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Title: ASSESSING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) FOR PLANNING FUTURE D&D

Abstract

This paper documents the fiscal year (FY) 2006 assessment to evaluate potential chemical and radiological hazards associated with vessels and piping in the former plutonium process areas at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Evaluations by PFP engineers as design authorities for specific systems and other subject-matter experts were conducted to identify the chemical hazards associated with transitioning the process areas for the long-term layup of PFP before its eventual final decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). D and D activities in the main process facilities were suspended in September 2005 for a period of between 5 and 10 years. A previous assessment conducted in FY 2003 found that certain activities to mitigate chemical hazards could be deferred safely until the D and D of PFP, which had been scheduled to result in a slab-on-grade condition by 2009. As a result of necessary planning changes, however, D and D activities at PFP will be delayed until after the 2009 time frame. Given the extended project and plant life, it was determined that a review of the plant chemical hazards should be conducted. This review to determine the extended life impact of chemicals is called the ''Plutonium Finishing Plant Chemical Hazards Assessment,more » FY 2006''. This FY 2006 assessment addresses potential chemical and radiological hazard areas identified by facility personnel and subject-matter experts who reevaluated all the chemical systems (items) from the FY 2003 assessment. This paper provides the results of the FY 2006 chemical hazards assessment and describes the methodology used to assign a hazard ranking to the items reviewed.« less

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Hanford Site (HNF), Richland, WA
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE - Office of Environmental Management (EM)
OSTI Identifier:
899763
Report Number(s):
HNF-31067-FP Rev 0
TRN: US0702073
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 33RD ANNUAL WASTE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE & EXHIBITION (WM07) SYMPOSIA INC 02/25/2007 THRU 03/1/2007 TUCSON ARIZONA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; SURPLUS NUCLEAR FACILITIES; HANFORD RESERVATION; DECOMMISSIONING; DECONTAMINATION; PLANNING; PLUTONIUM; RISK ASSESSMENT; RADIATION HAZARDS; HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Citation Formats

HOPKINS, A.M., KLOS, D.B., and MINETT, M.J. ASSESSING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) FOR PLANNING FUTURE D&D. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
HOPKINS, A.M., KLOS, D.B., & MINETT, M.J. ASSESSING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) FOR PLANNING FUTURE D&D. United States.
HOPKINS, A.M., KLOS, D.B., and MINETT, M.J. Thu . "ASSESSING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) FOR PLANNING FUTURE D&D". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/899763.
@article{osti_899763,
title = {ASSESSING CHEMICAL HAZARDS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) FOR PLANNING FUTURE D&D},
author = {HOPKINS, A.M. and KLOS, D.B. and MINETT, M.J.},
abstractNote = {This paper documents the fiscal year (FY) 2006 assessment to evaluate potential chemical and radiological hazards associated with vessels and piping in the former plutonium process areas at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Evaluations by PFP engineers as design authorities for specific systems and other subject-matter experts were conducted to identify the chemical hazards associated with transitioning the process areas for the long-term layup of PFP before its eventual final decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). D and D activities in the main process facilities were suspended in September 2005 for a period of between 5 and 10 years. A previous assessment conducted in FY 2003 found that certain activities to mitigate chemical hazards could be deferred safely until the D and D of PFP, which had been scheduled to result in a slab-on-grade condition by 2009. As a result of necessary planning changes, however, D and D activities at PFP will be delayed until after the 2009 time frame. Given the extended project and plant life, it was determined that a review of the plant chemical hazards should be conducted. This review to determine the extended life impact of chemicals is called the ''Plutonium Finishing Plant Chemical Hazards Assessment, FY 2006''. This FY 2006 assessment addresses potential chemical and radiological hazard areas identified by facility personnel and subject-matter experts who reevaluated all the chemical systems (items) from the FY 2003 assessment. This paper provides the results of the FY 2006 chemical hazards assessment and describes the methodology used to assign a hazard ranking to the items reviewed.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Jan 25 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Thu Jan 25 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}

