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Title: Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoors detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
952102
Report Number(s):
SAND2006-0963J
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Proposed for publication in Health Physics Journal.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Harper, Frederick Taylor, and Musolino, Stephen V. Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoors detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.. United States: N. p., 2006. Web.
Harper, Frederick Taylor, & Musolino, Stephen V. Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoors detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.. United States.
Harper, Frederick Taylor, and Musolino, Stephen V. Wed . "Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoors detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_952102,
title = {Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoors detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.},
author = {Harper, Frederick Taylor and Musolino, Stephen V.},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {Proposed for publication in Health Physics Journal.},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2006},
month = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2006}
}
  • Strategies and decisions to protect emergency responders, the public, and critical infrastructure against the effects of a radiological dispersal device detonated outdoors must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. This contrasts with planning for small-scale types of radiological or nuclear emergencies, or for a large-scale nuclear-power-type accident that evolves over many hours or days before radioactivity is released to the environment, such that its effects can be prospectively modeled and analyzed. By the time it is known an attack has occurred, most likely there will have been casualties, all the radioactivemore » material will have been released, plume growth will be progressing, and there will be no time left for evaluating possible countermeasures. This paper offers guidance to planners, first responders, and senior decision makers to assist them in developing strategies for protective actions and operational procedures for the first 48 hours after an explosive radiological dispersal device has been detonated.« less
  • Researchers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducted a field study to evaluate the deposition of an explosively dispersed radionuclide surrogate (CsCl) on grime and non-grime containing urban surfaces. An additional objective of this study was to evaluate several laboratory surface contamination techniques for the preparation of mock urban surfaces in order to determine the method that most closely mimics surface contamination following an RDD event. The field study was conducted at the LLNL Site 300 Contained Firing Facility (CFF). For our study, we detonated a mock RDD made using C4 and non-radioactive CsCl. Lab prepared concrete samples (3.8 cm xmore » 7.6 cm cylinders) were made using 4 different conditioning regimes to mimic a range of conditions that may be encountered during an RDD event. This sample set included dry, wet, carbonated and non-carbonated cores with and without the application of urban grime. In addition, concreted samples (13 cm x 13 cm x 5 cm) removed from an urban surface were placed inside the CFF chamber. The samples were placed inside the firing chamber at 3 different distances from the mock RDD device. Following the detonation of the mock RDD, the samples were removed from the firing chamber and selected cores were characterized by laser ablation and scanning electron microscopy. Preliminary results suggest that Cs migrates into the concrete samples and the presence of a grime layer does not appear to impede this migration.« less
  • Following a radioactive dispersal device (RDD) incident, it may be necessary to evaluate the internal contamination levels of a large number of potentially affected individuals to determine if immediate medical follow-up is necessary. Since the current laboratory capacity to screen for internal contamination is limited, rapid field screening methods can be useful in prioritizing individuals. This study evaluated the suitability of a radiation portal monitor for such screening. A model of the portal monitor was created for use with models of six anthropomorphic phantoms in Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code Version 5 (MCNP) X-5 Monte Carlo Team (MCNP A Generalmore » Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code Version 5. LA-CP-03-0245. Vol. 2. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004.). The count rates of the portal monitor were simulated for inhalation and ingestion of likely radionuclides from an RDD for each of the phantoms. The time-dependant organ concentrations of the radionuclides were determined using Dose and Risk Calculation Software Eckerman, Leggett, Cristy, Nelson, Ryman, Sjoreen and Ward (Dose and Risk Calculation Software Ver. 8.4. ORNL/TM-2001/190. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2006.). Portal monitor count rates corresponding to a committed effective dose E(50) of 10 mSv are reported.« less
  • This report presents preliminary operational guidelines and supporting work products developed through the interagency Operational Guidelines Task Group (OGT). The report consolidates preliminary operational guidelines, all ancillary work products, and a companion software tool that facilitates their implementation into one reference source document. The report is intended for interim use and comment and provides the foundation for fostering future reviews of the operational guidelines and their implementation within emergency preparedness and response initiatives in the event of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) incident. The report principally focuses on the technical derivation and presentation of the operational guidelines. End-user guidance providingmore » more details on how to apply these operational guidelines within planning and response settings is being considered and developed elsewhere. The preliminary operational guidelines are categorized into seven groups on the basis of their intended application within early, intermediate, and long-term recovery phases of emergency response. We anticipate that these operational guidelines will be updated and refined by interested government agencies in response to comments and lessons learned from their review, consideration, and trial application. This review, comment, and trial application process will facilitate the selection of a final set of operational guidelines that may be more or less inclusive of the preliminary operational guidelines presented in this report. These and updated versions of the operational guidelines will be made available through the OGT public Web site (http://ogcms.energy.gov) as they become finalized for public distribution and comment.« less