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Identification of efforts required for continued safe operation of KANUPP

Abstract

Kanupp, the first commercial CANDU PHWR, rated at 137 MWe, was built on turnkey basis by the Canadian General Electric Company for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and went operational in October, 1972 near Karachi. It has operated since then with a lifetime average availability factor of 51.5% and capacity factor of 25%. In 1976, Kanupp suffered loss of technical support from its original vendors due to the Canadian embargo on export of nuclear technology. Simultaneously, the world experienced the most explosive development and advancement in electronic and computer technology, accelerating the obsolescence of such equipment and systems installed in Kanupp. Replacement upgrading of obsolete computers, control and instrumentation was thus the first major set of efforts realized as essential f or continued safe operation. On the other hand, Kanupp was able to cope with the normal maintenance of its process, mechanical and electrical equipment till the late 80's. But now many of these components are reaching the end of their useful life, and developing chronic problems due to ageing, which can only be solved by complete replacement. This is much more difficult for custom-made nuclear process equipment, e.g. the reactor internals and the fuelling machine. Public awareness and international  More>>
Authors:
Ghafoor, M A; Hashmi, J A; Siddiqui, Z H [1] 
  1. Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, Karachi (Pakistan)
Publication Date:
Apr 01, 1991
Product Type:
Conference
Report Number:
INIS-XA-N-171
Resource Relation:
Conference: 2. PHWR operating safety experience meeting, Embalse, Cordoba (Argentina), 3-5 Apr 1991; Other Information: 6 refs; PBD: Apr 1991; Related Information: In: Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting, 810 pages.
Subject:
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS; AGING; COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYSTEMS; KANUPP REACTOR; REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS; SAFETY ANALYSIS; SAFETY STANDARDS; SERVICE LIFE
OSTI ID:
20483019
Research Organizations:
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Buenos Aires (Argentina); CANDU Owners Group, North York, ON (Canada)
Country of Origin:
IAEA
Language:
English
Other Identifying Numbers:
TRN: XA04N1310055690
Availability:
Available from INIS in electronic form
Submitting Site:
INIS
Size:
26 pages
Announcement Date:
Jul 23, 2004

Citation Formats

Ghafoor, M A, Hashmi, J A, and Siddiqui, Z H. Identification of efforts required for continued safe operation of KANUPP. IAEA: N. p., 1991. Web.
Ghafoor, M A, Hashmi, J A, & Siddiqui, Z H. Identification of efforts required for continued safe operation of KANUPP. IAEA.
Ghafoor, M A, Hashmi, J A, and Siddiqui, Z H. 1991. "Identification of efforts required for continued safe operation of KANUPP." IAEA.
@misc{etde_20483019,
title = {Identification of efforts required for continued safe operation of KANUPP}
author = {Ghafoor, M A, Hashmi, J A, and Siddiqui, Z H}
abstractNote = {Kanupp, the first commercial CANDU PHWR, rated at 137 MWe, was built on turnkey basis by the Canadian General Electric Company for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and went operational in October, 1972 near Karachi. It has operated since then with a lifetime average availability factor of 51.5% and capacity factor of 25%. In 1976, Kanupp suffered loss of technical support from its original vendors due to the Canadian embargo on export of nuclear technology. Simultaneously, the world experienced the most explosive development and advancement in electronic and computer technology, accelerating the obsolescence of such equipment and systems installed in Kanupp. Replacement upgrading of obsolete computers, control and instrumentation was thus the first major set of efforts realized as essential f or continued safe operation. On the other hand, Kanupp was able to cope with the normal maintenance of its process, mechanical and electrical equipment till the late 80's. But now many of these components are reaching the end of their useful life, and developing chronic problems due to ageing, which can only be solved by complete replacement. This is much more difficult for custom-made nuclear process equipment, e.g. the reactor internals and the fuelling machine. Public awareness and international concern about nuclear safety have increased significantly since the TMI and Chernobyl events. Corresponding realization of the critical role of human factors and the importance of operational experience feedback, has helped Kanupp by opening international channels of communication, including renewed cooperation on CANDU technology. The safety standards and criteria for CANDU as well as other NPPs have matured and evolved gradually over the past two decades. First Kanupp has to ensure that its present ageing-induced equipment problems are resolved to satisfy the original safety requirements and public risk targets which are still internationally acceptable. But as a policy, we are committed to upgrade the safety as far as possible, towards current standards and criteria. We are already modernizing our operational safety practices. We also intend to update our safety analysis, to confirm the current standards and criteria which are applicable in the context of the original plant design, and implement corresponding equipment upgrades where feasible, or special procedures to compensate where possible. This paper identifies the diverse upgrading efforts required in these three major areas, i.e. obsolescence, ageing and safety. A cost-benefit criterion is envisaged to prioritize their implementation with the available resources, to keep Kanupp operating safely, even beyond its originally intended lifespan. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {1991}
month = {Apr}
}