Abstract
Ontario Hydro operated Darlington in a safe manner in 1991. Ontario Hydro violated the Atomic Energy Control Regulations once and the physical security regulations three times in 1991. They failed to observe the Operating Licence conditions on ten occasions. The AECB did not find that the individual events had a significant impact on safety. There were no violations of the construction licence. None of the station staff received a radiation dose in excess of the regulatory limit. Radioactive emissions from the station were far below the regulatory limit. Special safety system performance was not fully satisfactory. Ontario Hydro failed to meet the unavailability targets for shutdown system one and the negative pressure containment system. Ontario Hydro reported seventeen incidents under conditions of the Operating and Construction licences. Units 1 and 2 remained shut down for most of 1991 because of unexplained fuel bundle damage in the reactor core. Ontario Hydro has decided to replace the main generator rotors because of cracks discovered on the rotor shaft. A fully modified rotor was installed on Unit 1. Ontario Hydro staff have a significant backlog of maintenance work. The Quality Improvement Program seemed to work well, resulting in some noticeable improvements. Three Shift
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Citation Formats
None.
AECB staff annual report of Darlington NGS for the year 1991.
Canada: N. p.,
1992.
Web.
None.
AECB staff annual report of Darlington NGS for the year 1991.
Canada.
None.
1992.
"AECB staff annual report of Darlington NGS for the year 1991."
Canada.
@misc{etde_10127195,
title = {AECB staff annual report of Darlington NGS for the year 1991}
author = {None}
abstractNote = {Ontario Hydro operated Darlington in a safe manner in 1991. Ontario Hydro violated the Atomic Energy Control Regulations once and the physical security regulations three times in 1991. They failed to observe the Operating Licence conditions on ten occasions. The AECB did not find that the individual events had a significant impact on safety. There were no violations of the construction licence. None of the station staff received a radiation dose in excess of the regulatory limit. Radioactive emissions from the station were far below the regulatory limit. Special safety system performance was not fully satisfactory. Ontario Hydro failed to meet the unavailability targets for shutdown system one and the negative pressure containment system. Ontario Hydro reported seventeen incidents under conditions of the Operating and Construction licences. Units 1 and 2 remained shut down for most of 1991 because of unexplained fuel bundle damage in the reactor core. Ontario Hydro has decided to replace the main generator rotors because of cracks discovered on the rotor shaft. A fully modified rotor was installed on Unit 1. Ontario Hydro staff have a significant backlog of maintenance work. The Quality Improvement Program seemed to work well, resulting in some noticeable improvements. Three Shift Supervisors and four Control Operators were licensed this year. All planned emergency exercises and drills took place as scheduled. Ontario Hydro identified and are addressing several areas for improvement during the drills. Except for a power supply interruption to some IAEA equipment, Ontario Hydro achieved all its safeguards goals at Darlington in 1991. The Tritium Removal Facility (TRF) operated intermittently during 1991. Ontario Hydro is proceeding with the design and planning of an annex to the TRF to replace the present temporary facilities. (Author).}
place = {Canada}
year = {1992}
month = {Nov}
}
title = {AECB staff annual report of Darlington NGS for the year 1991}
author = {None}
abstractNote = {Ontario Hydro operated Darlington in a safe manner in 1991. Ontario Hydro violated the Atomic Energy Control Regulations once and the physical security regulations three times in 1991. They failed to observe the Operating Licence conditions on ten occasions. The AECB did not find that the individual events had a significant impact on safety. There were no violations of the construction licence. None of the station staff received a radiation dose in excess of the regulatory limit. Radioactive emissions from the station were far below the regulatory limit. Special safety system performance was not fully satisfactory. Ontario Hydro failed to meet the unavailability targets for shutdown system one and the negative pressure containment system. Ontario Hydro reported seventeen incidents under conditions of the Operating and Construction licences. Units 1 and 2 remained shut down for most of 1991 because of unexplained fuel bundle damage in the reactor core. Ontario Hydro has decided to replace the main generator rotors because of cracks discovered on the rotor shaft. A fully modified rotor was installed on Unit 1. Ontario Hydro staff have a significant backlog of maintenance work. The Quality Improvement Program seemed to work well, resulting in some noticeable improvements. Three Shift Supervisors and four Control Operators were licensed this year. All planned emergency exercises and drills took place as scheduled. Ontario Hydro identified and are addressing several areas for improvement during the drills. Except for a power supply interruption to some IAEA equipment, Ontario Hydro achieved all its safeguards goals at Darlington in 1991. The Tritium Removal Facility (TRF) operated intermittently during 1991. Ontario Hydro is proceeding with the design and planning of an annex to the TRF to replace the present temporary facilities. (Author).}
place = {Canada}
year = {1992}
month = {Nov}
}