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Title: Evaluation of containment failure and cleanup time for Pu shots on the Z machine.

Abstract

Between November 30 and December 11, 2009 an evaluation was performed of the probability of containment failure and the time for cleanup of contamination of the Z machine given failure, for plutonium (Pu) experiments on the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Due to the unique nature of the problem, there is little quantitative information available for the likelihood of failure of containment components or for the time to cleanup. Information for the evaluation was obtained from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) at the Z machine facility. The SMEs provided the State of Knowledge (SOK) for the evaluation. There is significant epistemic- or state of knowledge- uncertainty associated with the events that comprise both failure of containment and cleanup. To capture epistemic uncertainty and to allow the SMEs to reason at the fidelity of the SOK, we used the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty for this evaluation. We quantified two variables: the probability that the Pu containment system fails given a shot on the Z machine, and the time to cleanup Pu contamination in the Z machine given failure of containment. We identified dominant contributors for both the time to cleanup and the probability of containment failure. These results will bemore » used by SNL management to decide the course of action for conducting the Pu experiments on the Z machine.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
984153
Report Number(s):
SAND2010-0883
TRN: US1005267
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY; CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS; FAILURES; CONTAMINATION; PLUTONIUM; LINEAR Z PINCH DEVICES; DECONTAMINATION; TIME DEPENDENCE; PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION; Fusion reactors.; Arrays.

Citation Formats

Darby, John L. Evaluation of containment failure and cleanup time for Pu shots on the Z machine.. United States: N. p., 2010. Web. doi:10.2172/984153.
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Darby, John L. Evaluation of containment failure and cleanup time for Pu shots on the Z machine.. United States. doi:10.2172/984153.
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Darby, John L. Mon . "Evaluation of containment failure and cleanup time for Pu shots on the Z machine.". United States. doi:10.2172/984153. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/984153.
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@article{osti_984153,
title = {Evaluation of containment failure and cleanup time for Pu shots on the Z machine.},
author = {Darby, John L.},
abstractNote = {Between November 30 and December 11, 2009 an evaluation was performed of the probability of containment failure and the time for cleanup of contamination of the Z machine given failure, for plutonium (Pu) experiments on the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Due to the unique nature of the problem, there is little quantitative information available for the likelihood of failure of containment components or for the time to cleanup. Information for the evaluation was obtained from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) at the Z machine facility. The SMEs provided the State of Knowledge (SOK) for the evaluation. There is significant epistemic- or state of knowledge- uncertainty associated with the events that comprise both failure of containment and cleanup. To capture epistemic uncertainty and to allow the SMEs to reason at the fidelity of the SOK, we used the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty for this evaluation. We quantified two variables: the probability that the Pu containment system fails given a shot on the Z machine, and the time to cleanup Pu contamination in the Z machine given failure of containment. We identified dominant contributors for both the time to cleanup and the probability of containment failure. These results will be used by SNL management to decide the course of action for conducting the Pu experiments on the Z machine.},
doi = {10.2172/984153},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2010},
month = {Mon Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2010}
}
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DOI:  10.2172/984153
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