Abstract
Power consumption of self-generation has been growing more than that of large power consumers since 1986 in Japan. Separation of large power consumers is caused by the utility{prime}s responsibility to pay fixed costs, and may force other general consumers to pay high rates for electric service. This report examines how rates for consumers with self-generation should be with a game theoretic approach to stop consumers{prime} shifting to sefl-generation and to utilize the existing self generation plants effectively. The time-of-use(TOU) pricing problem is formulated as a cooperative game, a Nash game, and a Stackelberg game, respectively, between an electric utility and a self-generator. As a result, it is shown that the situation of the Stackelberg game is the most similar to the real situation and desirable for the social welfare. When the marginal cost of the self-generator is lower than that of the electric utility and both of them are competitive, it is also disirable in society that the utility adopts discount rates to the self-generator. 7 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.
Asano, H
[1]
- Central Reserach Institute of electric Power Industry, Tokyo (Japan)
Citation Formats
Asano, H.
Game theoretic analysis of incentive rates for customers with self-generation; Jikahatsu hoyu juyoka muke ryokin no game ronteki bunseki.
Japan: N. p.,
1991.
Web.
Asano, H.
Game theoretic analysis of incentive rates for customers with self-generation; Jikahatsu hoyu juyoka muke ryokin no game ronteki bunseki.
Japan.
Asano, H.
1991.
"Game theoretic analysis of incentive rates for customers with self-generation; Jikahatsu hoyu juyoka muke ryokin no game ronteki bunseki."
Japan.
@misc{etde_10149787,
title = {Game theoretic analysis of incentive rates for customers with self-generation; Jikahatsu hoyu juyoka muke ryokin no game ronteki bunseki}
author = {Asano, H}
abstractNote = {Power consumption of self-generation has been growing more than that of large power consumers since 1986 in Japan. Separation of large power consumers is caused by the utility{prime}s responsibility to pay fixed costs, and may force other general consumers to pay high rates for electric service. This report examines how rates for consumers with self-generation should be with a game theoretic approach to stop consumers{prime} shifting to sefl-generation and to utilize the existing self generation plants effectively. The time-of-use(TOU) pricing problem is formulated as a cooperative game, a Nash game, and a Stackelberg game, respectively, between an electric utility and a self-generator. As a result, it is shown that the situation of the Stackelberg game is the most similar to the real situation and desirable for the social welfare. When the marginal cost of the self-generator is lower than that of the electric utility and both of them are competitive, it is also disirable in society that the utility adopts discount rates to the self-generator. 7 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.}
place = {Japan}
year = {1991}
month = {Oct}
}
title = {Game theoretic analysis of incentive rates for customers with self-generation; Jikahatsu hoyu juyoka muke ryokin no game ronteki bunseki}
author = {Asano, H}
abstractNote = {Power consumption of self-generation has been growing more than that of large power consumers since 1986 in Japan. Separation of large power consumers is caused by the utility{prime}s responsibility to pay fixed costs, and may force other general consumers to pay high rates for electric service. This report examines how rates for consumers with self-generation should be with a game theoretic approach to stop consumers{prime} shifting to sefl-generation and to utilize the existing self generation plants effectively. The time-of-use(TOU) pricing problem is formulated as a cooperative game, a Nash game, and a Stackelberg game, respectively, between an electric utility and a self-generator. As a result, it is shown that the situation of the Stackelberg game is the most similar to the real situation and desirable for the social welfare. When the marginal cost of the self-generator is lower than that of the electric utility and both of them are competitive, it is also disirable in society that the utility adopts discount rates to the self-generator. 7 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.}
place = {Japan}
year = {1991}
month = {Oct}
}