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Title: Establishing Tap Reliability in Expert Witness Testimony: Using Scenarios to Identify Calibration Needs

Abstract

In this paper we expand work initially described in calibrating low-level network taps, where we used examples of how one might establish the degree of soundness for network data gathering devices, using low-level tap calibration as our example. Our approach in this paper is adapted from Weismann's Flaw Hypothesis Methodology for penetration testing design, and extends the earlier work by considering a broader range of typical misuse and attack scenarios, again with respect to lower layer network devices.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
981601
Report Number(s):
PNNL-SA-53566
TRN: US201013%%811
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE 2007), 131-146
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
97 MATHEMATICAL METHODS AND COMPUTING; 99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE; CALIBRATION; DATA; DEFECTS; DESIGN; ENGINEERING; EQUIPMENT; HYPOTHESIS; LAYERS; PROCEEDINGS; RANGE; RELIABILITY; TESTING; WORK; forensics, security

Citation Formats

Endicott-Popovsky, Barbara E., Fluckiger, Jerry D., and Frincke, Deborah A. Establishing Tap Reliability in Expert Witness Testimony: Using Scenarios to Identify Calibration Needs. United States: N. p., 2007. Web. doi:10.1109/SADFE.2007.10.
Endicott-Popovsky, Barbara E., Fluckiger, Jerry D., & Frincke, Deborah A. Establishing Tap Reliability in Expert Witness Testimony: Using Scenarios to Identify Calibration Needs. United States. doi:10.1109/SADFE.2007.10.
Endicott-Popovsky, Barbara E., Fluckiger, Jerry D., and Frincke, Deborah A. Thu . "Establishing Tap Reliability in Expert Witness Testimony: Using Scenarios to Identify Calibration Needs". United States. doi:10.1109/SADFE.2007.10.
@article{osti_981601,
title = {Establishing Tap Reliability in Expert Witness Testimony: Using Scenarios to Identify Calibration Needs},
author = {Endicott-Popovsky, Barbara E. and Fluckiger, Jerry D. and Frincke, Deborah A.},
abstractNote = {In this paper we expand work initially described in calibrating low-level network taps, where we used examples of how one might establish the degree of soundness for network data gathering devices, using low-level tap calibration as our example. Our approach in this paper is adapted from Weismann's Flaw Hypothesis Methodology for penetration testing design, and extends the earlier work by considering a broader range of typical misuse and attack scenarios, again with respect to lower layer network devices.},
doi = {10.1109/SADFE.2007.10},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Apr 26 00:00:00 EDT 2007},
month = {Thu Apr 26 00:00:00 EDT 2007}
}

Conference:
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