Document Details


Title:
Brief summary concerning strategic withholding (nuclear parsimony)
Author(s):
Subject Terms:
MISSILES/launching; NUCLEAR DETERRENCE/; MILITARY STRATEGY/; BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; MISSILES; LAUNCHING; MISSILE LAUNCHING SITES; NATIONAL DEFENSE; CIVIL DEFENSE; URBAN AREAS; EVACUATION; WARFARE; VULNERABILITY; WEAPONS
Document Location:
U.S. Deptartment of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA, 22161, Phone:(703) 487-4650, Fax:(703) 321-8547
Document Categories:
Nuclear Weapons and Related Technology\Nuclear Warfare and Civil Defense; National Security, Policy, and Warfare\General
Document Type:
REPORT
Publication Date:
1971 Jun 02
Declassification Date:
1995 Sep 19
Declassification Status:
Declassified
Document Pages:
5
Accession Number:
OOLDE97051348
Document Number(s):
UCRL-ID-126111; DE97051348
Originating Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
OpenNet Entry Date:
1997 May 13
Description/Abstract:
This memorandum provides a brief summary on thoughts concerning 'Strategic Withholding' (or perhaps, 'Nuclear Parsimony'). It is chiefly meant to further support the view that there should be other significant doctrines besides 'Brute-Force Retaliation'. The basic doctrinal argument is that it may be broadly disadvantageous to fire one's missiles in equal, or 'total' retaliation. It may be better to reply only softly, or not at all. The basic justification rests on an assumption of extended war, and on a logic addressed to what's best for the surviving population and capability at any given point. In most strategic wargame exercises, it is rarely apparent that this principle is taken into account. The essential point of argument is that an extended war is not so different from peacetime posturing.


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