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Title: Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability

Abstract

The recent addition of imaging to the Nuclear Materials and Identification System (NMIS) using a small portable DT neutron generator with an embedded alpha detector to time and directionally tag neutrons from the DT reaction is discussed. The generator weighs {approx}35 lbs including power supplies (5 x 10{sup 7} n/sec) and operates on 50 watts power. Thus, the source can be easily moved to a variety of locations within an operational facility with minimum impact on operations or can be used at a fixed location for example to monitor receipts. Imaging NMIS (INMIS) not only characterizes the detailed shape of a containerized object by transmission tomography but determines the presence of fissile material by measuring the emitted radiation from induced fission. Previous work has shown that this type of imaging has a variety of applications other than nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A). These include nonproliferation applications such as verification of configuration of nuclear weapons/components shipped or received, warhead authentication behind an information barrier, and traceability of weapons components both fissile and non fissile in dismantlement and counter terrorism. This paper concentrates on the use for NMC&A. Some of the NMC&A applications discussed are: verifying inventory and receipts, making moremore » accurate holdup measurements especially where thicknesses of materials affect gamma ray spectrometry , determining the shape of unknown configurations of fissile materials where the material type may be known but not the form, determining the oxidation of fissile metal in storage cans, fingerprinting the content of storage containers going into a storage facility, and determining unknown configurations for criticality safety.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. ORNL
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
975054
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: ESARDA, Aix en Provence, France, 20070522, 20070524
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; CONFIGURATION; CONTAINERS; CRITICALITY; FISSILE MATERIALS; FISSION; IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS; MONITORS; NEUTRON GENERATORS; NEUTRONS; OXIDATION; POWER SUPPLIES; PROLIFERATION; RADIATIONS; SAFETY; SHAPE; SPECTROSCOPY; STORAGE; TOMOGRAPHY; VERIFICATION; WEAPONS

Citation Formats

Mullens, James Allen, Hausladen, Paul, Bingham, Philip R, Archer, Daniel E, Grogan, Brandon R, and Mihalczo, John T. Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Mullens, James Allen, Hausladen, Paul, Bingham, Philip R, Archer, Daniel E, Grogan, Brandon R, & Mihalczo, John T. Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability. United States.
Mullens, James Allen, Hausladen, Paul, Bingham, Philip R, Archer, Daniel E, Grogan, Brandon R, and Mihalczo, John T. Mon . "Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_975054,
title = {Use of Imaging for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability},
author = {Mullens, James Allen and Hausladen, Paul and Bingham, Philip R and Archer, Daniel E and Grogan, Brandon R and Mihalczo, John T},
abstractNote = {The recent addition of imaging to the Nuclear Materials and Identification System (NMIS) using a small portable DT neutron generator with an embedded alpha detector to time and directionally tag neutrons from the DT reaction is discussed. The generator weighs {approx}35 lbs including power supplies (5 x 10{sup 7} n/sec) and operates on 50 watts power. Thus, the source can be easily moved to a variety of locations within an operational facility with minimum impact on operations or can be used at a fixed location for example to monitor receipts. Imaging NMIS (INMIS) not only characterizes the detailed shape of a containerized object by transmission tomography but determines the presence of fissile material by measuring the emitted radiation from induced fission. Previous work has shown that this type of imaging has a variety of applications other than nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A). These include nonproliferation applications such as verification of configuration of nuclear weapons/components shipped or received, warhead authentication behind an information barrier, and traceability of weapons components both fissile and non fissile in dismantlement and counter terrorism. This paper concentrates on the use for NMC&A. Some of the NMC&A applications discussed are: verifying inventory and receipts, making more accurate holdup measurements especially where thicknesses of materials affect gamma ray spectrometry , determining the shape of unknown configurations of fissile materials where the material type may be known but not the form, determining the oxidation of fissile metal in storage cans, fingerprinting the content of storage containers going into a storage facility, and determining unknown configurations for criticality safety.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}

Conference:
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  • This paper discusses Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC)-VNIIEF activities in the area of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) procedures enhancement. The goal of such activities is the development of an automated systems for MPC and A at two of the active VNIIEF research sites: a research (reactor) site and a nuclear material production facility. The activities for MPC and A system enhancement at both sites are performed in the framework of a VNIIEF-Los Alamos National Laboratory contract with participation from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwestmore » National Laboratory, and PANTEX Plant in accordance with Russian programs supported by MinAtom. The American specialists took part in searching for possible improvement of technical solutions, ordering equipment, and delivering and testing the equipment that was provided by the Americans.« less
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