Abstract
The paper describes the methods of criticality control in use at a large research establishment and looks at some of the technical and administrative problems involved in the day-to-day control. Criticality advice is given formally by an establishment committee, reinforced by specialist consultants from other U.K.A.E.A. establishments and the Authority Health and Safety Branch, with a special provision for dealing with urgent matters. The advantages of a local part-time committee in a research establishment with rapidly changing requirements are discussed together with the positive steps necessary to ensure that part-time officers and members of the committee are able to keep up to date. The total amount of fissile material in use is about 150 kg and examples are given of some of the forms and conditions of use for which there were often no published criticality precedents. To avoid unnecessary restrictions, work with small quantities is considered to be exempt from any form of criticality control. The exempt quantities are stated. Examples are given of the controls recommended for larger amounts, from hundreds of grams in physics experiments to kilograms in chemical and metallurgical operations and the handling of reactor fuel elements. The problem of providing a technical argument for
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Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.
[1]
- Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, Berks. (United Kingdom)
Citation Formats
Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.
The Control of Criticality Hazards at Harwell.
IAEA: N. p.,
1966.
Web.
Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.
The Control of Criticality Hazards at Harwell.
IAEA.
Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.
1966.
"The Control of Criticality Hazards at Harwell."
IAEA.
@misc{etde_22117261,
title = {The Control of Criticality Hazards at Harwell}
author = {Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.}
abstractNote = {The paper describes the methods of criticality control in use at a large research establishment and looks at some of the technical and administrative problems involved in the day-to-day control. Criticality advice is given formally by an establishment committee, reinforced by specialist consultants from other U.K.A.E.A. establishments and the Authority Health and Safety Branch, with a special provision for dealing with urgent matters. The advantages of a local part-time committee in a research establishment with rapidly changing requirements are discussed together with the positive steps necessary to ensure that part-time officers and members of the committee are able to keep up to date. The total amount of fissile material in use is about 150 kg and examples are given of some of the forms and conditions of use for which there were often no published criticality precedents. To avoid unnecessary restrictions, work with small quantities is considered to be exempt from any form of criticality control. The exempt quantities are stated. Examples are given of the controls recommended for larger amounts, from hundreds of grams in physics experiments to kilograms in chemical and metallurgical operations and the handling of reactor fuel elements. The problem of providing a technical argument for safety is described in examples where lack of information has required obviously restrictive recommendations to be made. The question of inspection of operations is discussed with the view that more is to be gained by careful inspection and consultation before operations commence, as this is often an educative process for the staff involved. Methods of ensuring continued adherence to the approved conditions are examined. Some of the more difficult problems for a research establishment arise in storage of fissile material in its varied forms including fissile waste. Typical stores are described with the criticality safety controls. The aspects, which have been taken into account in advising whether or not criticality alarm systems should be installed, are given together with the emergency procedures for areas with such systems. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1966}
month = {May}
}
title = {The Control of Criticality Hazards at Harwell}
author = {Jefferson-Loveday, D. W.}
abstractNote = {The paper describes the methods of criticality control in use at a large research establishment and looks at some of the technical and administrative problems involved in the day-to-day control. Criticality advice is given formally by an establishment committee, reinforced by specialist consultants from other U.K.A.E.A. establishments and the Authority Health and Safety Branch, with a special provision for dealing with urgent matters. The advantages of a local part-time committee in a research establishment with rapidly changing requirements are discussed together with the positive steps necessary to ensure that part-time officers and members of the committee are able to keep up to date. The total amount of fissile material in use is about 150 kg and examples are given of some of the forms and conditions of use for which there were often no published criticality precedents. To avoid unnecessary restrictions, work with small quantities is considered to be exempt from any form of criticality control. The exempt quantities are stated. Examples are given of the controls recommended for larger amounts, from hundreds of grams in physics experiments to kilograms in chemical and metallurgical operations and the handling of reactor fuel elements. The problem of providing a technical argument for safety is described in examples where lack of information has required obviously restrictive recommendations to be made. The question of inspection of operations is discussed with the view that more is to be gained by careful inspection and consultation before operations commence, as this is often an educative process for the staff involved. Methods of ensuring continued adherence to the approved conditions are examined. Some of the more difficult problems for a research establishment arise in storage of fissile material in its varied forms including fissile waste. Typical stores are described with the criticality safety controls. The aspects, which have been taken into account in advising whether or not criticality alarm systems should be installed, are given together with the emergency procedures for areas with such systems. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1966}
month = {May}
}