Abstract
The safety culture of the nuclear organization can be addressed at the three levels of culture proposed by Edgar Schein. The industry literature provides a great deal of insight at the artefact and espoused value levels, although as yet it remains somewhat disorganized. There is, however, an overall lack of understanding of the assumption level of safety culture. This paper describes a possible framework for conceptualizing the assumption level, suggesting that safety culture is grounded in unconscious beliefs about the nature of the safety problem, its solution and how to organize to achieve the solution. Using this framework, the organization can begin to uncover the assumptions at play in its normal operation, decisions and events and, if necessary, engage in a process to shift them towards assumptions more supportive of a strong safety culture. (author)
Packer, Charles
[1]
- President, Cherrystone Management, Inc. Newcastle, ON (Canada)
Citation Formats
Packer, Charles.
A framework for the organizational assumptions underlying safety culture.
IAEA: N. p.,
2002.
Web.
Packer, Charles.
A framework for the organizational assumptions underlying safety culture.
IAEA.
Packer, Charles.
2002.
"A framework for the organizational assumptions underlying safety culture."
IAEA.
@misc{etde_20315947,
title = {A framework for the organizational assumptions underlying safety culture}
author = {Packer, Charles}
abstractNote = {The safety culture of the nuclear organization can be addressed at the three levels of culture proposed by Edgar Schein. The industry literature provides a great deal of insight at the artefact and espoused value levels, although as yet it remains somewhat disorganized. There is, however, an overall lack of understanding of the assumption level of safety culture. This paper describes a possible framework for conceptualizing the assumption level, suggesting that safety culture is grounded in unconscious beliefs about the nature of the safety problem, its solution and how to organize to achieve the solution. Using this framework, the organization can begin to uncover the assumptions at play in its normal operation, decisions and events and, if necessary, engage in a process to shift them towards assumptions more supportive of a strong safety culture. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {2002}
month = {Jul}
}
title = {A framework for the organizational assumptions underlying safety culture}
author = {Packer, Charles}
abstractNote = {The safety culture of the nuclear organization can be addressed at the three levels of culture proposed by Edgar Schein. The industry literature provides a great deal of insight at the artefact and espoused value levels, although as yet it remains somewhat disorganized. There is, however, an overall lack of understanding of the assumption level of safety culture. This paper describes a possible framework for conceptualizing the assumption level, suggesting that safety culture is grounded in unconscious beliefs about the nature of the safety problem, its solution and how to organize to achieve the solution. Using this framework, the organization can begin to uncover the assumptions at play in its normal operation, decisions and events and, if necessary, engage in a process to shift them towards assumptions more supportive of a strong safety culture. (author)}
place = {IAEA}
year = {2002}
month = {Jul}
}