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Title: Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing: Experience and Criticality Safety

Abstract

This paper discusses operational and criticality safety experience associated with the Idaho National Laboratory Fuel Conditioning Facility which uses a pyrometallurgical process to treat spent fast reactor metallic fuel. The process is conducted in an inert atmosphere hot cell. The process starts with chopping metallic fuel elements into a basket. The basket is lowered into molten salt (LiCl-KCl) along with a steel mandrel. Active metal fission products, transuranic metals and sodium metal in the spent fuel undergo chemical oxidation and form chlorides. Voltage is applied between the basket, which serves as an anode, and the mandrel, which serves as a cathode, causing metallic uranium in the spent fuel to undergo electro-chemical oxidation thereby forming uranium chloride. Simultaneously at the cathode, uranium chloride undergoes electro-chemical reduction and deposits uranium metal onto the mandrel. The uranium metal and accompanying entrained salt are placed in a distillation furnace where the uranium melts forming an ingot and the entrained salt boils and subsequently condenses in a separate crucible. The uranium ingots are placed in long term storage. During the ten year operating history, over one hundred criticality safety evaluations were prepared. All criticality safety related limits and controls for the entire process are containedmore » in a single document which required over thirty revisions to accommodate the process changes. Operational implementation of the limits and controls includes use of a near real-time computerized tracking system. The tracking system uses an Oracle database coupled with numerous software applications. The computerized tracking system includes direct fuel handler interaction with every movement of material. Improvements to this system during the ten year history include introduction of web based operator interaction, tracking of moderator materials and the development of a plethora database queries to assist in day to day operations as well as obtaining historical information. Over 12,000 driver fuel elements have been processed resulting in the production of 2500 kg of 20% enriched uranium. Also, over one thousand blanket fuel elements have been processed resulting in the production of 2400 kg of depleted uranium. These operations required over 35,000 fissile material transfers between zones and over 6000 transfers between containers. Throughout all of these movements, no mass limit violations occurred. Numerous lessons were learned over the ten year operating history. From a criticality safety perspective, the most important lesson learned was the involvement of a criticality safety practitioner in daily operations. A criticality safety engineer was assigned directly to facility operations, and was responsible for implementation of limits and controls including upkeep of the associated computerized tracking files. The criticality safety engineer was also responsible for conducting fuel handler training activities including serving on fuel handler qualification oral boards, and continually assessing operations from a criticality control perspective. The criticality safety engineer also attended bimonthly project planning meetings to identify upcoming process changes that would require criticality safety evaluation. Finally, the excellent criticality safety record was due in no small part to the continual support, involvement, trust, and confidence of project and operations mana« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE - NE
OSTI Identifier:
912451
Report Number(s):
INL/CON-07-12106
TRN: US0800401
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC07-99ID-13727
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Safety Analysis Working Group 2007 Annual Workshop,Idaho Falls, Idaho,05/19/2007,05/24/2007
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; CRITICALITY; DEPLETED URANIUM; ENRICHED URANIUM; FAST REACTORS; FISSILE MATERIALS; FISSION PRODUCTS; FUEL ELEMENTS; HOT CELLS; INERT ATMOSPHERE; MOLTEN SALTS; PROCESSING; SAFETY; SAFETY ANALYSIS; SPENT FUELS; URANIUM CHLORIDES; criticality; electrorefiner

Citation Formats

Chad Pope. Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing: Experience and Criticality Safety. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Chad Pope. Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing: Experience and Criticality Safety. United States.
Chad Pope. Tue . "Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing: Experience and Criticality Safety". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/912451.
@article{osti_912451,
title = {Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing: Experience and Criticality Safety},
author = {Chad Pope},
abstractNote = {This paper discusses operational and criticality safety experience associated with the Idaho National Laboratory Fuel Conditioning Facility which uses a pyrometallurgical process to treat spent fast reactor metallic fuel. The process is conducted in an inert atmosphere hot cell. The process starts with chopping metallic fuel elements into a basket. The basket is lowered into molten salt (LiCl-KCl) along with a steel mandrel. Active metal fission products, transuranic metals and sodium metal in the spent fuel undergo chemical oxidation and form chlorides. Voltage is applied between the basket, which serves as an anode, and the mandrel, which serves as a cathode, causing metallic uranium in the spent fuel to undergo electro-chemical oxidation thereby forming uranium chloride. Simultaneously at the cathode, uranium chloride undergoes electro-chemical reduction and deposits uranium metal onto the mandrel. The uranium metal and accompanying entrained salt are placed in a distillation furnace where the uranium melts forming an ingot and the entrained salt boils and subsequently condenses in a separate crucible. The uranium ingots are placed in long term storage. During the ten year operating history, over one hundred criticality safety evaluations were prepared. All criticality safety related limits and controls for the entire process are contained in a single document which required over thirty revisions to accommodate the process changes. Operational implementation of the limits and controls includes use of a near real-time computerized tracking system. The tracking system uses an Oracle database coupled with numerous software applications. The computerized tracking system includes direct fuel handler interaction with every movement of material. Improvements to this system during the ten year history include introduction of web based operator interaction, tracking of moderator materials and the development of a plethora database queries to assist in day to day operations as well as obtaining historical information. Over 12,000 driver fuel elements have been processed resulting in the production of 2500 kg of 20% enriched uranium. Also, over one thousand blanket fuel elements have been processed resulting in the production of 2400 kg of depleted uranium. These operations required over 35,000 fissile material transfers between zones and over 6000 transfers between containers. Throughout all of these movements, no mass limit violations occurred. Numerous lessons were learned over the ten year operating history. From a criticality safety perspective, the most important lesson learned was the involvement of a criticality safety practitioner in daily operations. A criticality safety engineer was assigned directly to facility operations, and was responsible for implementation of limits and controls including upkeep of the associated computerized tracking files. The criticality safety engineer was also responsible for conducting fuel handler training activities including serving on fuel handler qualification oral boards, and continually assessing operations from a criticality control perspective. The criticality safety engineer also attended bimonthly project planning meetings to identify upcoming process changes that would require criticality safety evaluation. Finally, the excellent criticality safety record was due in no small part to the continual support, involvement, trust, and confidence of project and operations mana},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue May 01 00:00:00 EDT 2007},
month = {Tue May 01 00:00:00 EDT 2007}
}

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