a broad range of test-related data.

- This information is useful in health studies regarding workers and the community.

- Release of this information should also encourage other nuclear weapon nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- Environmentalists. This declassified information will assist in studies related to the migration of radioactivity.

- Freedom of Information Act Requesters. The Department of Energy has also received a number of Freedom of Information Act requests for unannounced test information which, until today, has been denied.

(MORE)

- Historians and Researchers. There has been speculation on the number of unannounced tests by those interested in the subject. This declassification will end the speculation.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the community.

- A summary report on the testing information is attached. In addition, a detailed report is available which includes additional information regarding the depth of burial, exact time of the tests, sponsors of the tests, etc.

Attachment

(MORE)

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

SUMMARY LIST OF PREVIOUSLY UNANNOUNCED TESTS

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Niblick					
Carp Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (570 curies)	09/27/63	NTS*	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Narraguagus	09/27/63	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mullet	10/17/63	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Tuna Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (0.12 curies)	12/20/63	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Club Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (1.2 curies)	01/30/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Solendon Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (9.6 curies)	02/12/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bunker Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (1.4 curies)	02/13/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bonefish	02/18/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mackerel	02/18/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Handicap Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (300 curies)	03/12/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bogey Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (6.9 curies)	04/17/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

*NTS = Nevada Test Site

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Niblick -- Continued					
Driver Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (37 curies)	05/07/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bitterling	06/12/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Duffer	06/18/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Whetstone					
Links Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (less than 6.7 curies)	07/23/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Trogon	07/24/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Player	08/27/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Spoon	09/11/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Courser	09/25/64	NTS	Shaft	Joint US-UK	Less than 20 kt
Garden	10/23/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cassowary	12/16/64	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Tern Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (170 curies)	01/29/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Seersucker Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (1.3 curies)	02/19/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Suede	03/20/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Chenille Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (0.93 curies)	04/22/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Whetstone - Continued					
Muscovy	04/23/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Organdy	06/11/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Flintlock					
Izzer	07/16/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Pongee Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (6.4 curies)	07/22/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Ticking	08/21/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Kermet Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (less than 5.5 curies)	11/23/65	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sienna	01/18/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Reo Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (10 curies)	01/22/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Ochre	04/29/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Latchkey					
Tangerine	08/12/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Khaki	10/15/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Vigil Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (1.4 millicuries)	11/22/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sidecar Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (41 millicuries)	12/13/66	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Latchkey -- Continued					
Rivet I	01/18/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Rivet II Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (58 millicuries)	01/26/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mushroom Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (0.38 curies)	03/03/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Fizz	03/10/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Oakland	04/04/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Heilman Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (31 millicuries)	04/06/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Absinthe	05/26/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Crosstie					
Vito	07/14/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Gibson	08/04/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Lexington	08/24/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Gilroy	09/15/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cognac Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (64 millicuries)	10/25/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Worth	10/25/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Polka	12/06/67	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Crosstie -- Continued					
Brush Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (20 microcuries)	01/24/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mallet	01/31/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Torch	02/21/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Russet Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (29 curies)	03/05/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bevel	04/04/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Hatchet	05/03/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Crock	05/08/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Adze Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (7 millicuries)	05/28/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Wembley	06/05/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Funnel Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (20 microcuries)	06/25/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sevilla Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (4 millicuries)	06/25/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Bowline					
Spud	07/17/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Imp Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (4,200 curies)	08/09/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Bowline -- Continued					
Rack	08/15/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Welder	10/03/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Vat	10/10/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Hula Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (60 millicuries)	10/29/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bit	10/31/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
File	10/31/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Auger	11/15/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bay Leaf	12/12/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Scissors Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (130 microcuries)	12/12/68	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Shave	01/22/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Biggin	01/30/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Nipper	02/04/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Winch	02/04/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Valise	03/18/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Chatty	03/18/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Gourd	04/24/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Aliment	05/15/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Ipecac Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (trace)	05/27/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Bowline -- Continued					
Bowl	06/26/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Mandrel					
Horehound	08/27/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Kyack Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (510 curies)	09/20/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Seaweed Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (50 nanocuries)	10/01/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Seaweed B Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (200 nanocuries)	10/16/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Planer	11/21/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Culantro	12/10/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Tun Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (72 curies)	12/10/69	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Belen	02/04/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	20 to 200 kt
Piton A Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (25,000 curies)	05/28/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Piton	05/28/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Emery					
Scree Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (11 curies)	10/13/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Emery -- Continued					
Truchas Accidental release of radioactivity detected on site only (3 curies)	10/28/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Penasco	11/19/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Corazon	12/03/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Canjilon	12/16/70	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Dexter	06/23/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Grommet					
Bracken	07/09/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Apodaca	07/21/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Barranca	08/04/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Nama	08/05/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Baltic	08/06/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Frijoles	09/22/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Chantilly	09/29/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Lagoon	10/14/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Parnassia	11/30/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Hospah	12/14/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Yerba	12/14/71	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mescalero	01/05/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cowles	02/03/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Dianthus	02/17/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Grommet -- Continued					
Sappho	03/23/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Onaja	03/30/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Jicarilla	04/19/92	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Kara	05/11/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Merida	06/07/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Capitan	06/28/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Haplopappus	06/28/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Tajique	06/28/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Toggle					
Atarque	07/25/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cuchillo	08/09/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Akbar	11/09/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Arsenate	11/09/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Canna	11/17/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Tuloso	12/12/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Solanum	12/14/72	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Alumroot	02/14/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Gazook	03/23/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Natoma	04/05/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Colmor	04/26/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mesita	05/09/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cabresto	05/24/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Toggle -- Continued					
Kashan	05/24/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Potrillo	06/21/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	20 to 200 kt
Silene	06/28/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Arbor					
Polygonum	10/02/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Waller	10/02/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Pajara	12/12/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Seafoam	12/13/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Elida	12/19/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Spar	12/19/73	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Pinedrops	01/10/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Hulsea	03/14/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sapello	04/12/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Portrero	04/23/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Plomo	05/01/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Jib	05/08/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Grove	05/22/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Jara	06/06/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Bedrock					
Crestlake	07/18/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Pratt	09/25/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Trumbull	09/26/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Bedrock -- Continued					
Estaca	10/17/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Temescal	11/02/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Puddle	11/26/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Keel	12/16/74	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Portola	02/06/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Teleme	02/06/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bilge	02/19/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Alviso	06/11/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Futtock	06/18/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Anvil					
Deck	11/18/75	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Shallows	02/26/76	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Rivoli	05/20/76	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Fulcrum					
Gouda	10/06/76	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sprit	11/10/76	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Sutter	12/21/76	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Oarlock	02/16/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Dofino	03/08/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Forefoot	06/02/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Carnelian	07/28/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Flotost	08/16/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	**Date (GCT)**	**Location**	**Type**	**Purpose**	**Yield Range**
Operation Fulcrum -- Continued					
Gruyere	08/16/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Scupper	08/19/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Cresset					
Rib	12/14/77	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Karab	03/16/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Topmast	03/23/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Asco	04/25/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Jackpots	06/01/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Satz	07/07/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cremino	09/27/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Quicksilver					
Concentration	12/01/78	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Freezeout	05/11/79	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Phalanx					
Jarlsberg	08/27/83	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Branco	09/21/83	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Navata	09/29/83	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Fusileer					
Muggins	12/09/83	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Orkney	05/02/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Bellow	05/16/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

