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Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush

Technical Report:

Abstract

This paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly deterministic exploration process. The open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium is analysed. It is shown that in between intervals of soaring exploratory activities there may be an interval where exploration is declining over time.
Authors:
Publication Date:
Oct 01, 1985
Product Type:
Technical Report
Report Number:
NP-7750806
Reference Number:
DE-86-012777; ERA-12-009240; EDB-87-014499
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products. Universitaet Konstanz, Fakultaet fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik. Serie A. Volkswirtschaftliche Beitraege. No. 206
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY; NATURE RESERVES; EXPLORATION; ALLOCATIONS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; LAND OWNERSHIP; MINERAL RIGHTS; RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT; MATHEMATICS; OWNERSHIP; RESOURCES; STATISTICS; 290400* - Energy Planning & Policy- Energy Resources
OSTI ID:
7802981
Research Organizations:
Konstanz Univ. (Germany, F.R.). Fakultaet fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik
Country of Origin:
Germany
Language:
English
Other Identifying Numbers:
Other: ON: DE87750806
Availability:
NTIS (US Sales Only), PC A03/MF A01.
Submitting Site:
DE
Size:
Pages: 42
Announcement Date:
Dec 01, 1986

Technical Report:

Citation Formats

Mohr, E. Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush. Germany: N. p., 1985. Web.
Mohr, E. Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush. Germany.
Mohr, E. 1985. "Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush." Germany.
@misc{etde_7802981,
title = {Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush}
author = {Mohr, E}
abstractNote = {This paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly deterministic exploration process. The open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium is analysed. It is shown that in between intervals of soaring exploratory activities there may be an interval where exploration is declining over time.}
place = {Germany}
year = {1985}
month = {Oct}
}