Conference:
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  • All Hanford facilities, including the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) were evaluated for chemical hazards in 1997, 1998 and 2000. The hazard evaluation, known as the PFP Facility Vulnerability Assessment (FVA), was prompted when chemicals in Tank A-109 in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) exploded in May 1997. Actions were undertaken to eliminate or reduce what were thought to be the worst hazards following that evaluation. In 2001, a new PFP team was organized to review the progress to date in reducing hazards and to reassess hazards that might still remain within the facility. This reassessment continued into 2002 and ismore » referred to as the 2002 PFP Residual Chemical Hazards Reassessment (RCHR). This report explains the results of the 2001/2002 reassessment of the chemical hazards at PFP. This reassessment effort forms the basis of the RCHR. The RCHR relied on previous assessments as the starting point for the 2001/2002 evaluation and used ranking criteria very similar to previous efforts. The RCHR team was composed of professionals representing Industrial Hygiene, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Hazardous Materials Handling Specialists, Solid Waste Management Specialists and Environmental Specialists. All areas of concern that could be accessed were physically examined and photographed where possible. Information from processing records, facility drawings and documents, design engineers, process engineers and work packages were compiled. The PFP vessel inventory was examined and expanded where required. New items listed in the vessel inventory were investigated. All items investigated were ranked using the hazard ranking criteria developed. This information was put on data sheets and compiled in a database.« less
  • This report describes the evaluation methods and results of a chemical safety status assessment of the process equipment at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Nuclear Reservation Plutonium Finishing Plant. This assessment, designated as the Plutonium Finishing Plant Residual Chemical Hazards Assessment, focused particular emphasis on the idle and inactive plant systems, though certain active areas also were examined to the extent that these were examined during a previous facility vulnerability assessment completed in 1999. The Plutonium Finishing Plant is located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation that is situated in south central Washington State.
  • The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) consists of a number of process and support buildings for handling plutonium. Building construction began in the late 1940's to meet national priorities and became operational in 1950 producing refined plutonium salts and metal for the United States nuclear weapons program. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material for fabrication into a nuclear device for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race. PFP has nowmore » completed its mission and is fully engaged in deactivation, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). At this time the PFP buildings are planned to be reduced to ground level (slab-on-grade) and the site remediated to satisfy national, Department of Energy (DOE) and Washington state requirements. The D&D of a highly contaminated plutonium processing facility presents a plethora of challenges. PFP personnel approached the D&D mission with a can-do attitude. They went into D&D knowing they were facing a lot of challenges and unknowns. There were concerns about the configuration control associated with drawings of these old process facilities. There were unknowns regarding the location of electrical lines and process piping containing chemical residues such as strong acids and caustics. The gloveboxes were highly contaminated with plutonium and chemical residues. Most of the glovebox windows were opaque with splashed process chemicals that coated the windows or etched them, reducing visibility to near zero. Visibility into the glovebox was a serious worker concern. Additionally, all the gloves in the gloveboxes were degraded and unusable. Replacing gloves in gloveboxes was necessary to even begin glovebox cleanout. The sheer volume of breathing air needed was also an issue. These and other challenges and PFP's approach to overcome these challengers are described. Many of the challenges to the D&D work at PFP were met with innovative approaches based on new science and/or technology and many were also based on the creativity and motivation of the work force personnel.« less
  • This paper describes the unique challenges encountered and subsequent resolutions to accomplish the deactivation and decontamination of a plutonium ash contaminated building. The 232-Z Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant was used to recover plutonium from process wastes such as rags, gloves, containers and other items by incinerating the items and dissolving the resulting ash. The incineration process resulted in a light-weight plutonium ash residue that was highly mobile in air. This light-weight ash coated the incinerator's process equipment, which included gloveboxes, blowers, filters, furnaces, ducts, and filter boxes. Significant airborne contamination (over 1 million derivedmore » air concentration hours [DAC]) was found in the scrubber cell of the facility. Over 1300 grams of plutonium held up in the process equipment and attached to the walls had to be removed, packaged and disposed. This ash had to be removed before demolition of the building could take place.« less
  • The 241-Z treatment and storage tanks, a hazardous waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal (TSD) unit permitted pursuant to the ''Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976'' (RCRA) and Washington State ''Hazardous Waste Management Act, RCW 70.105'', have been deactivated and are being actively decommissioned. The 241-Z TSD unit managed non-listed radioactive contaminated waste water, containing trace RCRA characteristic constituents. The 241-Z TSD unit consists of below grade tanks (D-4, D-5, D-7, D-8, and an overflow tank) located in a concrete containment vault, sample glovebox GB-2-241-ZA, and associated ancillary piping and equipment. The tank system is located beneath the 241-Z building.more » The 241-Z building is not a portion of the TSD unit. The sample glovebox is housed in the above-grade building. Waste managed at the TSD unit was received via underground mining from Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) sources. Tank D-6, located in the D-6 vault cell, is a past-practice tank that was taken out of service in 1972 and has never operated as a portion of the RCRA TSD unit. CERCLA actions address Tank D-6, its containment vault cell, and soil beneath the cell that was potentially contaminated during past-practice operations and any other potential past-practice contamination identified during 241-Z closure, while outside the scope of the ''Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Closure Plant, 241-Z Treatment and Storage Tanks''.« less