United States Nuclear Tests -- By Date					
Event Name	Date (GCT)	Location	Type	Purpose	Yield Range
Operation Fusileer -- Continued					
Normanna	07/12/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Wexford	08/30/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Grenadier					
Vermejo	10/02/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Minero	12/20/84	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Cebrero	08/14/85	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Charioteer					
Abo	10/30/85	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Mogollon	04/20/86	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Galveston	09/04/86	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Touchstone					
Harlingen	08/23/88	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Cornerstone					
Monahans	11/09/88	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Kawich A	12/09/88	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt
Operation Aqueduct					
Bowie	04/06/90	NTS	Shaft	Weapons Related	Less than 20 kt

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DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Why didn't the Department of Energy announce these tests to begin with?

A. As a matter of past policy, the United States did not announce all of its underground nuclear tests in order to inhibit Soviet monitoring of United States activities.

Q. Why aren't the exact yields of these nuclear tests released?

A. With the announcement of each test, a yield range is provided. Exact yields are not provided in order to protect nuclear weapon design capabilities.

Q. Does this reveal all the nuclear detonations at the test site?

A. This declassifies all nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site. However, some of these tests had multiple explosives resulting in multiple nuclear detonations which are being reviewed for potential declassification.

Q. Offsite, how much radiation was released by these tests?

A. None. All offsite releases of radiation at the Nevada Test Site were announced at the time the releases occurred. Documented information on all releases at the Nevada Test Site has been made available to the public.

(MORE)

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Q. Onsite, how much radiation did employees receive from these tests?

A. It would be most unusual for employees to have received radiation from an underground test since forward areas are completely evacuated before the conduct of the actual tests. Furthermore, all employees and other personnel are required to wear individual radiation monitors while at the Nevada Test Site. Data from these monitors is recorded and retained as a permanent record to assure the health and safety of employees and other personnel.

Q. On all tests, was all offsite radiation made public? If yes, where is this information?

A. Yes, it has been made public. This information is available through the Nevada Operations Office's Coordination and Information Center in Las Vegas, Nevada. It is also available from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

Q. Does the Department of Energy now classify any information pertaining to offsite contamination from nuclear tests?

A. No, it is all unclassified.

Q. Did these tests contaminate underground water?

A. Although there has been some localized contamination of groundwater in the immediate vicinities of tests, we believe there has been very little movement of that water. Test site employees obtain their drinking water from several wells on the site. Site wells are monitored regularly and radioactive contaminants have never been found in test site drinking water.

(MORE)

Q. What were the significant contaminants to the environment from these 204 tests?

A. As with all underground nuclear tests, localized pockets of fission products resulting from the detonation are fused and confined underground in the immediate vicinity of the detonation. There was no significant environmental contamination at the surface of the ground. Virtually all of the radiation was in the form of short-lived noble gases that quickly dissipated in the air. None of the releases were detected off the Nevada Test Site, and there were no lasting environmental impacts, even in the immediate areas of the tests.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF UNITED STATES TOTAL PRODUCTION OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM

The Department of Energy has declassified the total United States production of weapon-grade plutonium.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **The United States produced 89 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium.**
  - The Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, produced 36 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium from 1953 through 1988.
  - The Hanford site near Richland, Washington, produced 53 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium from 1945 through 1987.
- The Hanford site also produced 13 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium and 13 kilograms of tritium.

BACKGROUND:

- The plutonium was produced to support the United States nuclear weapons program from 1945 through 1988.
- There have been requests for this information for health and safety calculations for independent studies to determine public radiation dosages.
- The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has also suggested the release of this information.

BENEFITS:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the total United States plutonium production. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important to the current debate over proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

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- Citizens will also be better informed about U.S. plutonium production activities which have had significant environmental impact at production and separation facilities.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

- This information is also useful to historians of the nuclear age.

- This information is also useful in health studies of workers and the communities and related activities as it shows the magnitude of production.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The Public: The public living near the site is, and has been, concerned with the health and safety issues relating to plutonium production.

- Environmentalists: With the declassification, those interested in determining the total magnitude of the production effort and its impact will have important information.

- Freedom of Information Act Requesters: The Department of Energy has received Freedom of Information Act requests concerning plutonium production and this information, until today, has been denied.

- Historians and Researchers: This information will be available for historical summaries and will end speculation on the subject of the magnitude of production.

- Health Researchers: This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the community.

(MORE)

Plutonium Inventories Today



*Has a current weapon's mission - cannot be declassified

MT = Metric Tons

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TODAY'S PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE NEAR AIKEN, SOUTH CAROLINA

The Department of Energy has declassified the total inventory of plutonium at the Savannah River Site.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **The total quantity of plutonium currently at Savannah River is 2.1 metric tons.** This amounts to:

  0.5 metric tons of metals, sources, standards, etc.

