Abstract
In this paper we analyse anti-pollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a ``polluter`` and the ``police`` in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the ``policy-maker``. We show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. (au).
Citation Formats
Holler, M J.
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic.
Denmark: N. p.,
1991.
Web.
Holler, M J.
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic.
Denmark.
Holler, M J.
1991.
"Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic."
Denmark.
@misc{etde_10148357,
title = {Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic}
author = {Holler, M J}
abstractNote = {In this paper we analyse anti-pollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a ``polluter`` and the ``police`` in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the ``policy-maker``. We show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. (au).}
place = {Denmark}
year = {1991}
month = {Feb}
}
title = {Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic}
author = {Holler, M J}
abstractNote = {In this paper we analyse anti-pollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a ``polluter`` and the ``police`` in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the ``policy-maker``. We show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. (au).}
place = {Denmark}
year = {1991}
month = {Feb}
}