Defining the needs for non-destructive assay of UF6 feed, product, and tails at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and possible next steps

Conference · Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2009

OSTI ID:990769

Boyer, Brian D ^[1]; Swinhoe, Martyn T ^[1]; Moran, Bruce W ^[2]; Lebrun, Alain ^[2]

---

1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
2. IAEA

Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to detect undeclared LEU production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of UF{sub 6} bulk material used in the process of enrichment at GCEPS. The inspectors also take destructive assay (DA) samples for analysis off-site which provide accurate, on the order of 0.1 % to 0.5% uncertainty, data on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, DA sample taking is a much more labor intensive and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of the results and contains the possibility of the loss of the continuity of knowledge of the samples during the storage and transit of the material. Use of the IAEA's inspection sampling algorithm shows that while total sample size is fixed by the total population of potential samples and its intrinsic qualities, the split of the samples into NDA or DA samples is determined by the uncertainties in the NDA measurements. Therefore, the larger the uncertainties in the NDA methods, more of the sample taken must be DA samples. Since the DA sampling is arduous and costly, improvements in NDA methods would reduce the number of DA samples needed. Furthermore, if methods of on-site analysis of the samples could be developed that have uncertainties in the 1-2% range, a lot of the problems inherent in DA sampling could be removed. The use of an unattended system that could give an overview of the entire process giving complementary data on the enrichment process as well as accurate measures of enrichment and weights of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product would be a major step in enhancing the ability of NDA beyond present attended systems. The possibility of monitoring the feed, tails, and product header pipes in such a way as to gain safeguards relevant flow and enrichment information without compromising the intellectual property of the operator including proprietary equipment and operational parameters would be a huge step forward. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including such process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector measurements reducing the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GeEPs safeguards.

• Research Organization: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE
• DOE Contract Number: AC52-06NA25396
• OSTI ID: 990769
• Report Number(s): LA-UR-09-04263; LA-UR-09-4263; TRN: US1007388
• Resource Relation: Conference: INMM 50th Annual Meeting ; July 12, 2009 ; Tucson, AZ
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ALGORITHMS
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS
DETECTION
GAS CENTRIFUGES
IAEA
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
INSPECTION
MONITORING
NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS
PROBABILITY
SAFEGUARDS
SAMPLING
STORAGE
TIME DELAY
SLIGHTLY ENRICHED URANIUM
URANIUM 235