  1.3 metric tons of compounds.

  0.3 metric tons of irradiated materials.

BACKGROUND:

- The material is stored in different forms including metal, oxide, liquid, and process residues.

- The Department of Energy is cooperating with independent studies conducted by the State of South Carolina and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to estimate offsite radiation and chemical releases from Savannah River and to measure potential health effects upon the workforce.

- This declassified information will permit more open discussions with environmental, health and safety interests and local Governments. While other information does remain classified, we will be working with stakeholders to establish priorities for additional declassifications.

- We are actively studying the proposed declassification of the Savannah River historical plutonium annual production to determine any nonproliferation implications.

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BENEFITS:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the plutonium inventory and its form at the Savannah River Site. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important to the current debate over proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

- This information is useful in health studies and related activities regarding workers and the community.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The General Public: The public living near the site is, and has been, concerned with health and safety issues relating to the inventories of plutonium at Savannah River.

- Environmentalists. With this declassification, those interested in environmental oversight of the plutonium related activities at Savannah River will have more information relating to this function.

- Freedom of Information Act Requesters. The Department of Energy has received Freedom of Information Act requests concerning Savannah River plutonium inventories and this information, until today, has been denied to the requesters.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies, such as those carried out by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for workers and the community.

(MORE)

DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Why is plutonium stored at Savannah River?

A. During the past 40 years, the Savannah River Site produced plutonium to meet national security requirements. The Savannah River Site is not currently producing any plutonium, although a significant amount of plutonium in various forms remains at the site. Consideration is being given to possible processing of the materials to place them in a form suitable for long-term storage.

Q. Is this plutonium stored safely?

A. Yes. Plutonium at the Savannah River site is carefully stored in secure vaults with ventilation and filtration systems. This plutonium is stored in metal and oxide forms. Additional processing, however, may be required to prepare the material for long-term storage. Part of this processing effort would involve repackaging the material into containers suitable for long-term storage and monitoring. During these operations the principal hazards are to operations personnel. The direct radiation from handling plutonium increases with time due to the buildup of decay products. The potential for exposure to airborne and respirable particles of plutonium depends on how often the material is handled and the probability of releasing plutonium oxide particles from containers unsuitable for long-term storage.

Q. How many weapons pits are stored at Savannah River?

A. The number of pits in storage at Savannah River is currently classified, but the plutonium in the pits is included in the total inventory that was released today. This information has been identified by the Secretary to be studied for possible future declassification.

(MORE)

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Q. If you are declassifying the Savannah River Site inventories, what about Pantex?

A. The total quantity of plutonium at Pantex remains classified due to a proliferation concern that the amount of plutonium in a nuclear weapon could be determined by correlating the number of dismantlements being released to the public, to future increases in the plutonium inventory.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TODAY'S PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT ROCKY FLATS PLANT NEAR DENVER, COLORADO

The Department of Energy has declassified the total plutonium inventory at the Rocky Flats Plant.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **Current total inventory of plutonium at Rocky Flats is 12.9 metric tons.** This amounts to:

  6.6 metric tons of metal.

  3.2 metric tons of compounds.

  3.1 metric tons of mixtures, etc.

BACKGROUND:

- The current total inventory of plutonium at Rocky Flats does not include material that will be recovered during decontamination of buildings and equipment or material in waste.

- This declassified information will permit more open discussions with environmental, safety and health interests and local Governments.

- The Department of Energy is cooperating with independent studies conducted by the Colorado Department of Health to estimate offsite radiation and chemical releases from Rocky Flats and to measure potential health effects upon the plant's workforce.

- We will be working with stakeholders to establish priorities for additional declassifications.

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BENEFIT:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the plutonium inventory and its form at the Rocky Flats Plant. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important to the current debate over proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

- This information is useful in health studies and related activities concerning workers and the community.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- Regulators. Rocky Flats Program Unit of the Colorado Department of Health and the Colorado Department of Health Director.

- The Public. The public living near the plant is, and has been, concerned with the health and safety issues relating to the inventories of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Plant. This includes the general public and Rocky Flats employees.

- Environmental, Safety and Health Interests. Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Rocky Mountain Peace Center, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Colorado Council on Rocky Flats, Rocky Flats Cleanup Commission, Rocky Flats Local Impacts Initiative, and the Citizens Advisory Board.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the public.

(MORE)

DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Will this plutonium be removed from Colorado?

A. The movement of plutonium from Rocky Flats is currently being addressed in a programmatic environmental impact statement for reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy held public scoping meetings in several locations across the country in September and October 1993. The environmental impact statement is expected to be final, following public comment, in late 1994.

Q. What are the medical impacts of the plutonium released offsite?

A. On October 21, 1993, the State of Colorado's Health Advisory Panel announced the findings of Phase I of a comprehensive health study of Rocky Flats. According to the panel's news release, "Phase I studies indicate that community exposures from past contaminant releases from Rocky Flats are small." The news release also states, "Preliminary estimates of health risk from these releases are small. In the areas of greatest impact, the risks are less than one chance of excess cancer in 100,000."

On November 24, 1993, the Colorado Department of Health announced it has received $500,000 from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health for the first year of a study of cancer incidence and mortality among workers at the Rocky Flats Plant who have been exposed to radioactive materials and chemicals. The state study is projected to take 5 years and cost an estimated $2.5 million.

(MORE)

Q. What is the Department of Energy doing to safeguard and monitor this plutonium?

A. Plutonium is stored with rigorous safeguards and safety measures subject to independent oversight.

The results of the Rocky Flats Plant's extensive environmental monitoring program are shared and compared each month with the state and neighboring communities in a public meeting. Radiation doses to the public from plant operations are typically below any regulatory limit and less than are received from naturally occurring radiation sources in the Denver metropolitan area.

Q. The Department of Energy Rocky Flats Office issued a news release in early July 1993 indicating the plutonium inventory was 10 or 11 metric tons, but today's release indicates 12.9 metric tons. What is the difference?

