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The case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26

Abstract

It is now universally recognized that arms control treaties should be effectively verified. The most objective, flexible and cost-effective means to verify the majority of multilateral treaties would be through a new agency under the United Nations. As a cooperative international effort to develop both the technology and the political framework for arms control verification, a United Nations verification agency (UNVA) would speed up and help secure the disarmament process by: verifying a number of existing and future treaties; investigating alleged breaches of treaties; and certifying, upon request, that voluntary arms control and confidence-building measures have been carried out. This paper presents the case for such a proposal, outlines a possible institutional configuration, considers the possibilities for growth and discusses the challenges facing the establishment of such an agency. (author). 16 refs., 1 tab.
Authors:
Publication Date:
Jul 01, 1990
Product Type:
Miscellaneous
Report Number:
INIS-mf-14959
Reference Number:
SCA: 350101; 055002; PA: AIX-28:006227; EDB-97:007532; NTS-97:005613; SN: 97001714044
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Jul 1990
Subject:
35 ARMS CONTROL; 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; INTERNATIONAL CONTROL; TREATIES; VERIFICATION; ARMS CONTROL; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS; UNITED NATIONS
OSTI ID:
409892
Research Organizations:
House of Commons, Ottawa, ON (Canada). Standing Committee on Energy, Mines and Resources
Country of Origin:
Canada
Language:
English
Other Identifying Numbers:
Other: ON: DE97609778; ISBN 0-662-18029-1; TRN: CA9600863006227
Availability:
INIS; OSTI as DE97609778
Submitting Site:
INIS
Size:
45 p.
Announcement Date:
Jan 09, 1997

Citation Formats

Dorn, A W. The case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26. Canada: N. p., 1990. Web.
Dorn, A W. The case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26. Canada.
Dorn, A W. 1990. "The case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26." Canada.
@misc{etde_409892,
title = {The case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26}
author = {Dorn, A W}
abstractNote = {It is now universally recognized that arms control treaties should be effectively verified. The most objective, flexible and cost-effective means to verify the majority of multilateral treaties would be through a new agency under the United Nations. As a cooperative international effort to develop both the technology and the political framework for arms control verification, a United Nations verification agency (UNVA) would speed up and help secure the disarmament process by: verifying a number of existing and future treaties; investigating alleged breaches of treaties; and certifying, upon request, that voluntary arms control and confidence-building measures have been carried out. This paper presents the case for such a proposal, outlines a possible institutional configuration, considers the possibilities for growth and discusses the challenges facing the establishment of such an agency. (author). 16 refs., 1 tab.}
place = {Canada}
year = {1990}
month = {Jul}
}