CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The breakup of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and other national and international events of recent history have enabled our national leadership to reconsider the constraints placed on both classified and unclassified Government information. The flow of information to the public which began with the Openness Initiative of the Secretary of Energy was reinforced by President Clinton's Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, "Classified National Security Information," signed on April 17, 1995, effective on October 16, 1995. Both of these actions have revolved around a trust to the people of this nation to insure a better Government through the release to the general public of formerly inaccessible information that led to policy in the past and still impacts on policy development today.

E.O. 12958, "Classified National Security Information," in response to the dramatic reduction of security threats confronted by the nation, implements the President's commitment to open Government. It reverses previous classification policy, and unless positive action is taken to show that National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents of permanent historical value 25 years or older is still sensitive and should continue to be protected, such documents will be declassified. There is a 5-year period (ending April 16, 2000) to allow such documents to be reviewed and sensitivities determined before automatic declassification is implemented. At the end of this period, documents which are of permanent historical value, are 25 years or older, and have not been positively shown to require continued protection (even if not yet reviewed) will be automatically declassified. Automatic declassification does not apply to requirements made under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. This exemption to automatic declassification applies to information classified as Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).

PURPOSE

The purpose of this guide is to provide assistance to personnel reviewing files which may include Department of Energy (DOE) classified information contained in documents considered for automatic declassification under the provisions of the E.O. Only personnel from the DOE and other agencies who have been trained and authorized by DOE may use this document as authority to declassify DOE NSI written prior to 1976 within their agency's files.

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958

This order, dated April 17, 1995, and effective October 16, 1995, prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying NSI.

Under section 6.1 of the E.O., "Nothing within this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Restricted Data' and Formerly Restricted Data' shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the regulations issued under that Act." Therefore, RD and FRD are specifically excluded from the provisions of the E.O.

Automatic Declassification (section 3.4)

"(a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25 years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below.

(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a), above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interest of the United States;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;

(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;

(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;

(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;

(6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;

(7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other officials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;

(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair the current national security emergency preparedness plans; or

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

DOE EXEMPTED NSI

Applying the guidance cited above, DOE has identified the following subject areas as containing selected information which requires continued protection under the provisions of the E.O. because of their continuing sensitivity. (Squared brackets are used to identify the appropriate portion of paragraph 3.4(b) of the Executive Order 12958 under which the exemption falls for that particular subject area. [3.4(b)(2)] means exemption 2 in paragraph 3.4(b).) DOE exempted NSI includes only the following subject areas which:

1. Concern safeguards and security information related to current security measures at DOE sites or security programs that could: (1) provide meaningful assistance to a malefactor for theft of special nuclear material (SNM); (2) provide meaningful assistance to a malefactor for the sabotage of DOE nuclear facilities or assets; (3) meaningfully assist a malefactor in composing a credible nuclear threat message; (4) be exploited by foreign intelligence service to either enhance its intelligence collection efforts or thwart U.S. counterintelligence efforts; or (5) provide meaningful assistance in gaining unauthorized access to currently classified information including that in secure communications or in automated information system (AIS) equipment and AISs. [3.4(b)(1), (2) and (3)]
2. Concern transportation safeguards systems used for transporting nuclear weapons and components and SNM relating to current systems still in operation. Examples of these systems include, but are not limited to, details of the safe secure trailers, operational procedures, secure communications, threats, and vulnerabilities. [3.4(b)(2) and (9)]
3. Concern compromise of any details of RD, FRD, or exempt NSI. Such compromise information typically points to where the information can be found in the public domain. [3.4(b)(2)]
4. Concern unrecovered nuclear weapons and classified components which may provide information that might assist in gaining unauthorized recovery of nuclear weapons or components by others with resultant compromise of nuclear weapons design information. [3.4(b)(2)]
5. Concern Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) assets, capabilities, equipment, procedures, or operations still currently being used to: (1) search for and aid in the recovery of lost nuclear weapons or materials; and (2) aid the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the events of a crime involving the theft or alleged theft of a nuclear weapon, an improvised nuclear device or a radiation dispersal device, or to commit any other crime involving nuclear weapons, explosives, devices, or nuclear materials. [3.4(b)(2) and (8)]
6. Concern vulnerability and hardening technology against nuclear weapons. [3.4(b)(2)]
7. Concern high altitude nuclear weapons effects information. [3.4(b)(2)]
8. Concern proliferation of nuclear weapons information, particularly proliferation detection components or systems and methods for spoofing (giving false indications) and tampering, that could assist potential proliferators, hostile nations, and potential adversaries to develop, improve, or use nuclear weapons. [3.4(b)(2) and (9)]
9. Concern DOE intelligence information or intelligence sources which is still currently being used and may reveal sensitive information related to the nuclear weapons program. [3.4(b)(1) and (2)]
10. Concern foreign governments or international organization(s) information which was provided to DOE, or DOE information provided to foreign government(s) or international organization(s), with the understanding that such information be kept in confidence. Such information includes, but is not limited to, information generated pursuant to agreements for cooperation or sensitive high level energy discussions between DOE (or the Manhattan Engineering District, or the Atomic Energy Commission, or Energy Research and Development Administration) officials and foreign government representatives. [3.4(b)(6) and (9)]
11. Concern naval nuclear propulsion information which will assist other nations in the application of nuclear propulsion to naval vessels, will provide unauthorized access to information related to the operational characteristics and capabilities of a naval nuclear propulsion plant. [3.4(b)(2), (4), (6) and (9)]