A. The 12.9 metric tons figure is the official inventory. In order to be able to provide an unclassified figure in July, the amount was approximated.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TODAY'S PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY-WEST NEAR IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO

The Department of Energy has declassified the total inventory of plutonium at the Argonne National Laboratory-West.

SPECIFICALLY:

- The total quantity of plutonium currently at Argonne National Laboratory-West is 4.0 metric tons. This amounts to:
  - 3.8 metric tons of unirradiated fuel elements, zero power physics reactor plates, and experimental capsules.
  - 0.1 metric tons of oxide and metal.
  - 0.1 metric tons of irradiated fuel elements and scrap.
- In the past, information was declassified concerning the inventory of 0.5 metric tons of plutonium in irradiated fuel elements at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls, Idaho.

BACKGROUND:

- The material is in different forms including metal, compounds, and scrap.
- The Department of Energy is cooperating in independent studies conducted by the State of Idaho and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to estimate offsite radiation and chemical releases from Argonne National Laboratory-West and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and to measure potential health effects upon facility work forces.
- This declassified information will permit more open discussions with environmental, safety and health interests and local Governments. While other information does remain classified, we will be working with stakeholders to establish priorities for additional declassifications.

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BENEFITS:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the plutonium inventory at the Argonne National Laboratory-West. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important in the current debate over the proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

- Will permit openness with the public on matters pertaining to public health and safety and the cleanup, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials.

- This information is useful in health studies and related activities concerning workers and the community.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The Public. The public living near the site is, and has been, concerned with the health and safety issues relating to the inventories of plutonium at the Argonne National Laboratory-West and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

- Environmental, Safety and Health Interests. Environmental Defense Institute and Snake River Alliance.

- Regulators. This information will assist State regulators in performing their functions.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TODAY'S PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY NEAR LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO AND PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY NEAR LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA

The Department of Energy has declassified the total inventory of plutonium at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **The total quantity of plutonium currently at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is 2.6 metric tons.**
- **The total quantity of plutonium currently at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is 0.4 metric tons.**

BACKGROUND:

- The material is in different forms including metal, compounds, and scrap.
- This information will permit more open discussions with environmental, safety and health interests and local Governments. While other information does remain classified, we will be working with stakeholders to establish priorities for additional declassifications.

BENEFITS:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the plutonium inventory and its form at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important in the current debate over the proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

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DECLASSIFICATION OF TODAY'S PLUTONIUM INVENTORY AT THE HANFORD SITE NEAR RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

The Department of Energy has declassified the total plutonium inventory at the Hanford Site.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **The total quantity of plutonium currently at Hanford is 11.0 metric tons.** This amounts to:

  4.0 metric tons in N-reactor fuel.

  3.2 metric tons in Fast Flux Test Facility Fuel.

  3.8 metric tons in form of metal, oxide, and scrap.

  The inventory consists of reactor-grade plutonium except for approximately 0.2 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium contained in the N-reactor fuel.

BACKGROUND:

- Hanford produced weapon-grade plutonium for the Nations nuclear weapon stockpile. Also, Hanford produced reactor-grade plutonium for use as experimental reactor fuel. Much of the reactor-grade plutonium is still at Hanford.

- The material is stored in various forms including metal, oxide, fuel elements, and scrap.

BENEFITS:

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the information concerning the plutonium inventory at the Hanford Site. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important to the current debate over proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

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- Will permit unclassified discussions of plutonium inventory data relevant to worker and public health and safety issues with State regulators, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other stakeholders.

- Will permit open public debate on policy issues pertaining to cleanup, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials.

- This information is useful in health studies and related activities concerning workers and the community.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The Public. The public living near the site is, and has been, concerned with the health and safety issues relating to the inventories of plutonium at the Hanford Site.

- Environmentalists. With this declassification, those interested in environmental oversight of the plutonium related activities at Hanford will have information relating to this function. Those interested include the Hanford Education Action League, Tribal interests, Nuclear Safety Campaign, and Heart of America Northwest.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the public by interested researchers such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

- Regulators. This information will assist State regulators in performing their functions.

(MORE)

DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Of what value is this information?

A. State regulators and the Environmental Protection Agency will be able to receive total quantities and some breakdown, on an unclassified basis. Local environmental groups will be able to better oversee plutonium related activities that have an impact on public health and safety. Environmental impact statements for spent fuel disposal and other activities may be carried out in a more open fashion.

Q. What is the Department of Energy doing to safeguard and monitor this plutonium?

A. Plutonium is stored with rigorous safeguards and safety measures subject to independent oversight.

The results of Hanford's extensive environmental monitoring program are made public. Radiation doses to the public from Hanford operations are typically below any regulatory limit and less than are received from naturally occurring radiation sources in the local metropolitan area.

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DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TOTAL PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION AT THE HANFORD SITE NEAR RICHLAND, WASHINGTON

The Department of Energy has declassified the remaining secret information regarding the total plutonium quantities produced or processed at the Hanford Site.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **Today's declassification, combined with the information declassified in September 1992, allows the public release of Hanford's total production of 53 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium and 13 kilograms of tritium. It also declassifies that part of N-reactor's plutonium production which was weapon-grade, i.e., 2.5 metric tons.**

- In addition, Hanford produced 13 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium.

BACKGROUND:

- Hanford plutonium production had been classified to protect the Nation's nuclear weapons production capabilities and, in some cases, to protect nuclear weapon design information. With the current world situation and the cessation of nuclear weapons production, this information is no longer a national security issue.

- The Department of Energy is cooperating with the independent Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to estimate offsite radiation releases from Hanford.

BENEFITS:

- Better informed citizens will be able to participate more effectively in discussions about past activities and their impact on the Hanford Region.

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- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

- As part of the Secretary's Openness Initiative, the Department is declassifying the total quantities of weapon-grade plutonium production at the Hanford Site, as well as today's plutonium inventory. As a result of this declassification, the public will have information that is important in the current debate over the proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium.

- Will facilitate open review of documents containing information relating to potential worker and community health effects, as well as environmental impacts, resulting from Hanford operations.

