Abstract
Accidents involving primary-to-secondary leakage (PRISE) caused by rupture of one or a few tubes are well known design basis events in both, western and VVER NPPs. Operating experience and in-service inspections of VVER-440 units have demonstrated also the potential for large PRISE leaks in the case of the steam generator (SG) primary collector cover lift-up (Rovno NPP). Without performing any countermeasure for limitation of SG collector cover lift-up, a full opening results in PRISE leak with an equivalent diameter 107 mm. Although this accident was not considered in the original design, this event is usually analysed as DBA too. Different means are available for detection and mitigation of PRISE leakage in NPPs currently in operation (J.Bohunice V-1 and V-2) or under construction (Mochovce) in Slovakia. 8 refs.
Citation Formats
Matejovic, P, and Vranka, L.
Support calculations for management of PRISE leakage accidents.
Finland: N. p.,
1997.
Web.
Matejovic, P, & Vranka, L.
Support calculations for management of PRISE leakage accidents.
Finland.
Matejovic, P, and Vranka, L.
1997.
"Support calculations for management of PRISE leakage accidents."
Finland.
@misc{etde_605589,
title = {Support calculations for management of PRISE leakage accidents}
author = {Matejovic, P, and Vranka, L}
abstractNote = {Accidents involving primary-to-secondary leakage (PRISE) caused by rupture of one or a few tubes are well known design basis events in both, western and VVER NPPs. Operating experience and in-service inspections of VVER-440 units have demonstrated also the potential for large PRISE leaks in the case of the steam generator (SG) primary collector cover lift-up (Rovno NPP). Without performing any countermeasure for limitation of SG collector cover lift-up, a full opening results in PRISE leak with an equivalent diameter 107 mm. Although this accident was not considered in the original design, this event is usually analysed as DBA too. Different means are available for detection and mitigation of PRISE leakage in NPPs currently in operation (J.Bohunice V-1 and V-2) or under construction (Mochovce) in Slovakia. 8 refs.}
place = {Finland}
year = {1997}
month = {Dec}
}
title = {Support calculations for management of PRISE leakage accidents}
author = {Matejovic, P, and Vranka, L}
abstractNote = {Accidents involving primary-to-secondary leakage (PRISE) caused by rupture of one or a few tubes are well known design basis events in both, western and VVER NPPs. Operating experience and in-service inspections of VVER-440 units have demonstrated also the potential for large PRISE leaks in the case of the steam generator (SG) primary collector cover lift-up (Rovno NPP). Without performing any countermeasure for limitation of SG collector cover lift-up, a full opening results in PRISE leak with an equivalent diameter 107 mm. Although this accident was not considered in the original design, this event is usually analysed as DBA too. Different means are available for detection and mitigation of PRISE leakage in NPPs currently in operation (J.Bohunice V-1 and V-2) or under construction (Mochovce) in Slovakia. 8 refs.}
place = {Finland}
year = {1997}
month = {Dec}
}