These are the only NSI subject areas that DOE desires to continue to protect in documents that are older than 1976 and have permanent historical value. Even though the documents within these subject areas are exempt from automatic declassification, they are still subject to mandatory and systematic declassification review under the provisions of the E.O.

PHILOSOPHY OF THIS GUIDE

This guide is designed to be an aid in the declassification of DOE NSI contained in documents originating prior to 1976 only. No RD or FRD information is covered by this guide. The E.O. specifically exempts RD and FRD information from automatic declassification.

The DOE NSI documents, prior to 1976, were originated by DOE's predecessors: the Manhattan Engineering District; the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); and the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA). Historically, this was work done for other agencies and not actually contained within DOE documents. Within this document population, there is a subset of DOE information which falls within the eleven subject areas discussed above for exemption. In conjunction with the above reasoning, DOE has always used topical guidance for its classification guides with very specific and detailed guidance. These classification guides are periodically reviewed and updated to reflect changing sensitivities and resultant changes in the protection afforded the subject of the topic. A survey of topical guidance has shown that there is no significant change in the required level of protection for DOE NSI. Therefore, the declassification of DOE NSI documents originating prior to 1976 is not a matter of topical classification changes or classification downgrading, but rather a conscientious decision on whether relatively old (prior to 1976) documents with permanent historical value should continue to be protected in light of the current world situation. To implement this decision, the guide provides a "GO/NO GO" approach to answering the declassification question. Therefore, within this guide, the only specific guidance is "unclassified" or "retain classification."

Additionally, for the purposes of the NSI reviewers, all of the following topics are considered unclassified:

1. Any aspect of environmental, health, radiation exposure, and safety issues;
2. Any aspect of human radiation experiments; or
3. Any topic not covered by a DOE classification guide.

This guidance is contained in the DOE publication Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy, RDD-2, dated January 1, 1995, which also contains additional information on unclassified subject areas.

This guide will provide the basis for a document by document review for exempted information under the provisions of section 3.4(d) of the E.O. For any topics which are not identified within this guide but which must have the classification retained, DOE will submit a letter of justification to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) amending the guide. Pending receipt of a response from ISOO, the documents containing the information in question will remain classified.

If documents are discovered during a review which appear to contain classified information but are not marked as being classified, the documents will be held and protected as classified until it is reviewed by DOE, or DOE contractor, authorized derivative classifier (ADC) using the appropriate topical classification guide and procedures. Final decision of classification will rest with the ADC.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD. If the reviewer, using the information provided in the Appendix, suspects that a NSI classified, or unmarked, document may contain RD/FRD, the document should be controlled and marked

Directions for further action should then be requested from the following contact in the Office of Declassification, DOE: Document Declassification Division, (301) 903-4199.