- Will permit more open public debate on policy issues pertaining to cleanup, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The Public. The public living near the site is, and has been, concerned with the health and safety issues relating to the production of plutonium at the Hanford Site.

- Environmentalists. With this declassification, those interested in migration of radioactivity off the site can use this information in their calculations. Those interested include the Hanford Education Action League; Tribal interests; the Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project; Heart of America; the States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and the Environmental Protection Agency.

(MORE)

- Freedom of Information Act Requesters. The Department of Energy has received Freedom of Information Act requests concerning Hanford plutonium production and this information, until today, has been denied.

- Historians and Researchers. There has been speculation on the Hanford plutonium production by those interested in the subject. This declassification will end the speculation.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies and will facilitate the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention studies regarding workers and this community.

- State Regulators. This information will assist State regulators in performing their functions.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION INFORMATION

The Department of Energy has declassified inertial confinement fusion information to assist development of a potential new energy source for the 21st century. Inertial confinement fusion is a method of energy production that uses an energetic laser, or other "driver," to compress and heat a very small capsule of fuel containing isotopes of hydrogen to the density and temperature that cause the fuel to ignite.

Inertial confinement fusion experiments involve the use of laser or particle beams to deliver energy to the outer surface of pellets that contain a mixture of hydrogen isotopes, deuterium, and tritium. Specifically, the Department of Energy has declassified the following facts:

- Information concerning laboratory inertial confinement fusion targets.
- Calculations, modeling, and experimental data on hydrodynamic instabilities and mix on unclassified inertial confinement fusion targets.
- Information relevant to the energy applications of inertial confinement fusion.
- Inertial confinement fusion equipment fabrication techniques.

BACKGROUND:

- Since the beginning of the Department of Energy's inertial confinement fusion program in 1963, similarities between inertial confinement fusion and nuclear weapons research resulted in classification restrictions on information developed in the U.S. inertial confinement fusion program. However, in recent years, other countries have developed and published information in this area. Some of the technical information being published abroad was developed earlier in the United States, but our scientists were prevented from publishing or discussing their findings because of classification restrictions.

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- There is some inertial confinement fusion information that will remain classified. This relates to weapons research. We will continue to review the classified portion of inertial confinement fusion to see if more information can be released.

BENEFITS:

- U.S. scientists will be able to publish more inertial confinement fusion papers in the open literature and participate more effectively in the world fusion community.

- Timely advances may result in inertial confinement fusion research for a clean commercial energy source due to a more open dialogue between U.S. and foreign scientists.

- U.S. classification policies will more realistically reflect the information already widely available.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- Scientific Community. Advances may be accelerated toward achieving clean and plentiful civilian power through fusion energy by broader international cooperation.

- Environmentalists. The information that now can be made available to the public will better explain the benefits of fusion as a potential source of energy.

- Power Industry. Enable the power utilities to better evaluate the current status and potential of inertial confinement fusion as a future energy source.

- The Public. Better enable the public to make informed decisions concerning support for the inertial confinement fusion program.

(MORE)

INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION



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DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What are the advantages to the United States from the declassification of this information?

A. With these declassifications, our scientists can freely exchange more inertial confinement fusion information with others working in the same field and help advance the programs.

Q. Has this declassification been coordinated with other government agencies?

A. Yes.

Q. How broad is the support for this declassification?

A. Support is very broad. This action was recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the Fusion Policy Advisory Committee. The recommendations were further reviewed by a special panel including private researchers, universities, etc. The Directors of the three national laboratories involved in weapons research and development have endorsed the recommendations.

Q. Does this complete the declassification of inertial confinement fusion and, if not, why not?

A. Roughly 20 percent of inertial confinement fusion information related to weapons needs to remain classified at this time due to proliferation concerns.

Q. Are there potentially proliferant nations for which this declassified information would be of value?

A. Inertial confinement fusion information declassified by this action will not be of value to emerging proliferants.

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Q. Is this declassification going to aid the inertial confinement fusion programs of other nations and not help our program?

A. The United States does not have a monopoly on good science. The free exchange of inertial confinement fusion information will help all parties, including the United States. We will, therefore, benefit technically from the open discussion with worldwide researchers and this interaction will aid in the ultimate goal of the inertial confinement fusion program - a comparatively clean and plentiful source of energy.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF MERCURY QUANTITIES FOR OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE Y-12 PLANT

The Department of Energy has declassified the quantity of mercury used in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant for lithium enrichment.

SPECIFICALLY:

- **The quantity of mercury used for lithium enrichment was 24 million pounds.**
- As noted in a 1983 Department of Energy report, about three-quarters of a million pounds of mercury is believed to have been lost to the environment; much into the East Fork of Poplar Creek near the Y-12 Plant. However, incomplete records for that period prevent a fully accurate accounting of the quantities of mercury received, used, and lost to the environment.

BACKGROUND:

- Natural lithium consists mostly of the isotope lithium-7, but contains a small percentage (7.5 percent) of the isotope lithium-6.
- The most efficient industrial-scale process in the United States for enriching lithium in the lithium-6 isotope was the mercury-based Column Exchange (Colex) process.
- Very large quantities of mercury were procured for the Colex process in the early 1950's to make available lithium-6 for use in nuclear weapons and for use in the production of tritium.

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- This declassified information will permit more open discussions with environmental, safety and health interests and the State of Tennessee. While other information does remain classified, we will be working with stakeholders to establish priorities for possible additional declassifications.

- The Department of Energy is cooperating with independent studies conducted by the Tennessee Department of Health to estimate offsite radiation and chemical releases from Oak Ridge and to measure potential health effects upon the plant workforce.

BENEFITS:

- The State of Tennessee had access to classified quantities of mercury; however, the declassification will permit them to make use of those quantities on an unclassified basis and to provide them to the public. The newly declassified information may be of value in reconstructing doses to the workers.

- Declassification of this information may facilitate the conduct of independent public epidemiologic studies related to public and worker exposures that may have resulted from the very large quantities of mercury used during the operation of the plant during the mid-1950's to early 1960's.

