CHAPTER 3
Transportation Safeguards Systems

This chapter is for the use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning transportation safeguards systems used for transporting nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials (SNM). Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to Transportation Safeguards Systems (TSS) used for transporting nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear material (SNM). These documents are exempted from automatic declassification procedures as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption to automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) and (9) of E.O. 12958 which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction; . . .

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

This chapter addresses information concerning transportation safeguards systems used for transporting nuclear weapons and components and SNM relating to current systems still in operation. Examples of these systems include, but are not limited to, details of the safe secure trailers, operational procedures, secure communications, threats, and vulnerabilities.

To inform the public, it is desirable to make information about DOE shipments available to the maximum extent consistent with national security and safety. However, in order to preclude assisting a potential adversary in identifying attractive targets or predicting their locations and times en route, most information establishing shipping patterns is classified. In the absence of protective measures, such information would assist a potential adversary in identifying future shipments with content and itineraries of more attractive value, and could assist significantly in making plans to hijack, divert, or otherwise disrupt the TSS. Information concerning convoy and courier operating procedures, equipment, and tactics is also classified for the same reasons. The methods of collection of information for the purpose of threat assessment are also classified to protect sources and/or prevent malefactors from purposefully releasing fraudulent information through sources used by the TSS.

BROAD GUIDANCE

For TSS trips, information including identification of most shipment contents (nuclear weapon, device, or component shipment contents are usually at least Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)), frequency of trips, routes followed, locations at any given time, and information concerning Military First Destinations (MFD) must remain classified since they impact on current operations. Shipping documents are classified according to the specificity of information they reveal; for example, the classification of the completed 19-point shipping request ranges from Confidential NSI for models, mock ups, and SNM shipments not related to the weapon program up to Secret Restricted Data (SRD) for nuclear weapon shipments and shipments of SNM which could reveal SNM production rates. NOTE: The reporting identification symbol (RIS) used as identification does not provide protection of information.

Methods used to gather information about a perceived threat to a particular shipment or the TSS in general; specific techniques used to collect information concerning threats to TSS trips; sources of information, not officially released, used to assess the credibility and level of threats to TSS trips; technical criteria, methodology and techniques used to assess threats to TSS trips are classified and need to remain classified to prevent compromise of important sources of information having a direct impact on current operations.

Information is sensitive if it reveals information uniquely related to the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) operations as compared to those of other commercial carriers. Unauthorized release of such information could reasonably be expected to assist individuals in at least disrupting or interfering with TSD operations. Information which would assist an adversary in planning or executing an attack, such as current design information and protective features of safe secure trailer (SST) and safe secure railcar (SSR) vehicles is classified and must remain classified for future operations.

Information revealing current tactics and responses of the courier force to defend a shipment must also continue to be protected, as are threat scenarios and official evaluations of planned response effectiveness.

Most operational information concerning shipments of weapons is classified and categorized as FRD because of its relationship to weapons production and stockpile information. Estimates of plutonium masses which are contained in the nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons components, which can be derived by special loading rules for TSS for plutonium shipments are considered RD.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning transportation safeguards systems not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the (AEA) and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 4
COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

This chapter is for use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning compromise of classified DOE information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 and of permanent historical value pertaining to compromise of classified DOE information. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification provisions outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption of compromise of DOE classified information from automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) of E.O. 12958, which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which is expected to: . . .

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."

DOE classified information is protected by preventing its unauthorized dissemination. If DOE classified information appears without authorization in the public domain, the protection has failed and that information is compromised. In some cases, commenting on the classified information or attempting to prevent its further dissemination could result in greater damage to the national security than if no comment and no retrieval attempts were made. The fact that DOE classified information has appeared publicly does not make it unclassified and is not sufficient grounds for declassification.

In the past, statements have appeared in the public domain containing information classified by DOE guidance (e.g., speculative or theoretical statements by uncleared persons in newspapers, magazines, and books, or that are made in speeches, on television, or at open meetings). The location of such information, DOE analysis of it, and/or the fact that specified classified information has appeared publicly, are all classified NSI at the same classification level as the compromised information. DOE analysis of the compromised information may be NSI, RD, or FRD depending on the information revealed. This prevents providing the lending of official credence to speculation or theory which may be unsupported otherwise.

DOE NSI is exempt from automatic declassification when the specific information concerns compromise of DOE classified information which is still unrecovered and/or available in the public domain and contains still-classified information that may reveal sensitive information related to the DOE nuclear weapons program.

BROAD GUIDANCE

The primary reasons for classifying compromise-related DOE information and investigations are to limit damage, conceal security system vulnerabilities, and preclude further compromise. When the compromise is unintentional, it only plays into a malefactor's hands to alert them to the fact that there has been an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. When the compromise is intentional, but not the result of a malefactor's actions, elaborations on the incident could confirm information that would otherwise remain questionable. Finally, when the compromise arises from the activities of a malefactor, the investigation may lead to the identification of additional information serving to identify the mechanisms that effected the compromise and/or the discovery of its existence.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 identifying compromised DOE classified information and not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by statute, such as, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 5
UNRECOVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CLASSIFIED COMPONENTS

This chapter is for the use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning unrecovered nuclear weapons and classified components. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to unrecovered nuclear weapons and classified components. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification procedures as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption to automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) of E.O. 12958 which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."

This chapter addresses the concerns over unrecovered nuclear weapons and classified components. The concern is that information about either or both of these items might assist an adversary in gaining unauthorized recovery of nuclear weapons or components lost due to an accident with a resultant compromise of nuclear weapons design information.

Nuclear weapons and their classified components, in the custody of the Departments of Energy and Defense in many locations, are subjected to environments and/or activities which could result in a lost or missing weapon or component. Most of these incidents have occurred because an operational aircraft crashed or a weapon fell to land or sea during a mishap involving an operational aircraft. Loss of weapons or components could occur during logistical movement by aircraft, railcar, seagoing vessel, or highway vehicle as a result of accident, or theft. They could occur in a laboratory setting or a manufacturing facility. In the event of such an occurrence, a Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) may be assembled to assist in the search and recovery of the item(s). The equipment and personnel of NEST have the capability to locate diverted special nuclear material (SNM) or nuclear weapons.

BROAD GUIDANCE

Information which could assist in locating an unrecovered nuclear weapon or classified component must be classified until the weapon or component is recovered. What may have been a scenario leading to an unrecoverable weapon or component at the time of the accident may resolve itself through advances in technology. Therefore, with a location and description of the object which was lost, a proliferator or terrorist could recover a weapon or classified component and, through disassembly, discern the technology existent in a working nuclear device or weapon.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning unrecoverable nuclear weapons or classified components not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

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