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Title: Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System

Abstract

The purpose of this report is to present the results of a site-wide system fragility assessment. This assessment focuses solely on the performance of the water distribution systems that supply Chemical and Metallurgy Research (CMR), Weapons Engineering and Tritium Facility (WETF), Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF), Waste Characterization, Reduction, Repackaging Facility (WCRRF), and Transuranic Waste Inspectable Storage Project (TWISP). The analysis methodology is based on the American Lifelines Alliance seismic fragility formulations for water systems. System fragilities are convolved with the 1995 LANL seismic hazards to develop failure frequencies. Acceptance is determined by comparing the failure frequencies to the DOE-1020 Performance Goals. This study concludes that: (1) If a significant number of existing isolation valves in the water distribution system are closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in specific nuclear facilities; (2) Then, the water distribution systems for WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP meet the PC-2 performance goal and the water distribution system for CMR is capable of surviving a 0.06g earthquake. A parametric study of the WETF water distribution system demonstrates that: (1) If a significant number of valves in the water distribution system are NOT closed to dedicate the entire water system tomore » fighting fires in WETF; (2) Then, the water distribution system for WETF has an annual probability of failure on the order of 4 x 10{sup -3} that does not meet the PC-2 performance goal. Similar conclusions are expected for CMR, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. It is important to note that some of the assumptions made in deriving the results should be verified by personnel in the safety-basis office and may need to be incorporated in technical surveillance requirements in the existing authorization basis documentation if credit for availability of fire protection water is taken at the PC-2 level earthquake levels. Assumptions are presented in Section 2.2 of this report.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
901898
Report Number(s):
LA-14325
TRN: US0702777
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; DOCUMENTATION; EARTHQUAKES; LANL; LIQUID WASTES; METALLURGY; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; PERSONNEL; PROBABILITY; STORAGE; TRITIUM; VALVES; WASTES; WATER; WATER SUPPLY; WEAPONS

Citation Formats

Greg Mertz Jason Cardon Mike Salmon. Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System. United States: N. p., 2007. Web. doi:10.2172/901898.
Greg Mertz Jason Cardon Mike Salmon. Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System. United States. doi:10.2172/901898.
Greg Mertz Jason Cardon Mike Salmon. Fri . "Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System". United States. doi:10.2172/901898. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/901898.
@article{osti_901898,
title = {Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System},
author = {Greg Mertz Jason Cardon Mike Salmon},
abstractNote = {The purpose of this report is to present the results of a site-wide system fragility assessment. This assessment focuses solely on the performance of the water distribution systems that supply Chemical and Metallurgy Research (CMR), Weapons Engineering and Tritium Facility (WETF), Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF), Waste Characterization, Reduction, Repackaging Facility (WCRRF), and Transuranic Waste Inspectable Storage Project (TWISP). The analysis methodology is based on the American Lifelines Alliance seismic fragility formulations for water systems. System fragilities are convolved with the 1995 LANL seismic hazards to develop failure frequencies. Acceptance is determined by comparing the failure frequencies to the DOE-1020 Performance Goals. This study concludes that: (1) If a significant number of existing isolation valves in the water distribution system are closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in specific nuclear facilities; (2) Then, the water distribution systems for WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP meet the PC-2 performance goal and the water distribution system for CMR is capable of surviving a 0.06g earthquake. A parametric study of the WETF water distribution system demonstrates that: (1) If a significant number of valves in the water distribution system are NOT closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in WETF; (2) Then, the water distribution system for WETF has an annual probability of failure on the order of 4 x 10{sup -3} that does not meet the PC-2 performance goal. Similar conclusions are expected for CMR, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. It is important to note that some of the assumptions made in deriving the results should be verified by personnel in the safety-basis office and may need to be incorporated in technical surveillance requirements in the existing authorization basis documentation if credit for availability of fire protection water is taken at the PC-2 level earthquake levels. Assumptions are presented in Section 2.2 of this report.},
doi = {10.2172/901898},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Mar 30 00:00:00 EDT 2007},
month = {Fri Mar 30 00:00:00 EDT 2007}
}

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