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Nuclear industry and the management of accident risk in Europe: from the internalisation default to the coverage organization; Industrie nucleaire et gestion du risque d'accident en Europe: du defaut d'internalisation a l'organisation de la couverture

Abstract

The production of nuclear energy creates environmental and sanitary risks among which the risk of nuclear accident. There is a twofold dimension in the management of such a risk: a preventive dimension and a compensatory one. Given its catastrophic and unpredictable character, the nuclear risk has always been managed in a specific way. In Europe, its management is unsatisfactory. The civil liability regime is beneficial to the nuclear industry as it leads to a lack of internalisation and thus to a limited coverage of potential damages. The financial cap of the nuclear operator's civil liability reduces his incentives for the prevention of accidents. By narrowing its liability, it also limits the burden tied to the coverage of the full potential damages. The organisation of the nuclear risk coverage was heavily conditioned by the civil liability regime and the financial cap it creates. Such an organisation is inefficient. The nuclear insurance market's financial capacity is not enough to compensate for all the potential victims of a major nuclear accident. Moreover, the functioning of this market is quite costly for the nuclear operator. While new electronuclear projects are being launched in Europe, the management of nuclear risks must be questioned in order  More>>
Authors:
Publication Date:
Dec 15, 2007
Product Type:
Thesis/Dissertation
Report Number:
FRNC-TH-7462
Resource Relation:
Other Information: [305 refs].; This record replaces 39075145; These sciences economiques
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; ACCIDENTS; CIVIL LIABILITY; COST; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ENERGY POLICY; ENERGY SUPPLIES; EUROPE; GREENHOUSE EFFECT; INSURANCE; NUCLEAR POWER; RADIATION PROTECTION; RADIOACTIVE WASTES; VICTIMS COMPENSATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION
OSTI ID:
21057873
Research Organizations:
Aix-Marseille-3 Univ. Paul Cezanne, 13 - Marseille (France)
Country of Origin:
France
Language:
French
Other Identifying Numbers:
TRN: FR0801449075145
Availability:
Available from the INIS Liaison Officer for France, see the 'INIS contacts' section of the INIS website for current contact and E-mail addresses: http://www.iaea.org/inis/Contacts/
Submitting Site:
INIS
Size:
370 page(s)
Announcement Date:
Aug 18, 2008

Citation Formats

Fiore, K. Nuclear industry and the management of accident risk in Europe: from the internalisation default to the coverage organization; Industrie nucleaire et gestion du risque d'accident en Europe: du defaut d'internalisation a l'organisation de la couverture. France: N. p., 2007. Web.
Fiore, K. Nuclear industry and the management of accident risk in Europe: from the internalisation default to the coverage organization; Industrie nucleaire et gestion du risque d'accident en Europe: du defaut d'internalisation a l'organisation de la couverture. France.
Fiore, K. 2007. "Nuclear industry and the management of accident risk in Europe: from the internalisation default to the coverage organization; Industrie nucleaire et gestion du risque d'accident en Europe: du defaut d'internalisation a l'organisation de la couverture." France.
@misc{etde_21057873,
title = {Nuclear industry and the management of accident risk in Europe: from the internalisation default to the coverage organization; Industrie nucleaire et gestion du risque d'accident en Europe: du defaut d'internalisation a l'organisation de la couverture}
author = {Fiore, K.}
abstractNote = {The production of nuclear energy creates environmental and sanitary risks among which the risk of nuclear accident. There is a twofold dimension in the management of such a risk: a preventive dimension and a compensatory one. Given its catastrophic and unpredictable character, the nuclear risk has always been managed in a specific way. In Europe, its management is unsatisfactory. The civil liability regime is beneficial to the nuclear industry as it leads to a lack of internalisation and thus to a limited coverage of potential damages. The financial cap of the nuclear operator's civil liability reduces his incentives for the prevention of accidents. By narrowing its liability, it also limits the burden tied to the coverage of the full potential damages. The organisation of the nuclear risk coverage was heavily conditioned by the civil liability regime and the financial cap it creates. Such an organisation is inefficient. The nuclear insurance market's financial capacity is not enough to compensate for all the potential victims of a major nuclear accident. Moreover, the functioning of this market is quite costly for the nuclear operator. While new electronuclear projects are being launched in Europe, the management of nuclear risks must be questioned in order to find better solutions to the necessity of internalising, preventing and compensating. Nuclear operators should be responsible for all the damages caused through an unlimited liability rule. The coverage of potential damages could also be improved by setting up a risk-sharing agreement at the European scale between operators. (author)}
place = {France}
year = {2007}
month = {Dec}
}