Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Hamlet, Jason R; Bauer, Todd M; Pierson, Lyndon G

Title: Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Abstract

Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

Inventors:: Hamlet, Jason R; Bauer, Todd M; Pierson, Lyndon G

Issue Date:: 2014-09-30

Research Org.:: Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE

OSTI Identifier:: 1159918

Patent Number(s):: 8848905

Application Number:: 12/844,860

Assignee:: Sandia Corporation (Albuquerque, NM)

Patent Classifications (CPCs):: H - ELECTRICITY H04 - ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE H04L - TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION

H - ELECTRICITY H04 - ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE H04K - SECRET COMMUNICATION

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H - ELECTRICITY H04 - ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE H04L - TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
H04L9/0869 - {involving random numbers or seeds}
H04L9/00 - {Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic} arrangements for secret or secure communication {
H04L9/3278 - {using physically unclonable functions [PUF]}
H04L2209/34 - Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction

H - ELECTRICITY H04 - ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE H04K - SECRET COMMUNICATION
H04K1/04 - by frequency scrambling, i.e. by transposing or inverting parts of the frequency band or by inverting the whole band
H04K1/06 - by transmitting the information or elements thereof at unnatural speeds or in jumbled order or backwards

H - ELECTRICITY H04 - ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE H04L - TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
H04L9/0866 - {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}

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DOE Contract Number:: AC04-94AL85000

Resource Type:: Patent

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Citation Formats


                    Hamlet, Jason R, Bauer, Todd M, and Pierson, Lyndon G. Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting.  United States: N. p., 2014. 
        Web.

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                    Hamlet, Jason R, Bauer, Todd M, & Pierson, Lyndon G. Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting.  United States.

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                    Hamlet, Jason R, Bauer, Todd M, and Pierson, Lyndon G. Tue .  
        "Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting".  United States.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1159918.

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@article{osti_1159918,

  title        = {Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting},

  author       = {Hamlet, Jason R and Bauer, Todd M and Pierson, Lyndon G},

  abstractNote = {Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.},

  doi          = {},

  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {2014},

  month        = {9}

}

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Similar Records

Title: Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Abstract

Citation Formats

Reconfigurable trusted computing in hardware conference, January 2007

Dynamic Intellectual Property Protection for Reconfigurable Devices conference, December 2007

Protecting bus-based hardware IP by secret sharing conference, January 2008

Anti-counterfeiting, key distribution, and key storage in an ambient world via physical unclonable functions journal, October 2008

Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers journal, September 2009

A Digital 1.6 pJ/bit Chip Identification Circuit Using Process Variations journal, January 2008

A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications conference, January 2004

Energy Scalable Universal Hashing journal, December 2005

Extended abstract: The butterfly PUF protecting IP on every FPGA conference, June 2008

LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication conference, January 1994

Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation conference, January 2007

Physical Unclonable Functions and Public-Key Crypto for FPGA IP Protection conference, August 2007

Reconfigurable trusted computing in hardware
conference, January 2007

Dynamic Intellectual Property Protection for Reconfigurable Devices
conference, December 2007

Protecting bus-based hardware IP by secret sharing
conference, January 2008

Anti-counterfeiting, key distribution, and key storage in an ambient world via physical unclonable functions
journal, October 2008

Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers
journal, September 2009

A Digital 1.6 pJ/bit Chip Identification Circuit Using Process Variations
journal, January 2008

A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications
conference, January 2004

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journal, December 2005

Extended abstract: The butterfly PUF protecting IP on every FPGA
conference, June 2008

LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication
conference, January 1994

Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
conference, January 2007

Physical Unclonable Functions and Public-Key Crypto for FPGA IP Protection
conference, August 2007