- This information is useful in health studies and related activities concerning workers and the community.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The Public. The public living near the site in Oak Ridge has been concerned with the health and safety issues relating to the quantities of mercury used and released to the surrounding area.

- Environmentalists. With this declassification, those interested in migration of mercury off the site can fold this information into their calculations.

- Freedom of Information Act Requesters. The Department of Energy has received Freedom of Information Act requests concerning the Oak Ridge operation. Information on specific mercury quantities, until today, has been denied.

(MORE)

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the community.

- Regulators. Those interested include the Tennessee Department of Health and the Division of Environmental Epidemiology, which is preparing a radiation and chemical historical dose reconstruction.

(MORE)

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What benefits will the public obtain from this information?

A. The public will benefit from knowing that independent experts have reviewed this information and that the exposure estimates being used in the study are as accurate as possible.

Q. Will the declassified information permit more accurate estimates of mercury exposure in and outside of the plant?

A. The State of Tennessee was previously provided classified access to this information for use in estimating historical releases of mercury to the environment. The State requested that the information be declassified in order to allow other independent parties to be able to recreate the State's estimates; otherwise, the State believes the credibility of its health study will be threatened. The public will know that other scientists have reviewed this information and determined if they agree with, or can improve upon, the existing estimates being used by the State of Tennessee in their study.

Q. Why were these quantities not released in the past?

A. Historically, most information related to mercury use at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant has been classified. In the early 1980's, the quantities of mercury released to the environment were made publicly available, but the total quantity was classified to protect lithium production information from the Soviets. The information released today is the first process-related information judged ready for declassification. In support of the State of Tennessee Health Studies, the Department of Energy is currently reviewing other mercury-related information to determine further declassifications.

(MORE)

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Q. How were people affected by exposure to this mercury?

A. A study conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health indicated measurable neurologic symptoms (eye-hand coordination, tremors) among workers exposed to the mercury; however, the study detected no life-threatening conditions at the time of its completion. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is initiating a new study to re-examine the workers exposed to mercury. Results of this new study will determine what type of further followup is necessary.

Q. Is this mercury a threat to people now?

A. There is insufficient data to determine whether the mercury is still a threat. Mercury is no longer used in the Y-12 operations. A pilot survey begun in 1984 by the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment and the Centers for Disease Control showed no indication of increased health risks to presumably exposed Oak Ridge residents; however, studies of mercury levels in fish have not been completed. The Tennessee Department of Health and Environment will evaluate risks to the population from the Department of Energy contractor operations in Oak Ridge. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health will continue to evaluate health of the worker population exposed to mercury.

Q. What were the environmental impacts and health impacts of spills?

A. In 1984, the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment and the Centers for Disease Control initiated a pilot study to document human body levels of mercury and to determine whether exposure to mercury contaminated soils or consumption of fish presumed to be contaminated with mercury constituted an immediate health risk to the Oak Ridge population. The pilot survey showed no indication of increased risk to the presumably exposed population; however, the results of the fish studies are still in progress.

Q. Is all mercury information now available to the public?

A. No. But we are working with the State of Tennessee to establish declassification priorities. The Department of Energy is dedicated to getting as much of this information out in the open as possible.

(MORE)

Q. The highly enriched uranium inventory at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, should be made public. Why not do so?

A. There is a potential proliferation concern. However, we are continuing to review it for possible future declassification.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF PRE-1961 PACIFIC NUCLEAR TEST YIELDS

The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense have jointly declassified the yields of all nuclear tests conducted in the Pacific prior to the 1958-1961 moratorium.

SPECIFICALLY:

- Attached is a listing of the dates and yields.

BACKGROUND:

- The yields of tests now declassified were part of Operations Greenhouse, Redwing, and Hardtack I conducted from 1951 to 1958. The yields of tests during Operation Crossroads conducted in 1946 at Bikini; Operation Sandstone (1948) at Enewetak; Operation Ivy (1952) at Enewetak; and Operation Castle (1954) at Bikini and Enewetak had been previously declassified. All told, 21 of the 66 tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak had been previously declassified. With the declassification of the remaining 45 test yields and the declassification of the three high altitude tests Teak, Orange, and Yucca, all tests conducted in the Pacific prior to the 1958-61 moratorium have been declassified.

- In 1992 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Marshall Islands, requested declassification of test yields conducted at Bikini and Enewetak.

- Some of these nuclear test yields may have been inadvertently released from Government control, and estimates were previously published by citizen groups.

BENEFITS:

- The declassified yields can now be publicly used in environmental studies of nuclear testing at Bikini and Enewetak, as well as studies of worldwide fallout.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nuclear nations to declassify similar information.

(MORE)

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WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- Environmentalists. With this declassification, those interested in worldwide fallout will have better unclassified information for their calculations.

- Historians and Researchers. There have been a number of requests for information by those interested in this subject. This declassification will provide them with information to complete their projects.

- Health Researchers. This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies regarding workers and the community.

- Freedom of Information Act Requestors. With this declassification, a number of documents which were classified only because they contained the yields of these tests can now be declassified. Forty-three Freedom of Information Act requests have concerned the weapons testing program in the Pacific.

