Abstract
CANDU incorporates two diverse, passive shutdown systems, independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Both shutdown systems function in the low pressure, low temperature, moderator which surrounds the fuel channels. The shutdown systems are functionally different, physically separate, and passive since the driving force for SDS1 is gravity and the driving force for SDS2 is stored energy. The physics of the reactor core itself ensures a degree of passive safety in that the relatively long prompt neutron generation time inherent in the design of CANDU reactors tend to retard power excursions and reduces the speed required for shutdown action, even for large postulated reactivity increases. All passive systems include a number of active components or initiators. Hence, an important aspect of passive systems is the inclusion of fail safe (activated by active component failure) operation. The mechanisms that achieve the fail safe action should be passive. Consequently the passive performance of the CANDU shutdown systems extends beyond their basic modes of operation to include fail safe operation based on natural phenomenon or stored energy. For example, loss of power to the SDS1 clutches results in the drop of the shutdown rods by gravity, loss of power or
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Citation Formats
Hart, R S, and Olmstead, R A.
CANDU passive shutdown systems.
IAEA: N. p.,
1996.
Web.
Hart, R S, & Olmstead, R A.
CANDU passive shutdown systems.
IAEA.
Hart, R S, and Olmstead, R A.
1996.
"CANDU passive shutdown systems."
IAEA.
@misc{etde_443194,
title = {CANDU passive shutdown systems}
author = {Hart, R S, and Olmstead, R A}
abstractNote = {CANDU incorporates two diverse, passive shutdown systems, independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Both shutdown systems function in the low pressure, low temperature, moderator which surrounds the fuel channels. The shutdown systems are functionally different, physically separate, and passive since the driving force for SDS1 is gravity and the driving force for SDS2 is stored energy. The physics of the reactor core itself ensures a degree of passive safety in that the relatively long prompt neutron generation time inherent in the design of CANDU reactors tend to retard power excursions and reduces the speed required for shutdown action, even for large postulated reactivity increases. All passive systems include a number of active components or initiators. Hence, an important aspect of passive systems is the inclusion of fail safe (activated by active component failure) operation. The mechanisms that achieve the fail safe action should be passive. Consequently the passive performance of the CANDU shutdown systems extends beyond their basic modes of operation to include fail safe operation based on natural phenomenon or stored energy. For example, loss of power to the SDS1 clutches results in the drop of the shutdown rods by gravity, loss of power or instrument air to the injection valves of SDS2 results in valve opening via spring action, and rigorous self checking of logic, data and timing by the shutdown systems computers assures a fail safe reactor trip through the collapse of a fluctuating magnetic field or the discharge of a capacitor. Event statistics from operating CANDU stations indicate a significant decrease in protection system faults that could lead to loss of production and elimination of protection system faults that could lead to loss of protection. This paper provides a comprehensive description of the passive shutdown systems employed by CANDU. (author). 4 figs, 3 tabs.}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1996}
month = {Dec}
}
title = {CANDU passive shutdown systems}
author = {Hart, R S, and Olmstead, R A}
abstractNote = {CANDU incorporates two diverse, passive shutdown systems, independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Both shutdown systems function in the low pressure, low temperature, moderator which surrounds the fuel channels. The shutdown systems are functionally different, physically separate, and passive since the driving force for SDS1 is gravity and the driving force for SDS2 is stored energy. The physics of the reactor core itself ensures a degree of passive safety in that the relatively long prompt neutron generation time inherent in the design of CANDU reactors tend to retard power excursions and reduces the speed required for shutdown action, even for large postulated reactivity increases. All passive systems include a number of active components or initiators. Hence, an important aspect of passive systems is the inclusion of fail safe (activated by active component failure) operation. The mechanisms that achieve the fail safe action should be passive. Consequently the passive performance of the CANDU shutdown systems extends beyond their basic modes of operation to include fail safe operation based on natural phenomenon or stored energy. For example, loss of power to the SDS1 clutches results in the drop of the shutdown rods by gravity, loss of power or instrument air to the injection valves of SDS2 results in valve opening via spring action, and rigorous self checking of logic, data and timing by the shutdown systems computers assures a fail safe reactor trip through the collapse of a fluctuating magnetic field or the discharge of a capacitor. Event statistics from operating CANDU stations indicate a significant decrease in protection system faults that could lead to loss of production and elimination of protection system faults that could lead to loss of protection. This paper provides a comprehensive description of the passive shutdown systems employed by CANDU. (author). 4 figs, 3 tabs.}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1996}
month = {Dec}
}