Abstract
Consequences of radioactive emissions from a hypothetical severe accident at a Swedish nuclear power plant are estimated. Three different cases are studied; two cases where the systems for reduction of accident consequences work properly; and one case where they don`t - a `worst` case. The first case, where the security systems are supposed to work fully, give limited consequences: between a few and about 50 cancer deaths in Europe (integrated in time) depending on wind directions. Food production would be affected in an area within 10 km from the reactor, but not to a large extent. The second case, where the security system do not function to 100%, but 0.1% of the total activity is released, would give 20-100 extra cancer deaths in the normally prevailing winds for all Swedish sites. Under very unfavourable wind conditions this sum may rise to 200, for the Barsebaeck site perhaps to 500. Ground contamination of Iodine can be heavy within short distance, with repercussions for agriculture. For the last, worst case, severe consequences may follow, possibly with acute radiation deaths in an area closer than 5 km from the reactor. In favourable wind conditions cancer deaths can amount to a few hundred over
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Citation Formats
Baeverstam, U.
Radiation doses and ground contamination in Sweden after a major nuclear reactor accident. An enquiry performed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute in concert with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, September 1995; Straaldoser och markbelaeggning i Sverige efter en stor kaernkraftolycka. En utredning utfoerd av SSI i samraad med SKI, september 1995.
Sweden: N. p.,
1995.
Web.
Baeverstam, U.
Radiation doses and ground contamination in Sweden after a major nuclear reactor accident. An enquiry performed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute in concert with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, September 1995; Straaldoser och markbelaeggning i Sverige efter en stor kaernkraftolycka. En utredning utfoerd av SSI i samraad med SKI, september 1995.
Sweden.
Baeverstam, U.
1995.
"Radiation doses and ground contamination in Sweden after a major nuclear reactor accident. An enquiry performed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute in concert with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, September 1995; Straaldoser och markbelaeggning i Sverige efter en stor kaernkraftolycka. En utredning utfoerd av SSI i samraad med SKI, september 1995."
Sweden.
@misc{etde_209518,
title = {Radiation doses and ground contamination in Sweden after a major nuclear reactor accident. An enquiry performed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute in concert with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, September 1995; Straaldoser och markbelaeggning i Sverige efter en stor kaernkraftolycka. En utredning utfoerd av SSI i samraad med SKI, september 1995}
author = {Baeverstam, U}
abstractNote = {Consequences of radioactive emissions from a hypothetical severe accident at a Swedish nuclear power plant are estimated. Three different cases are studied; two cases where the systems for reduction of accident consequences work properly; and one case where they don`t - a `worst` case. The first case, where the security systems are supposed to work fully, give limited consequences: between a few and about 50 cancer deaths in Europe (integrated in time) depending on wind directions. Food production would be affected in an area within 10 km from the reactor, but not to a large extent. The second case, where the security system do not function to 100%, but 0.1% of the total activity is released, would give 20-100 extra cancer deaths in the normally prevailing winds for all Swedish sites. Under very unfavourable wind conditions this sum may rise to 200, for the Barsebaeck site perhaps to 500. Ground contamination of Iodine can be heavy within short distance, with repercussions for agriculture. For the last, worst case, severe consequences may follow, possibly with acute radiation deaths in an area closer than 5 km from the reactor. In favourable wind conditions cancer deaths can amount to a few hundred over 50 years, at normal conditions up to 2000-8000 and in the most unfavourable weather perhaps twice that amount. Emergency evacuation would be recommended, under the plume, at a distance up to 100-150 km. This will however not be possible, due to lack of time. The high level of contamination will cause a long-time evacuation from the area within distances of up to 50 km. 45 refs, 8 tabs, 5 figs.}
place = {Sweden}
year = {1995}
month = {Dec}
}
title = {Radiation doses and ground contamination in Sweden after a major nuclear reactor accident. An enquiry performed by the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute in concert with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, September 1995; Straaldoser och markbelaeggning i Sverige efter en stor kaernkraftolycka. En utredning utfoerd av SSI i samraad med SKI, september 1995}
author = {Baeverstam, U}
abstractNote = {Consequences of radioactive emissions from a hypothetical severe accident at a Swedish nuclear power plant are estimated. Three different cases are studied; two cases where the systems for reduction of accident consequences work properly; and one case where they don`t - a `worst` case. The first case, where the security systems are supposed to work fully, give limited consequences: between a few and about 50 cancer deaths in Europe (integrated in time) depending on wind directions. Food production would be affected in an area within 10 km from the reactor, but not to a large extent. The second case, where the security system do not function to 100%, but 0.1% of the total activity is released, would give 20-100 extra cancer deaths in the normally prevailing winds for all Swedish sites. Under very unfavourable wind conditions this sum may rise to 200, for the Barsebaeck site perhaps to 500. Ground contamination of Iodine can be heavy within short distance, with repercussions for agriculture. For the last, worst case, severe consequences may follow, possibly with acute radiation deaths in an area closer than 5 km from the reactor. In favourable wind conditions cancer deaths can amount to a few hundred over 50 years, at normal conditions up to 2000-8000 and in the most unfavourable weather perhaps twice that amount. Emergency evacuation would be recommended, under the plume, at a distance up to 100-150 km. This will however not be possible, due to lack of time. The high level of contamination will cause a long-time evacuation from the area within distances of up to 50 km. 45 refs, 8 tabs, 5 figs.}
place = {Sweden}
year = {1995}
month = {Dec}
}