Attachment

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

LIST OF DECLASSIFIED YIELDS OF TESTS CONDUCTED IN THE PACIFIC PRIOR TO 1958-1961 MORATORIUM

LIST OF DECLASSIFIED YIELDS OF TESTS CONDUCTED IN PACIFIC PRIOR TO 1958-61 MORATORIUM

Name	Date	Location	Type	Yield (in kilotons)
Operation Greenhouse				
Dog	4/07/51	Enewetak	Tower	81
George	5/08/51	Enewetak	Tower	225
Item	5/24/51	Enewetak	Tower	45.5
Operation Redwing				
Cherokee	5/20/56	Bikini	Airdrop	3800
Yuma	5/27/56	Enewetak	Tower	0.19
Erie	5/30/56	Enewetak	Tower	14.9
Flathead	6/11/56	Bikini	Barge	365
Blackfoot	6/11/56	Enewetak	Tower	8
Kickapoo	6/13/56	Enewetak	Tower	1.49
Osage	6/16/56	Enewetak	Airdrop	1.7
Inca	6/21/56	Enewetak	Tower	15.2
Dakota	6/25/56	Bikini	Barge	1100
Mohawk	7/02/56	Enewetak	Tower	360
Apache	7/08/56	Enewetak	Barge	1850
Navajo	7/10/56	Bikini	Barge	4500
Huron	7/21/56	Enewetak	Barge	250
Operation Hardtack I				
Yucca	4/28/58	Pacific	Balloon	1.7
Fir	5/11/58	Bikini	Barge	1360
Butternut	5/11/58	Enewetak	Barge	81
Wahoo	5/16/58	Enewetak	Underwater	9
Holly	5/20/58	Enewetak	Barge	5.9
Nutmeg	5/21/58	Bikini	Barge	25.1
Yellowwood	5/26/58	Enewetak	Barge	330
Magnolia	5/26/58	Enewetak	Barge	57
Tobacco	5/30/58	Enewetak	Barge	11.6
Sycamore	5/31/58	Bikini	Barge	92
Rose	6/02/58	Enewetak	Barge	15
Umbrella	6/08/58	Enewetak	Underwater	8
Maple	6/10/58	Bikini	Barge	213

CONTINUED

Name	Date	Location	Type	Yield
Aspen	6/14/58	Bikini	Barge	319
Walnut	6/14/58	Enewetak	Barge	1450
Linden	6/18/58	Enewetak	Barge	11
Redwood	6/27/58	Bikini	Barge	412
Elder	6/27/58	Enewetak	Barge	880
Hickory	6/29/58	Bikini	Barge	14
Sequoia	7/01/58	Enewetak	Barge	5.2
Cedar	7/02/58	Bikini	Barge	220
Dogwood	7/05/58	Enewetak	Barge	397
Poplar	7/12/58	Bikini	Barge	9300
Scaevola	7/14/58	Enewetak	Barge	0*
Pisonia	7/17/58	Enewetak	Barge	255
Juniper	7/22/58	Bikini	Barge	65
Olive	7/22/58	Enewetak	Barge	202
Pine	7/26/58	Enewetak	Barge	2000
Teak	8/01/58	Johnston	Rocket	3800
Quince	8/06/58	Enewetak	Surface	0**
Orange	8/12/58	Johnston	Rocket	3800
Fig	8/18/58	Enewetak	Surface	0.02

*safety experiment

**weapons related, yield was not up to expectation

(MORE)

DOE FACTS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What is meant by Pacific pre-moratorium tests?

A. These are nuclear tests that were conducted in the Pacific Ocean testing areas prior to October 31, 1958. From November 1958 to August 1961, the United States did not conduct any nuclear weapon tests, as part of a moratorium on testing which was also observed by the United Kingdom and the Former Soviet Union. The Former Soviet Union resumed testing September 1, 1961. With this declassification, all remaining, previously classified, yields of tests conducted in the Pacific prior to the 1958-1961 moratorium are now being released.

Q. Are all pre-1961 atmospheric test yields declassified?

A. Yes.

Q. If tests were for weapons design purposes, can you say what the weapons were?

A. No, in most instances the association of specific tests with specific weapons is classified to protect nuclear weapon design capabilities.

Q. Have the island residents been compensated?

A. Yes. The United States has paid $25,000 to each individual with a radiation-related medical condition. In 1977, the United States also paid $1,000 to each resident on Utrik Atoll. In addition, a Nuclear Claims Tribunal now has jurisdiction to compensate claims related to nuclear tests.

Q. What were the health effects from these tests?

A. The United States has operated a medical surveillance program for the exposed population for the last 36 years. Data from this program have been and continue to be used to study potential relationships between the testing program and subsequent health effects. The Department of Energy is committed to sharing this information for independent analysis and building scientific consensus.

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Q. How does this information affect worldwide fallout estimates?

A. We hope this information will be useful to independent researchers interested in worldwide fallout. It is worth noting that the United States has already done extensive monitoring over the years to document contributions to worldwide fallout levels from other nations testing nuclear weapons.

Q. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has already reported many of these yields. Is this really a declassification?

A. Yes, it is a declassification and represents an official release of data that had previously been classified. Some of these yields may have been inadvertently released from Government control and estimates were previously published by citizen groups.

DOE FACTS

DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS TURNED OVER TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

The Department of Energy in conjunction with the National Archives and Records Administration will review Department of Energy documents for release to the public.

Over the past few years, there has been increasing public interest in the history of the Department and its predecessor agencies. A national group of historians, including some prominent Nobel Laureates, have petitioned the Department for greater access to our classified records. In addition, the Assistant Archivist of the United States has requested that the Department of Energy enter into a Memorandum of Understanding for the systematic review of Department of Energy records at the Archives.

SPECIFICALLY:

- The Department of Energy will provide a staff of up to six qualified reviewers, onsite at the National Archives and Records Administration, to review Department of Energy documents. This will, over time, lead to an ever-increasing volume of unclassified Department of Energy information available to the public. This new level of cooperation is part of the Department of Energy's openness policy.

- Since the signing of the Department of Energy FY 1994 budget on October 28, 1993, we have implemented plans which will allow us to proceed with a document review effort at the National Archives and Records Administration. In furtherance of this objective, the Secretary has taken the following specific steps:

  - Established a training program through which technically qualified personnel can be certified as reviewers.

  - Negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Energy and the National Archives and Records Administration to govern the overall performance of the declassification effort of the Department of Energy documents at the National Archives and Records Administration.

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- Contracted for the necessary technical personnel to actually perform the document reviews.

BACKGROUND:

- There is great interest by many people in reviewing Atomic Energy Commission/Energy Research and Development Administration/Department of Energy records at the National Archives.

- Even though nuclear proliferation remains a national security concern, due to the end of the Cold War, much information in classified documents no longer warrants classification and could be released to the public.

