Abstract
At the consultants' meeting on the 'Safety of WWER-1000 Model 320 Nuclear Power Plants' organized by the IAEA within the framework of its Extrabudgetary Programme on the Safety of WWER-1000 NPPs, which was held in Vienna, 1-5 June 1992, the problem of core control and protection strategy was identified as an issue of safety concern. Considering the safety importance of this issue, a consultants' meeting on 'Core Control and Protection Strategy for WWER-1000 Reactors' was convened in Vienna in April 1994 attended by 20 international experts in the area of core control and protection in order to review control and protection system design, to compare them with western practices and to recommend corrective measures. The first WWER-1000 NPP was put into operation in 1980 and there are currently 19 units operating. The accumulated operational experience is more than 130 reactor-years. In addition, there are 8 units under various stages of construction. The previous general observations in the area of core control and protection strategy was focused on core design objectives, core design and fuel management, fuel assembly and core component designs, including burnable absorber and control rod designs, core power distribution control strategy, core control and protection system designs and
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Citation Formats
None.
Draft report of a consultants meeting on core control and protection strategy of WWER-1000 reactors. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER-1000 NPPs.
IAEA: N. p.,
1994.
Web.
None.
Draft report of a consultants meeting on core control and protection strategy of WWER-1000 reactors. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER-1000 NPPs.
IAEA.
None.
1994.
"Draft report of a consultants meeting on core control and protection strategy of WWER-1000 reactors. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER-1000 NPPs."
IAEA.
@misc{etde_20892360,
title = {Draft report of a consultants meeting on core control and protection strategy of WWER-1000 reactors. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER-1000 NPPs}
author = {None}
abstractNote = {At the consultants' meeting on the 'Safety of WWER-1000 Model 320 Nuclear Power Plants' organized by the IAEA within the framework of its Extrabudgetary Programme on the Safety of WWER-1000 NPPs, which was held in Vienna, 1-5 June 1992, the problem of core control and protection strategy was identified as an issue of safety concern. Considering the safety importance of this issue, a consultants' meeting on 'Core Control and Protection Strategy for WWER-1000 Reactors' was convened in Vienna in April 1994 attended by 20 international experts in the area of core control and protection in order to review control and protection system design, to compare them with western practices and to recommend corrective measures. The first WWER-1000 NPP was put into operation in 1980 and there are currently 19 units operating. The accumulated operational experience is more than 130 reactor-years. In addition, there are 8 units under various stages of construction. The previous general observations in the area of core control and protection strategy was focused on core design objectives, core design and fuel management, fuel assembly and core component designs, including burnable absorber and control rod designs, core power distribution control strategy, core control and protection system designs and in-core and ex-core instrumentation systems. While core design objectives of WWER-1000 plants are similar to western practices in general, there are important differences on the design limits and regulatory practices followed for the compliance with the design limits. As a result of previous general observations and specific concerns on core control and protection system design, three working groups were formed to further investigate the specific issues and to compile information on safety issues based on design differences between these plants and similar western plants, to identify areas which need further analysis and make recommendations for short-term and long-term corrective actions. The working group focused on the following areas: a. Core Design and Core Control Strategy b. Control Rod Insertion Reliability c. Core Control and Protection Systems The objective of the first working group was to evaluate and make recommendations on core design objectives, core design and fuel management practices, fuel assembly and core components including burnable absorbers and control rods, and to evaluate core power distribution control strategy currently practiced in WWER-1000 reactors. Recognizing the importance of problems related to control rod insertion reliability concerns, a second working group was formed in order to perform an in-depth review of the control rod drop problem, to understand the underlying causes, to investigate similar incidents in western plants and to justify the corrective measures taken. An objective of the third working group was to review Russian control and protection system design, limitation systems design, use of in-core detectors for protection purposes, Three Mile Island requirements, anticipated transients without scram and beyond design basis accident requirements, and to compare them with western practices, making short term and long term recommendations.}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1994}
month = {Dec}
}
title = {Draft report of a consultants meeting on core control and protection strategy of WWER-1000 reactors. Extrabudgetary programme on the safety of WWER-1000 NPPs}
author = {None}
abstractNote = {At the consultants' meeting on the 'Safety of WWER-1000 Model 320 Nuclear Power Plants' organized by the IAEA within the framework of its Extrabudgetary Programme on the Safety of WWER-1000 NPPs, which was held in Vienna, 1-5 June 1992, the problem of core control and protection strategy was identified as an issue of safety concern. Considering the safety importance of this issue, a consultants' meeting on 'Core Control and Protection Strategy for WWER-1000 Reactors' was convened in Vienna in April 1994 attended by 20 international experts in the area of core control and protection in order to review control and protection system design, to compare them with western practices and to recommend corrective measures. The first WWER-1000 NPP was put into operation in 1980 and there are currently 19 units operating. The accumulated operational experience is more than 130 reactor-years. In addition, there are 8 units under various stages of construction. The previous general observations in the area of core control and protection strategy was focused on core design objectives, core design and fuel management, fuel assembly and core component designs, including burnable absorber and control rod designs, core power distribution control strategy, core control and protection system designs and in-core and ex-core instrumentation systems. While core design objectives of WWER-1000 plants are similar to western practices in general, there are important differences on the design limits and regulatory practices followed for the compliance with the design limits. As a result of previous general observations and specific concerns on core control and protection system design, three working groups were formed to further investigate the specific issues and to compile information on safety issues based on design differences between these plants and similar western plants, to identify areas which need further analysis and make recommendations for short-term and long-term corrective actions. The working group focused on the following areas: a. Core Design and Core Control Strategy b. Control Rod Insertion Reliability c. Core Control and Protection Systems The objective of the first working group was to evaluate and make recommendations on core design objectives, core design and fuel management practices, fuel assembly and core components including burnable absorbers and control rods, and to evaluate core power distribution control strategy currently practiced in WWER-1000 reactors. Recognizing the importance of problems related to control rod insertion reliability concerns, a second working group was formed in order to perform an in-depth review of the control rod drop problem, to understand the underlying causes, to investigate similar incidents in western plants and to justify the corrective measures taken. An objective of the third working group was to review Russian control and protection system design, limitation systems design, use of in-core detectors for protection purposes, Three Mile Island requirements, anticipated transients without scram and beyond design basis accident requirements, and to compare them with western practices, making short term and long term recommendations.}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1994}
month = {Dec}
}