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Title: Tracking and Monitoring of Radioactive Materials in the Commercial Hazardous Materials Supply Chain

Abstract

One of the main components of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Materials Program is to prevent the loss of radioactive materials through the use of tracking technologies. If a source is inadvertently lost or purposely abandoned or stolen, it is critical that the source be recovered before harm to the public or the environment occurs. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tagging on radioactive sources is a technology that can be operated in the active or passive mode, has a variety of frequencies available allowing for flexibility in use, is able to transmit detailed data and is discreet. The purpose of the joint DOE and EPA Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) project is to evaluate the viability, effectiveness and scalability of RFID technology under a variety of transportation scenarios. The goal of the Phase II was to continue testing integrated RFID tag systems from various vendors for feasibility in tracking radioactive sealed sources which included the following performance objectives: 1. Validate the performance of RFID intelligent systems to monitor express air shipments of medical radioisotopes in the nationwide supply chain, 2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regards to probability of tag detection and operational reliability, 3. Determinemore » if the implementation of these systems improves manpower effectiveness, and 4. Demonstrate that RFID tracking and monitoring of radioactive materials is ready for large scale deployment at the National level. For purposes of analysis, the test scenario employed in this study utilized the real world commerce supply chain process for radioactive medical isotopes to validate the performance of intelligent RFID tags. Three different RFID systems were assessed from a shipping and packaging perspective, included varied environmental conditions, varied commodities on board vehicles, temporary staging in shipping terminals using various commodities and normal transportation handling. We tracked 32 air express (AE) shipments from a medical radioisotope (MR) production facility in Boston, MA to ORNL in Oak Ridge, TN. Each RFID system was individually tested in Type A modified packaging with differing quantities of Phosphorus-32 (1,000 μci, 500 μci and 250 μci) for 16 shipments per system. Three of these shipments per system contained dry ice (9 total). An additional 16 shipments were tested that contained one tag from each system using Type A packaging without Phosphorus-32. Twelve of these shipments contained dry ice. RFID interrogators for each system were installed at four waypoints along the 1,000 mile shipping route from source to designation via air and surface. Each package was expected to be detected by its corresponding interrogator(s) at each way point. System A's overall probability of detection was 77 percent, System B's overall probability of detection was 20 percent and System C's overall probability was 75 percent. The presence of more than one RFID system in a shipment did not appear to have an effect on any of the three systems tested. However, no tests of significance could be performed because group sample sizes did not satisfy the standard binomial test-of-significance between independent samples. Preliminary analysis of the data using pair-wise comparison (in process) is expected to show some (possibly significant) differences due to packaging and the effects of dry ice on the tags. Phase II of the RadSTraM project verified that RFID tagging can be applied to the tracking and monitoring of medical radioisotope air express shipments. This study demonstrated that active RFID tagging systems can be feasibly integrated and scaled into the nation-wide supply chain to track and monitor medical radioisotopes.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. ORNL
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
Work for Others (WFO)
OSTI Identifier:
931106
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 15th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials - PATRAM 2007, Miami, FL, USA, 20071020, 20071026
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; RADIATION MONITORING; IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS; PACKAGING; PERFORMANCE; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; SEALED SOURCES; AIR TRANSPORT; LAND TRANSPORT; Tracking Monitoring Radioactive Materials Commerce Commercial Hazardous Materials HAZMAT Supply Chain

Citation Formats

Walker, Randy M, Kopsick, Deborah A, Warren, Tracy A, Abercrombie, Robert K, Sheldon, Frederick T, Hill, David E, Gross, Ian G, and Smith, Cyrus M. Tracking and Monitoring of Radioactive Materials in the Commercial Hazardous Materials Supply Chain. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Walker, Randy M, Kopsick, Deborah A, Warren, Tracy A, Abercrombie, Robert K, Sheldon, Frederick T, Hill, David E, Gross, Ian G, & Smith, Cyrus M. Tracking and Monitoring of Radioactive Materials in the Commercial Hazardous Materials Supply Chain. United States.
Walker, Randy M, Kopsick, Deborah A, Warren, Tracy A, Abercrombie, Robert K, Sheldon, Frederick T, Hill, David E, Gross, Ian G, and Smith, Cyrus M. Mon . "Tracking and Monitoring of Radioactive Materials in the Commercial Hazardous Materials Supply Chain". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_931106,
title = {Tracking and Monitoring of Radioactive Materials in the Commercial Hazardous Materials Supply Chain},
author = {Walker, Randy M and Kopsick, Deborah A and Warren, Tracy A and Abercrombie, Robert K and Sheldon, Frederick T and Hill, David E and Gross, Ian G and Smith, Cyrus M},
abstractNote = {One of the main components of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Materials Program is to prevent the loss of radioactive materials through the use of tracking technologies. If a source is inadvertently lost or purposely abandoned or stolen, it is critical that the source be recovered before harm to the public or the environment occurs. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tagging on radioactive sources is a technology that can be operated in the active or passive mode, has a variety of frequencies available allowing for flexibility in use, is able to transmit detailed data and is discreet. The purpose of the joint DOE and EPA Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) project is to evaluate the viability, effectiveness and scalability of RFID technology under a variety of transportation scenarios. The goal of the Phase II was to continue testing integrated RFID tag systems from various vendors for feasibility in tracking radioactive sealed sources which included the following performance objectives: 1. Validate the performance of RFID intelligent systems to monitor express air shipments of medical radioisotopes in the nationwide supply chain, 2. Quantify the reliability of these tracking systems with regards to probability of tag detection and operational reliability, 3. Determine if the implementation of these systems improves manpower effectiveness, and 4. Demonstrate that RFID tracking and monitoring of radioactive materials is ready for large scale deployment at the National level. For purposes of analysis, the test scenario employed in this study utilized the real world commerce supply chain process for radioactive medical isotopes to validate the performance of intelligent RFID tags. Three different RFID systems were assessed from a shipping and packaging perspective, included varied environmental conditions, varied commodities on board vehicles, temporary staging in shipping terminals using various commodities and normal transportation handling. We tracked 32 air express (AE) shipments from a medical radioisotope (MR) production facility in Boston, MA to ORNL in Oak Ridge, TN. Each RFID system was individually tested in Type A modified packaging with differing quantities of Phosphorus-32 (1,000 μci, 500 μci and 250 μci) for 16 shipments per system. Three of these shipments per system contained dry ice (9 total). An additional 16 shipments were tested that contained one tag from each system using Type A packaging without Phosphorus-32. Twelve of these shipments contained dry ice. RFID interrogators for each system were installed at four waypoints along the 1,000 mile shipping route from source to designation via air and surface. Each package was expected to be detected by its corresponding interrogator(s) at each way point. System A's overall probability of detection was 77 percent, System B's overall probability of detection was 20 percent and System C's overall probability was 75 percent. The presence of more than one RFID system in a shipment did not appear to have an effect on any of the three systems tested. However, no tests of significance could be performed because group sample sizes did not satisfy the standard binomial test-of-significance between independent samples. Preliminary analysis of the data using pair-wise comparison (in process) is expected to show some (possibly significant) differences due to packaging and the effects of dry ice on the tags. Phase II of the RadSTraM project verified that RFID tagging can be applied to the tracking and monitoring of medical radioisotope air express shipments. This study demonstrated that active RFID tagging systems can be feasibly integrated and scaled into the nation-wide supply chain to track and monitor medical radioisotopes.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}

Conference:
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