Abstract
The paper refers primarily to nuclear power reactors for which EURATOM has performed safety reviews in co-operation with national technical advisory organizations concerned in the licensing procedures. Comparative data are tabulated on a number of containment concepts and other engineered safeguards to protect against or to limit the consequences of major hypothetical accidents for a number of power reactors. Main environmental data, such as magnitudes of exclusion areas and population densities, are also presented. A number of topics of particular interest which were encountered during the safety analysis and which find widespread application in the assessment of the siting conditions and emergency planning are discussed. In this discussion, emphasis is placed on containment, engineered safeguards and emergency equipment. These items are considered in general with emphasis on: (a ) the importance of meeting operability and high efficiency requirements (reliability ) when needed through design and layout; (b) periodic testing and/or inspection possibilities and requirements in order to maintain high availability standards. Attention is drawn to some difficulties which have arisen in connection with design, material choice and construction of steel containment structures and which in the interests of safety as well as of economic optimization justify in the future more
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Citation Formats
Vinck, W. F., and Maurer, H.
Some Examples of the Relationship Between Containment and Other Engineered Safeguard Requirements, Accident Analyses and Site Conditions.
IAEA: N. p.,
1967.
Web.
Vinck, W. F., & Maurer, H.
Some Examples of the Relationship Between Containment and Other Engineered Safeguard Requirements, Accident Analyses and Site Conditions.
IAEA.
Vinck, W. F., and Maurer, H.
1967.
"Some Examples of the Relationship Between Containment and Other Engineered Safeguard Requirements, Accident Analyses and Site Conditions."
IAEA.
@misc{etde_22121090,
title = {Some Examples of the Relationship Between Containment and Other Engineered Safeguard Requirements, Accident Analyses and Site Conditions}
author = {Vinck, W. F., and Maurer, H.}
abstractNote = {The paper refers primarily to nuclear power reactors for which EURATOM has performed safety reviews in co-operation with national technical advisory organizations concerned in the licensing procedures. Comparative data are tabulated on a number of containment concepts and other engineered safeguards to protect against or to limit the consequences of major hypothetical accidents for a number of power reactors. Main environmental data, such as magnitudes of exclusion areas and population densities, are also presented. A number of topics of particular interest which were encountered during the safety analysis and which find widespread application in the assessment of the siting conditions and emergency planning are discussed. In this discussion, emphasis is placed on containment, engineered safeguards and emergency equipment. These items are considered in general with emphasis on: (a ) the importance of meeting operability and high efficiency requirements (reliability ) when needed through design and layout; (b) periodic testing and/or inspection possibilities and requirements in order to maintain high availability standards. Attention is drawn to some difficulties which have arisen in connection with design, material choice and construction of steel containment structures and which in the interests of safety as well as of economic optimization justify in the future more care in the use of possibly uniform or single-code requirements. Examples of uncertainties encountered in some accident analyses and their influence on siting considerations are discussed, with emphasis on safeguards intended to retain radioactive material in the plant, such as extent of core damage, iodine plate-out, filtering efficiency, wash-out effects. The means by which some of the main uncertainties have been or can in the future be eliminated through appropriate experimental programmes performed throughout the world are discussed. Some examples are also given of the influence of factors which could be reasonably incorporated in accident model calculations, such as taking into account the influence of the post-incident pressure decrease (artificial or natural) on leak-rates from shell-type secondary containments. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1967}
month = {Sep}
}
title = {Some Examples of the Relationship Between Containment and Other Engineered Safeguard Requirements, Accident Analyses and Site Conditions}
author = {Vinck, W. F., and Maurer, H.}
abstractNote = {The paper refers primarily to nuclear power reactors for which EURATOM has performed safety reviews in co-operation with national technical advisory organizations concerned in the licensing procedures. Comparative data are tabulated on a number of containment concepts and other engineered safeguards to protect against or to limit the consequences of major hypothetical accidents for a number of power reactors. Main environmental data, such as magnitudes of exclusion areas and population densities, are also presented. A number of topics of particular interest which were encountered during the safety analysis and which find widespread application in the assessment of the siting conditions and emergency planning are discussed. In this discussion, emphasis is placed on containment, engineered safeguards and emergency equipment. These items are considered in general with emphasis on: (a ) the importance of meeting operability and high efficiency requirements (reliability ) when needed through design and layout; (b) periodic testing and/or inspection possibilities and requirements in order to maintain high availability standards. Attention is drawn to some difficulties which have arisen in connection with design, material choice and construction of steel containment structures and which in the interests of safety as well as of economic optimization justify in the future more care in the use of possibly uniform or single-code requirements. Examples of uncertainties encountered in some accident analyses and their influence on siting considerations are discussed, with emphasis on safeguards intended to retain radioactive material in the plant, such as extent of core damage, iodine plate-out, filtering efficiency, wash-out effects. The means by which some of the main uncertainties have been or can in the future be eliminated through appropriate experimental programmes performed throughout the world are discussed. Some examples are also given of the influence of factors which could be reasonably incorporated in accident model calculations, such as taking into account the influence of the post-incident pressure decrease (artificial or natural) on leak-rates from shell-type secondary containments. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1967}
month = {Sep}
}