DECLASSIFICATION DATE OR EVENT

The NSI written prior to 1976 which the DOE is exempting from automatic declassification is contained in a very narrowly defined group of subjects. The reason for continued protection of these subjects is that they provide insight into, or border very closely on, RD and/or FRD information. DOE's Order 5650.2B, "Identification of Classified Information," mandates a 2-year periodic review of all DOE classification guides. The requirement for the review is as follows:

Chapter V, Part B, Paragraph 4 - "Each DOE or DOE contractor organization shall review each classification guide it issues at least every 2 years to ensure that such guides do not contradict current classification policy. If the review indicates that the guide does not contradict such policy, the reviewer shall annotate the record copy of the guide with the results and date of the review. If the review indicates that the guide does contradict such policy, the issuing organization shall also note the nature of the problem and the nature of and schedule for planned corrective action."

This Order also applies to this guide, mandating at least a 2-year periodic review to assure that DOE NSI is declassified when protection for national security reasons is no longer necessary. Therefore, the declassification date or event (DDE), required by the E.O., is periodically updated as a part of the biennial updating of this document. Markings on documents reviewed using this guide will reflect this DDE philosophy.

Specific DDEs for each exempted subject area are included as a section at the end of each chapter. The specific DDEs and the general topic areas to which they apply within each chapter are listed at the end of the applicable chapter.

When the guide is updated, changes from "retain classification" to "unclassified" will be clearly marked. Any document reviewed using this guide will be prominently marked as such on the front cover, citing use of the guide (DOE CG-HR-1) and the specific guidance(s) used to retain the classification (10.1, 2.1, etc.). This will facilitate future reviews of the documents after update of this guide.

USING THIS GUIDE

This guide is designed for use by personnel authorized by DOE to review and declassify DOE NSI originating prior to 1976 deemed to be of significant historical value. To use this guide, the following must be remembered:

1. Documents containing any RD and/or FRD are exempt from declassification, regardless of whether they also contain NSI.
2. Guidance for each of the exempted NSI subject areas is contained in its own chapter of this guide. The chapter will provide guidance to either declassify the document or retain the present classification.
3. All other DOE NSI of permanent historical value written prior to 1976, which do not fall under the exemptions contained in paragraph 1 or 2 above, will become automatically declassified upon review or no later than April 16, 2000.

CHAPTER 2
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INFORMATION

This chapter is for use by personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originated prior to 1976 concerning DOE safeguards and security information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to DOE nuclear safeguards and security information. These documents may be exempted from automatic declassification provisions of Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption from automatic declassification is sections 3.4(b)(1), (2) and (3) of E.O. 12958 which read:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which is expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interest of the United States;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;

(3) reveal information that would impair U. S. cryptologic system or activities."

Safeguards and security information refers to information concerning the safeguarding of DOE nuclear materials and the security of DOE facilities and assets.

The best designed and most conscientiously operated protection system can, with some probability, be defeated by an adversary with sufficient resources and information. Information whose dissemination has the potential for significantly lowering the resources needed for a successful attack or for significantly increasing the probability of success should be protected. The principal reason for classifying DOE safeguards and security information is to deny the release of information that will assist a malefactor.

Certain information concerning the protection of a DOE facility would be of great value to a malefactor. This information would defeat any deterrent values of security systems, while allowing the adversary to (1) plan an attack; (2) circumvent, bypass, or disable security system components; or (3) defeat protective force efforts to neutralize an attack. Areas of DOE safeguards and security interests include (1) the safeguards and security concerning an automated information system (AIS), (2) communications security (COMSEC), (3) vulnerabilities information, (4) control and accountability of nuclear materials, (5) operations security (OPSEC), (6) malevolent dispersal of radioactive material, (7) nuclear threat messages, and (8) technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM).

The term automated information system (AIS) is defined as "any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem or equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data, to include computer software, firmware, and hardware. Included in this definition are word processors, microprocessors, personal computers, controllers, automated office support systems (AOSS), memory typewriters, and other stand-alone or special computer systems."

Communications security (COMSEC) means protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the United States government related to national security and to ensure the authenticity of such communications. Such protection results from the application of security measures (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, and emission security) to electrical systems generating, handling, processing, or using national security or national security related information. It also includes the application of physical security measures to communications security information or materials. The classification of all COMSEC equipment and related documentation is determined by the Director, National Security Agency (NSA). Large amounts of classified information are channeled into communication centers and distributed via communications systems. Thus, COMSEC is vitally important to ensure that the communications systems of these locations and the information associated with them are not compromised.

