Abstract
There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient
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Citation Formats
Parker, L.
Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter].
United Kingdom: N. p.,
1978.
Web.
Parker, L.
Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter].
United Kingdom.
Parker, L.
1978.
"Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter]."
United Kingdom.
@misc{etde_6630863,
title = {Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter]}
author = {Parker, L}
abstractNote = {There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient energy sources. If this is true then it cannot be said that the NPT is a failure, merely that its success does not correspond to its apparent purposes.}
journal = []
journal type = {AC}
place = {United Kingdom}
year = {1978}
month = {Aug}
}
title = {Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter]}
author = {Parker, L}
abstractNote = {There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient energy sources. If this is true then it cannot be said that the NPT is a failure, merely that its success does not correspond to its apparent purposes.}
journal = []
journal type = {AC}
place = {United Kingdom}
year = {1978}
month = {Aug}
}