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Title: Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

Abstract

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
936986
Report Number(s):
UCRL-JRNL-227856
TRN: US200821%%186
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Center for Contemporary Conflict: Strategic Insights, VI, no. 4, June 1, 2007, pp. 1-14; Journal Volume: 6; Journal Issue: 4
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS; INDIA; NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PAKISTAN; PROLIFERATION; SECURITY; STABILITY

Citation Formats

Joeck, N. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Joeck, N. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation. United States.
Joeck, N. Mon . "Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/936986.
@article{osti_936986,
title = {Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation},
author = {Joeck, N},
abstractNote = {The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.},
doi = {},
journal = {Center for Contemporary Conflict: Strategic Insights, VI, no. 4, June 1, 2007, pp. 1-14},
number = 4,
volume = 6,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Feb 05 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Mon Feb 05 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}
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