Abstract
The safety of technical systems is so difficult to assess because the concept 'risk' contains technical-scientific factors as well as components of individual and social psychology. Immediate or short-term hazards of human life as i.e. caused by the operation of industrial plants and mediate and thus long-term hazards have to be distinguished. Characteristic for the second hazard groups is the great time-lag before the effect takes place. Thus a causal relationship can be recognized only late and not definitely. Even when the causes have been obviated the effects still show. The development of a systems-analytical model as a basis of decisive processes for the introduction of highly endangered large-scale technologies seems particularly difficult. A starting point for the quantification of the risk can still be seen in the product of the probability of realization and the extent of the damage. Public opinion, however, does not base its evaluations on an objective concept of risk but tends to have an attitude of aversion against great and disastrous accidents. On the other hand, plenty of slight accidents are accepted much more easily, even when the amount of deadly victims from accidents reaches dimensions beyond those of the rare large-scale accidents. Here, mostly
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Jaeger, T A
[1]
- Bundesanstalt fuer Materialpruefung, Berlin (Germany, F.R.)
Citation Formats
Jaeger, T A.
Assessment of technical risks.
Germany: N. p.,
1978.
Web.
Jaeger, T A.
Assessment of technical risks.
Germany.
Jaeger, T A.
1978.
"Assessment of technical risks."
Germany.
@misc{etde_5761693,
title = {Assessment of technical risks}
author = {Jaeger, T A}
abstractNote = {The safety of technical systems is so difficult to assess because the concept 'risk' contains technical-scientific factors as well as components of individual and social psychology. Immediate or short-term hazards of human life as i.e. caused by the operation of industrial plants and mediate and thus long-term hazards have to be distinguished. Characteristic for the second hazard groups is the great time-lag before the effect takes place. Thus a causal relationship can be recognized only late and not definitely. Even when the causes have been obviated the effects still show. The development of a systems-analytical model as a basis of decisive processes for the introduction of highly endangered large-scale technologies seems particularly difficult. A starting point for the quantification of the risk can still be seen in the product of the probability of realization and the extent of the damage. Public opinion, however, does not base its evaluations on an objective concept of risk but tends to have an attitude of aversion against great and disastrous accidents. On the other hand, plenty of slight accidents are accepted much more easily, even when the amount of deadly victims from accidents reaches dimensions beyond those of the rare large-scale accidents. Here, mostly the damage possible but not the probability of its occurence is seen, let alone the general use of the new technology. The value of the mathematical models for estimating risks is mainly due to the fact that they are able to clear up decisions.}
journal = []
volume = {8:3}
place = {Germany}
year = {1978}
month = {Jan}
}
title = {Assessment of technical risks}
author = {Jaeger, T A}
abstractNote = {The safety of technical systems is so difficult to assess because the concept 'risk' contains technical-scientific factors as well as components of individual and social psychology. Immediate or short-term hazards of human life as i.e. caused by the operation of industrial plants and mediate and thus long-term hazards have to be distinguished. Characteristic for the second hazard groups is the great time-lag before the effect takes place. Thus a causal relationship can be recognized only late and not definitely. Even when the causes have been obviated the effects still show. The development of a systems-analytical model as a basis of decisive processes for the introduction of highly endangered large-scale technologies seems particularly difficult. A starting point for the quantification of the risk can still be seen in the product of the probability of realization and the extent of the damage. Public opinion, however, does not base its evaluations on an objective concept of risk but tends to have an attitude of aversion against great and disastrous accidents. On the other hand, plenty of slight accidents are accepted much more easily, even when the amount of deadly victims from accidents reaches dimensions beyond those of the rare large-scale accidents. Here, mostly the damage possible but not the probability of its occurence is seen, let alone the general use of the new technology. The value of the mathematical models for estimating risks is mainly due to the fact that they are able to clear up decisions.}
journal = []
volume = {8:3}
place = {Germany}
year = {1978}
month = {Jan}
}