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Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic

Abstract

In this paper we analyse anti-pollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a ``polluter`` and the ``police`` in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the ``policy-maker``. We show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. (au).
Authors:
Publication Date:
Feb 01, 1991
Product Type:
Technical Report
Report Number:
AAU-OI-MEMO-1991-4
Reference Number:
SCA: 290300; PA: DK-93:001275; SN: 93000980997
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Feb 1991
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; MATHEMATICAL LOGIC; DECISION MAKING; POLLUTION ABATEMENT; POLITICAL ASPECTS; LEGAL INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOR; 290300; ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY
OSTI ID:
10148357
Research Organizations:
Aarhus Univ. (Denmark). Oekonomisk Inst.
Country of Origin:
Denmark
Language:
English
Other Identifying Numbers:
Other: ON: DE93784746; TRN: DK9301275
Availability:
OSTI; NTIS
Submitting Site:
DK
Size:
19 p.
Announcement Date:
Jul 05, 2005

Citation Formats

Holler, M J. Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic. Denmark: N. p., 1991. Web.
Holler, M J. Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic. Denmark.
Holler, M J. 1991. "Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic." Denmark.
@misc{etde_10148357,
title = {Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic}
author = {Holler, M J}
abstractNote = {In this paper we analyse anti-pollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a ``polluter`` and the ``police`` in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the ``policy-maker``. We show that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. (au).}
place = {Denmark}
year = {1991}
month = {Feb}
}