Abstract
The results of the analysis are the following: Rules on the compliance examination by the conventions member states are laid down in the 13 conventions examined. However, they are generally imprecise and not wide ranging. The member states are indeed obliged to make declarations. The verification process is usually formulated in a very general manner: verification of national implementation reports is only explicitly envisaged in six conventions. Several explanations can be put forward for such weak verification provisions in environmental and resource protection conventions. One goes that international environmental policy either does not objectively affect any political field relevant to (inter)national security and power politics or else is not perceived as a security policy. Therefore there is at best little need for verification. Nevertheless, there are some strong arguments pointing to a gradual development in the interlinkage of security and the environment. Above all the discussion an a convention to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions up to 60% seems to be moving in this direction. (orig./HSCH).
Citation Formats
Fischer, W.
The verification of international conventions on protection of the environment and common resources. A comparative analysis of the instruments and procedures for international verification with the example of thirteen conventions.
Germany: N. p.,
1991.
Web.
Fischer, W.
The verification of international conventions on protection of the environment and common resources. A comparative analysis of the instruments and procedures for international verification with the example of thirteen conventions.
Germany.
Fischer, W.
1991.
"The verification of international conventions on protection of the environment and common resources. A comparative analysis of the instruments and procedures for international verification with the example of thirteen conventions."
Germany.
@misc{etde_10113576,
title = {The verification of international conventions on protection of the environment and common resources. A comparative analysis of the instruments and procedures for international verification with the example of thirteen conventions}
author = {Fischer, W}
abstractNote = {The results of the analysis are the following: Rules on the compliance examination by the conventions member states are laid down in the 13 conventions examined. However, they are generally imprecise and not wide ranging. The member states are indeed obliged to make declarations. The verification process is usually formulated in a very general manner: verification of national implementation reports is only explicitly envisaged in six conventions. Several explanations can be put forward for such weak verification provisions in environmental and resource protection conventions. One goes that international environmental policy either does not objectively affect any political field relevant to (inter)national security and power politics or else is not perceived as a security policy. Therefore there is at best little need for verification. Nevertheless, there are some strong arguments pointing to a gradual development in the interlinkage of security and the environment. Above all the discussion an a convention to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions up to 60% seems to be moving in this direction. (orig./HSCH).}
place = {Germany}
year = {1991}
month = {Jul}
}
title = {The verification of international conventions on protection of the environment and common resources. A comparative analysis of the instruments and procedures for international verification with the example of thirteen conventions}
author = {Fischer, W}
abstractNote = {The results of the analysis are the following: Rules on the compliance examination by the conventions member states are laid down in the 13 conventions examined. However, they are generally imprecise and not wide ranging. The member states are indeed obliged to make declarations. The verification process is usually formulated in a very general manner: verification of national implementation reports is only explicitly envisaged in six conventions. Several explanations can be put forward for such weak verification provisions in environmental and resource protection conventions. One goes that international environmental policy either does not objectively affect any political field relevant to (inter)national security and power politics or else is not perceived as a security policy. Therefore there is at best little need for verification. Nevertheless, there are some strong arguments pointing to a gradual development in the interlinkage of security and the environment. Above all the discussion an a convention to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions up to 60% seems to be moving in this direction. (orig./HSCH).}
place = {Germany}
year = {1991}
month = {Jul}
}