BENEFITS:

- Historians and others will have access to more information in their efforts to educate and inform the public.

- Environmentalists will have access to additional information to assist them in their studies.

- Release of previously secret information should also encourage other nations to declassify similar information.

WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS?:

- The stakeholders in this effort, include environmentalists, historians, researchers, scientists, and industrial workers, as well as State and other Federal personnel.

- This declassification will permit greater public review of information of potential value for epidemiologic or other health studies pertaining to Department of Energy sites.

(MORE)

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. How big is the backlog of documents turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration that will be declassified as a result of the effort you have initiated?

A. The documents at the National Archives and Records Administration of interest to the Department of Energy is approximately 1,000 linear feet.

Q. How did such a large collection of classified documents accumulate?

A. Heretofore, there has not been a consistent effort to systematically declassify the Department of Energy records. Recent changes in the global political structure, worldwide advances in nuclear technology, and public interest in the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons program have prompted the Department to address this issue as part of our policy of openness.

Q. Are resources going to be provided for review of the documents held at the National Archives and Records Administration?

A. The Department requested and received resources from Congress in the FY 1994 budget to initiate this effort.

Q. Since all the Department's documents at the National Archives and Records Administration are already over 30 years old, why can't the Department solve this backlog problem by simply declassifying them in bulk, since they're obviously too old to still be sensitive?

A. Bulk declassification is not possible for nuclear weapons information due to proliferation concerns. In some cases, nuclear weapons information that the United States would consider outdated would actually be more useable by a potential Third World nuclear proliferant state than would our more state-of-the-art "high tech" information. We do not want to make it easier for potentially proliferant nations to acquire the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons, regardless of whether they would use new or old technology.

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DOE FACTS

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS REGARDING CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS

In keeping with the Administration's desires for greater openness within the Government, Secretary O'Leary has included plans for a significant expansion of the Department of Energy's efforts in the review of documents for declassification.

SPECIFICALLY:

- The Office of Declassification will increase from three to six the number of document reviewers dedicated to this effort. This increase will be supplemented by an intensive effort for training additional qualified declassifiers throughout the Department and contractor complex.

- A Process Improvement Team has also been empaneled to examine the Freedom of Information Act process throughout the Department and identify potential areas for streamlining reviews, eliminating process delays, and clarification of the Freedom of Information Act requirements. (This effort is designed to reduce not only the backlog in classified document reviews but the backlog in all Freedom of Information Act requests.) The improvements in the process will ensure that pertinent classified documents are reviewed more promptly for declassification.

BACKGROUND:

Classification review of documents is a Departmental function mandated by the Freedom of Information Act. The Office of Declassification is the Department's executive agent with responsibility to assure identification of all information that requires dissemination control for reasons of national security. Classified information under the control of the Department of Energy is particularly critical because of the need to protect highly sensitive nuclear weapon design and materials production from becoming available to proliferant countries or other countries inimical to the interests of the United States.

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Requests for the review of classified Department of Energy records have been increasing steadily over the past several years. The volume of requests doubled from FY 1992 to FY 1993. As a result of the continuing increase in demand, the Freedom of Information Act classified document review backlog has grown to 14 linear feet. The Department of Energy is committed to reducing this backlog.

BENEFITS:

- Researchers will have access to requested information more quickly.
- Public interest groups and journalists will be provided more timely responses so that the public will be better informed on current events or events that affect important policy debates.
- Individuals requiring information from the Department in order to settle legal disputes will have better service.
- The Department of Energy will improve its relations with the public resulting in a more open discourse on current issues.

DOE FACTS

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STAKEHOLDERS WORK SESSION ON DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

This initiative will:

- Take an unprecedented look at the Department of Energy's declassification program to ensure that our policies and procedures are in step with the new national and international environment, balancing the interests of stakeholders with national security concerns.

- Listen to our stakeholders on the Department's overall declassification program, including identifying priorities for declassification of information and documents in order to provide the information they need.

A critical step toward meeting the objectives of this initiative is to obtain stakeholders input. To accomplish this step, the Department of Energy is sponsoring a 1-day work session which will provide a forum for interactive dialogue between stakeholders and the Department of Energy on:

- **The overall Department of Energy declassification and control program;**

- **The Secretary's plan to improve declassification and access to Department of Energy information; and**

- **Continuing public input mechanisms on declassification of information and document declassification priorities.**

Details concerning the work session are as follows:

Date: February 1994

Location: Conference center or academic institution within the Washington, D.C. area. The exact date and location will be publicly announced.

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Participants: The Secretary will invite a representative group of the Department of Energy stakeholders, with additional open seating on a space available basis. Invited stakeholders will include the Congress, environmental groups, local citizens groups, historians, other public interest groups, and other Government agencies.

- Follow-on work sessions are planned for major Department of Energy field locations.

DOE FACTS

FACILITY ACCESS CONTROLS

Traditionally, the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies have maintained high levels of security for facilities nationwide. Strict security controls were necessary to protect the Department of Energy's sensitive information and materials from theft or terrorist attacks. The end of the Cold War and the general reduction in overall domestic threat levels over the past several years, as well as the Clinton Administration's emphasis on making Government more responsive and accessible to its customers and stakeholders, have caused the Department to review security levels and access controls and, where possible, incorporate improved procedures for greater facility access.

Secretary O'Leary's early initiatives to simplify and improve access to the Department of Energy's facilities have resulted in a number of procedural changes which have created a more open and customer-friendly business environment within the Department. Recent improvements have included:

- Most sensitive and classified activities have been moved into smaller areas which are protected by more traditional security measures. This allows freer access and accessibility to less sensitive areas of the Department of Energy's facilities.

- Procedures for visitor access have been improved by:

  - simplified badging procedures;
  - elimination of electronic screening in most cases;
  - elimination of escort requirements for nonsensitive areas; and
  - new streamlined procedures for handling large groups.

- Revised procedures to allow previously restricted electronic equipment (e.g., cellular phones, cameras, tape recorders, etc.) into nonsensitive areas.

- Training for protective force personnel on customer service procedures.

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