Document Details

OPERATION WIGWAM, MAY 1955, PROJECT 2.4, DETERMINATION OF RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD TO PERSONNEL

HAWKINS, M B; SARTOR, J D; HOWELL, J E; BIGGER, M M; KEHRER, W S; KAWAHARA, F K; VINE, F S; LEE, H; BLACK, R H; CREW, R J; LANE, W B; SOULE, R R

WIGWAM OPERATION; HAZARDS; CONTAMINATION; SHIPS; DECONTAMINATION

Location - DOE/NNSA NUCLEAR TESTING ARCHIVE Address - P.O. Box 98521 City - Las Vegas State - NV Zip - 89193-8521 Phone - (702)794-5106 Fax - (702)862-4240 Email - NTA@NV.DOE.GOV

REPORT

1955 May 31

Unknown

0098

NV0006188

WT1012SUPERSED

UNITED STATES NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATOR

1994 Aug 26

2003 Sep 18

WT-1012 (SUPERSEDES ITR-1062); DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE RADIOLOG ICAL HAZARD TO PERSONNEL ON BOARD SHIPS TRAVERSING A ZONE OF WATER CON TAMINATED BY A SUBSURFACE NUCLEAR DETONATION IS DEVELOPED THROUGH CONS IDERATION OF THE SIZE, SHAPE, LOCATION, AND RADIATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTAMINATED AREAS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME. THE GAMMA-RADIATION INTENSITY AT DEFINITE SHIPBOARD STATIONS DURING AND AFTER TRAVERSES TH ROUGH THE AREA, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WASHDOWN SYSTEM, AND THE EFFECT IVENESS OF VARIOUS CONTAMINATION COUNTERMEASURES ARE DISCUSSED. THE P RINCIPAL CONTAMINATED ZONE OF WATER WAS ABOUT 5 SQUARE MILES AT H + 19 MIN; THE AVERAGE "TRANSIT" INTENSITIES WERE 25 TO 30 R/HR AT 3 FT ABO VE THE SURFACE. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DECAYED DURING D-DAY AT A RATE R EPRESENTED BY THE EXPONENT -1.5; THE OVER-ALL DECAY-DILUTION EXPONENT WAS -1.8. TRAVERSING THE CONTAMINATED AREA WITH THE WASHDOWN SYSTEM O N DID NOT INCREASE THE RADIATION LEVELS ON DECK APPRECIABLY DURING THE TEST. RESIDUAL RADIATION LEVELS RESULTING FROM THE WASHDOWN WATER BE ING CONTAMINATED WERE 4 PER CENT OF THE PEAK INTENSITIES ENCOUNTERED O N DECK. THE RADIOLOGICAL SITUATION ACTUALLY ENCOUNTERED BY THE TEST S HIPS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TACTICALLY SERIOUS UNLESS REPEATEDLY ENCOUNT ERED. THE SHIPBOARD SITUATION EXTRAPOLATED TO EARLIER TIMES IS INDICA TED TO BE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS. HOWEVER, IT IS CONCLUDED, SUBJECT TO R EVISION BY A MORE ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS, THAT SHIPS CAN OPERAT E IN AND AROUND A NUCLEAR DETONATION AS ENCOUNTERED HERE IF INTERCEPTI ON OF THE AIRBORNE ACTIVITY AND THE CONTAMINATED WATER SURFACE IS DELA YED TO ABOUT H + 10 MIN AND IF REPEATED EXPOSURES TO NEW DETONATIONS A RE NOT ANTICIPATED.