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DEBATE OVER HOW TO USE THE BOMB (Washington, D.C., Late Spring 1945)
Events
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Dawn of the Atomic Era, 1945
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The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
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Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
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The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
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Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
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The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
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The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
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Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
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The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
In early May 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,
with the approval of
President Harry S. Truman, formed an
Interim Committee of top officials charged with
recommending the proper use of atomic weapons in wartime
and developing a position for the United States on postwar
atomic policy. Stimson headed the advisory group
composed of Vannevar Bush,
James Conant, Karl T. Compton, Under
Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary
of State William L. Clayton, and future Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes.
Robert Oppenheimer,
Enrico Fermi,
Arthur Compton, and
Ernest Lawrence served as scientific
advisors (the Scientific Panel), while General George
Marshall represented the military. The committee met
on May 31 and then again the next day with leaders from
the business side of the Manhattan Project, including
Walter S. Carpenter of DuPont, James C. White of Tennessee
Eastman, George H. Bucher of Westinghouse, and James A.
Rafferty of Union Carbide.
At the May 31 meeting, Lawrence suggested that a
demonstration of the atomic bomb might possibly convince
the Japanese to surrender. This was rejected,
however, out of fear that the bomb might be a dud, that
the Japanese might put American prisoners of war in the
area, or that they might manage to shoot down the
plane. The shock value of the new weapon could also
be lost. These reasons and others convinced the group that
the bomb should be dropped without warning on a "dual
target" -- a war plant surrounded by workers'
homes. On June 6, Stimson informed President Truman
(right) that the Interim Committee recommended keeping the
atomic bomb a secret until Japan had been bombed.
The attack should take place as soon as possible and
without warning. Truman and Stimson agreed that the
President would stall if the Soviet Union asked about
atomic weapons in the upcoming meetings to be held at
Potsdam and that it might be possible to gain concessions
from the Soviet Union later in return for providing
technical information.
The Interim Committee also discussed the postwar fate of
atomic energy. At the May 31 meeting, they concluded that
the United States should try to retain superiority of
nuclear weapons in case international relations
deteriorated. Most present at the meeting thought
that atomic secrets should be protected for the present,
though they conceded that the United States monopoly could
not be held long. The meeting with the industrialists
confirmed their view that the United States had a lead of
three to ten years on the Soviet Union in production
facilities for bomb fabrication. There had been some
discussion of free exchange of nuclear research for
peaceful purposes and the international inspection system
that such an exchange would require. Stimson told
Truman that the Interim Committee was considering domestic
legislation and that its members generally held the
position that international agreements should be made in
which all nuclear research would be made public and a
system of inspections would be devised. In case
international agreements were not forthcoming, the United
States should continue to produce as much fissionable
material as possible to take advantage of its current
position of superiority.
Not all the scientists of the Manhattan Project were
satisfied that their voices had been heard in
decision-making about the bomb. They had built the
bomb and thought they had a right to help determine how it
was to be used. The Scientific Panel of the Interim
Committee was supposed to be the connection between the
scientists and the policymakers, but after the scientists
of the Met Lab were briefed by Arthur
Compton on June 2 about the Interim Committee's
conclusions, the Met Lab decided to create a "second
opinion." The result was the Committee on the
Social and Political Implications of the Atomic Bomb,
which was chaired by James Franck and included
Glenn Seaborg and
Leo Szilard. Its report argued that
postwar international control of atomic power was the only
way to stop the arms race that would be
inevitable if the United States bombed Japan without first
demonstrating the weapon in an uninhabited area.
Oppenheimer, Fermi, Compton, and Lawrence (the Scientific
Panel) disagreed with the Franck Report, however, and
concluded that no technical test would convince Japan to
surrender. On June 21, the Interim Committee
concurred. The bomb would be used as soon as
possible, without warning, and against a war plant
surrounded by additional buildings. As to informing
the Soviet Union, the Committee concluded that Truman
should mention at Potsdam that the United States was
preparing to use a new kind of weapon against Japan.
The bomb target selection group was chaired by
Leslie Groves, a responsibility he shared
with General Thomas Farrell, his military aide since
February 1945. In late May, the committee of
scientists and Army Air Force officers listed Kokura
Arsenal, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto as the four best
targets, believing that attacks on these cities would make
a profound psychological impression on the Japanese and
weaken military resistance. (None of these cities
had yet been bombed by Curtis LeMay's Twentieth Air Force,
which planned to eliminate all major Japanese cities by
January 1, 1946.) Stimson vetoed Kyoto, Japan's most
cherished cultural center, and Nagasaki replaced Kyoto on
the target list. Now all that was left was for
Truman to give his final approval, and then it would be up
to the weather to determine which of these four cities
would be the first struck by an atomic bomb.
-
The War Enters Its Final Phase, 1945
-
Debate Over How to Use the Bomb, Late Spring
1945
-
The Trinity Test, July 16, 1945
-
Safety and the Trinity Test, July 1945
-
Evaluations of Trinity, July 1945
-
Potsdam and the Final Decision to Bomb, July
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6,
1945
-
The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9,
1945
-
Japan Surrenders, August 10-15, 1945
-
The Manhattan Project and the Second World War,
1939-1945
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Sources and notes for this page.
The text for this page was adapted from, and portions
were taken directly from the
Office of History and Heritage Resources
publication:
F. G. Gosling,
The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb
(DOE/MA-0001; Washington: History Division, Department
of Energy, January 1999), 45-47. See also Vincent C. Jones,
Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 530.
The photograph of Robert Oppenheimer,
Enrico Fermi, and
Ernest Lawrence is courtesy the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Click
here for information on the photograph of Ernest
Lawrence, Arthur Compton, Vannevar Bush, James
Conant, Karl Compton, and Alfred Loomis. The portrait of
President Harry S. Truman is courtesy
the
Truman Presidential Library. The photographs of "Joe 1" (the first
Soviet atomic test) and of
Leo Szilard with
Albert Einstein are courtesy the
Federation of American Scientists. The photograph of
Leslie Groves and Thomas Farrell is
reprinted from Jones, Manhattan, 512.
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