OPSEC is defined by DOE as a program designed to disrupt or defeat the ability of foreign intelligence services or other adversaries to exploit sensitive DOE activities or information and to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Sensitive activities are defined as classified and unclassified facilities, programs, operations, inquiries, investigations, research, exercises, tests, training, and other functions of the Department, or its contractors that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the national security. Since DOE and contractor operations include a variety of sensitive activities, applicable OPSEC measures likewise cover a wide range and tend to be oriented toward highly specific facilities or operations.

Modern intelligence collection utilizes equipment and devices incorporating state-of-the-art technology to accomplish technical penetrations of targeted areas. Such intelligence gathering devices have been discovered in U.S. facilities throughout the world. The detection of a clandestine installed device is extremely difficult. The purpose of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) program is to detect and deter such intelligence collection.

BROAD GUIDANCE

Although much information concerning safeguards and security, particularly general information regarding this subject area, is unclassified, certain information that would be beneficial to a malefactor in targeting, planning, and executing an attack against DOE nuclear facilities, nuclear materials or nuclear weapons, has properly been classified for national security reasons. Some of this classified safeguards and security information, however, has lost its sensitivity with the passage of time and should be declassified. Indeed, significant amounts of safeguards and security information in historical documents still bearing classification markings no longer warrants protection as classified information.

For example, information concerning safeguards and security vulnerability information becomes declassifiable upon correction of the vulnerability. When these vulnerabilities have been corrected, the document describing the vulnerability should be declassified. Even where explicit information is not readily available indicating the correction of a vulnerability. information 25 or more years old, concerning a specific vulnerability at a site or facility is too dated to be of use to a malefactor and should be declassified.

However, some safeguards and security information requires continued protection because it reveals details indicative of safeguards and security methodology, planning, systems, and operations in use today or evolutionary in nature from earlier methods, planning, etc. Such information may provide insight into current safeguards and security measures and may warrant exemption from automatic declassification.

Similarly, limited information concerning material accountability has lost its sensitivity with time. Historical information regarding special nuclear material (SNM) inventory differences (IDs) would not be useful today to a malefactor in diverting or stealing SNM, or making a current credible nuclear threat, and is, therefore, declassified. Other historical information about material accountability and control, however, requires protection because it may reveal information about allocations of SNM to atomic energy defense activities (e.g., nuclear weapons design or naval nuclear propulsion).

Information concerning OPSEC could lead to its use by a malefactor and possibly to a loss of classified information, and should therefore not be automatically declassified.

A malefactor who wishes to initiate a highly significant dispersal of radioactive material, or to threaten such dispersal, would almost always require multiple acts (e.g., releasing radioactivity by an explosion or other act while almost simultaneously destroying safety and/or containment systems, or the theft of radioactive sources followed by an explosion, or other means of dispersal). Information that can be protected and that would be useful to a malefactor in effecting a highly significant dispersal of radioactive material should remain classified. By restricting access to the information, the consequences of a dispersion attempt could be decreased and the effort and knowledge required by the malefactor would be increased.

Another concern of DOE is the assessment of, and response to, threat messages. Threat messages received in the past have established a need to prepare for this situation in the future. An important consideration is the credibility of the threat messages. Techniques have been developed that attempt to establish this credibility. With regard to nuclear threat messages in general, the fact that a nuclear threat message was received by DOE or other cleared agencies is no longer sensitive if revealed in historical classified documents over 25 years old. However, other information, actual analysis of such information and responses to them warrants exemption from automatic declassification because such dated information may still be of great value to a malefactor today.

Discussion of the technical surveillance threat in terms of specifics is classified because DOE does not want to provide information to a that will assist in their countering our selection of procedures, methods, or equipment. Detailed descriptions of TSCM capabilities and limitations are classified for the same reason. Some facts uncovered by TSCM surveys, inspections and monitors may be exempt from automatic declassification to avoid assisting potential adversaries today.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning DOE safeguards and security information not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by statute such as the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE