skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: THE COLD AND DARK PROCESS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Abstract

The deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of a facility exposes D&D workers to numerous hazards. One of the more serious hazards is coming into contact to hazardous energy sources (e.g. electrical, pressurized steam). At the Savannah River Site (SRS) a formal process for identifying and eliminating sources of hazardous energy was developed and is called ''Cold & Dark''. Several ''near miss'' events involving cutting of energized conductors during D&D work in buildings thought to be isolated identified the need to have a formal process to identify and isolate these potentially hazardous systems. This process was developed using lessons learned from D&D activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) in Colorado. The Cold & Dark process defines an isolation boundary (usually a building perimeter) and then systematically identifies all of the penetrations through this boundary. All penetrations that involve hazardous energy sources are then physically air-gapped. The final product is a documented declaration of isolation performed by a team involving operations, engineering, and project management. Once the Cold & Dark declaration is made for a building work can proceed without the usual controls used in an operational facility (e.g. lockout/tagout, arc flash PPE). It is important to note thatmore » the Cold & Dark process does not remove all hazards from a facility. Work planning and controls still need to address hazards that can be present from such things as chemicals, radiological contamination, residual liquids, etc., as well as standard industrial hazards.« less

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
SRS
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
899037
Report Number(s):
WSRC-MS-2007-00022
TRN: US0701711
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC09-96SR18500
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY TOPICAL MEETING ON DECOMMISSIONING, DECONTAMINATION AND REUTILIZATION
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; SURPLUS NUCLEAR FACILITIES; DEACTIVATION; DECOMMISSIONING; ENERGY SOURCES; SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT; STEAM SYSTEMS; SHUTDOWN; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

Citation Formats

Gilmour, J, William Austin, W, and Cathy Sizemore, C. THE COLD AND DARK PROCESS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Gilmour, J, William Austin, W, & Cathy Sizemore, C. THE COLD AND DARK PROCESS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE. United States.
Gilmour, J, William Austin, W, and Cathy Sizemore, C. Wed . "THE COLD AND DARK PROCESS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/899037.
@article{osti_899037,
title = {THE COLD AND DARK PROCESS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE},
author = {Gilmour, J and William Austin, W and Cathy Sizemore, C},
abstractNote = {The deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of a facility exposes D&D workers to numerous hazards. One of the more serious hazards is coming into contact to hazardous energy sources (e.g. electrical, pressurized steam). At the Savannah River Site (SRS) a formal process for identifying and eliminating sources of hazardous energy was developed and is called ''Cold & Dark''. Several ''near miss'' events involving cutting of energized conductors during D&D work in buildings thought to be isolated identified the need to have a formal process to identify and isolate these potentially hazardous systems. This process was developed using lessons learned from D&D activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) in Colorado. The Cold & Dark process defines an isolation boundary (usually a building perimeter) and then systematically identifies all of the penetrations through this boundary. All penetrations that involve hazardous energy sources are then physically air-gapped. The final product is a documented declaration of isolation performed by a team involving operations, engineering, and project management. Once the Cold & Dark declaration is made for a building work can proceed without the usual controls used in an operational facility (e.g. lockout/tagout, arc flash PPE). It is important to note that the Cold & Dark process does not remove all hazards from a facility. Work planning and controls still need to address hazards that can be present from such things as chemicals, radiological contamination, residual liquids, etc., as well as standard industrial hazards.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Jan 31 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Wed Jan 31 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}

Conference:
Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share:
  • The deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) of a facility exposes D and D workers to numerous hazards. One of the more serious hazards is coming into contact to hazardous energy sources (e.g. electrical, pressurized steam). At the Savannah River Site (SRS) a formal process for identifying and eliminating sources of hazardous energy was developed and is called 'Cold and Dark'. Several 'near miss' events involving cutting of energized conductors during D and D work in buildings thought to be isolated identified the need to have a formal process to identify and isolate these potentially hazardous systems. This process wasmore » developed using lessons learned from D and D activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) in Colorado. The Cold and Dark process defines an isolation boundary (usually a building perimeter) and then systematically identifies all of the penetrations through this boundary. All penetrations that involve hazardous energy sources are then physically air-gapped. The final product is a documented declaration of isolation performed by a team involving operations, engineering, and project management. Once the Cold and Dark declaration is made for a building work can proceed without the usual controls used in an operational facility (e.g. lockout/tag-out, arc flash PPE). It is important to note that the Cold and Dark process does not remove all hazards from a facility. Work planning and controls still need to address hazards that can be present from such things as chemicals, radiological contamination, residual liquids, etc., as well as standard industrial hazards. Savannah River Site experienced 6 electrical events prior to declaring a facility 'cold and dark' and has had zero electrical events after 'cold and dark' declaration (263 facilities to date). The formal Cold and Dark process developed at SRS has eliminated D and D worker exposures to hazardous energy sources. Since the implementation of the process there have been no incidents involving energized conductors or pressurized liquids/gases. During this time SRS has demolished over 200 facilities. The ability to perform intrusive D and D activities without the normal controls such as lock outs results in shorter schedule durations and lower overall costs for a facility D and D.« less
  • Cold crucible induction melters (CCIM) have been proposed as an alternative technology for waste glass melting at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as for other waste vitrification facilities. Proponents of this technology cite high temperature operation, high tolerance for noble metals and aluminum, high waste loading, high throughput capacity, and low equipment cost as the advantages over existing Joule Heated Melter (JHM) technology. This paper describes the CCIM technology and identifies technical challenges that must be addressed in order to implement CCIMs in the DWPF. The CCIM uses induction heating to maintainmore » molten glass at high temperature. A water-cooled helical induction coil is connected to an AC current supply, typically operating at frequencies from 100 KHz to 5 MHz. The oscillating magnetic field generated by the oscillating current flow through the coil induces eddy currents in conductive materials within the coil. Those oscillating eddy currents, in turn, generate heat in the material. In the CCIM, the induction coil surrounds a 'Cold Crucible' which is formed by metal tubes, typically copper or stainless steel. The tubes are constructed such that the magnetic field does not couple with the crucible. Therefore, the field generated by the induction coil couples primarily with the conductive medium (hot glass) within. The crucible tubes are water cooled to maintain their temperature between 100 C to 200 C so that a protective layer of molten glass and/or batch material, referred to as a 'skull', forms between them and the hot, corrosive melt. Because the protective skull is the only material directly in contact with the molten glass, the CCIM doesn't have the temperature limitations of traditional refractory lined Joule heated melters. It can be operated at melt temperatures in excess of 2000 C, allowing processing of high waste loading batches and difficult-to-melt compounds. The CCIM is poured through a bottom drain, typically through a water-cooled slide valve that starts and stops the pour stream. To promote uniform temperature distribution and increase heat transfer to the slurry fed High Level Waste (HLW) sludge, the CCIM may be equipped with bubblers and/or water cooled mechanical agitators. The DWPF could benefit from use of CCIM technology, especially in light of our latest projections of waste volume to be vitrified. Increased waste loading and increased throughput could result in substantial life cycle cost reduction. In order to significantly surpass the waste throughput capability of the currently installed Joule Heated Melter, it may be necessary to install two 950 mm CCIMs in the DWPF Melt Cell. A cursory evaluation of system design requirements and modifications to the facility that may be required to support installation and operation of two 950 mm CCIMs was performed. Based on this evaluation, it appears technically feasible to position two CCIMs in the Melt Cell of the DWPF within the existing footprint of the current melter. Interfaces with support systems and controls including Melter Feed, Power, Melter Cooling Water, Melter Off-gas, and Canister Operations must be designed to support dual CCIM operations.« less
  • Cold crucible induction melters (CCIM) have been proposed as an alternative technology for waste glass melting at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as for other waste vitrification facilities. Proponents of this technology cite high temperature operation, high tolerance for noble metals and aluminum, high waste loading, high throughput capacity, and low equipment cost as the advantages over existing Joule Heated Melter (JHM) technology. The CCIM uses induction heating to maintain molten glass at high temperature. A water-cooled helical induction coil is connected to an AC current supply, typically operating at frequencies frommore » 100 KHz to 5 MHz. The oscillating magnetic field generated by the oscillating current flow through the coil induces eddy currents in conductive materials within the coil. Those oscillating eddy currents, in turn, generate heat in the material. In the CCIM, the induction coil surrounds a 'Cold Crucible' which is formed by metal tubes, typically copper or stainless steel. The tubes are constructed such that the magnetic field does not couple with the crucible. Therefore, the field generated by the induction coil couples primarily with the conductive medium (hot glass) within. The crucible tubes are water cooled to maintain their temperature between 100 C to 200 C so that a protective layer of molten glass and/or batch material, referred to as a 'skull', forms between them and the hot, corrosive melt. Because the protective skull is the only material directly in contact with the molten glass, the CCIM doesn't have the temperature limitations of traditional refractory lined JHM. It can be operated at melt temperatures in excess of 2000 C, allowing processing of high waste loading batches and difficult-to-melt compounds. The CCIM is poured through a bottom drain, typically through a water-cooled slide valve that starts and stops the pour stream. To promote uniform temperature distribution and increase heat transfer to the slurry fed High Level Waste (HLW) sludge, the CCIM may be equipped with bubblers and/or water cooled mechanical agitators. The DWPF could benefit from use of CCIM technology, especially in light of our latest projections of waste volume to be vitrified. Increased waste loading and increased throughput could result in substantial life cycle cost reduction. In order to significantly surpass the waste throughput capability of the currently installed JHM, it may be necessary to install two 950 mm CCIMs in the DWPF Melt Cell. A cursory evaluation of system design requirements and modifications to the facility that may be required to support installation and operation of two 950 mm CCIMs was performed. Based on this evaluation, it appears technically feasible to position two CCIMs in the Melt Cell of the DWPF within the existing footprint of the current melter. Interfaces with support systems and controls including Melter Feed, Power, Melter Cooling Water, Melter Off-gas, and Canister Operations must be designed to support dual CCIM operations. This paper describes the CCIM technology and identifies technical challenges that must be addressed in order to implement CCIMs in the DWPF.« less
  • Savannah River Site (SRS) sludge batch 4 (SB4) waste surrogate with high aluminum and iron content was vitrified with commercially available Frit 503-R4 (8 wt.% Li{sub 2}O, 16 wt.% B2O3, 76 wt.% SiO{sub 2}) by cold crucible inductive melting using lab- (56 mm inner diameter), bench- (236 mm) and large-scale (418 mm) cold crucible. The waste loading ranged between 40 and 60 wt.%. The vitrified products obtained in the lab-scale cold crucible were nearly amorphous with traces of unreacted quartz in the product with 40 wt.% waste loading and traces of spinel phase in the product with 50 wt.% wastemore » loading. The glassy products obtained in the bench-scale cold crucible are composed of major vitreous and minor iron-rich spinel phase whose content at {approx}60 wt.% waste loading may achieve {approx}10 vol.%. The vitrified waste obtained in the large-scale cold crucible was also composed of major vitreous and minor spinel structure phases. No nepheline phase has been found. Average degree of crystallinity was estimated to be {approx}12 vol.%. Anionic motif of the glass network is built from rather short metasilicate chains and boron-oxygen constituent based on boron-oxygen triangular units.« less
  • The full-scale cold crucible test on vitrification of sludge batch 4 (SB4) Savannah River Site HLW surrogate using a 418 mm inner diameter stainless steel crucible was carried-out for 66 hrs. Commercially available Frit 503-R4 (8 wt.% Li{sub 2}O, 16 wt.% B{sub 2}O{sub 3}, 76 wt.% SiO{sub 2}) was used as a glass forming additive at a calcine to frit ratio of 1:1 (50 wt.% calcine, 50 wt.% frit). Two portions of slurry prepared from frit and mixture of chemicals simulating waste in amount of {approx}750 kg and from frit and waste surrogate prepared by the SRT-MST-2007-00070 procedure in amountmore » of {approx}1,300 kg with water content of {approx}27 and {approx}50 wt.%, respectively, was processed and {approx}875 kg of the vitrified product in total ({approx}415 + 460 kg) was obtained. Average parameters were as follows: vibration power - 121.6 to 134.1 kW, feed rate (capacity) - 25.1 to 39.8 kg/hr, glass pour rate (productivity) - 14.0 kg/hr specific energy expenses for feed processing - 4.8 to 3.4 kW x hr/kg, specific energy expenses for glass production (melting ratio) - 8.7 to 9.6 kW x hr/kg, specific glass productivity - 2453 kg/(m{sup 2} x d). The product was composed of major vitreous and minor spinel structure phases. No nepheline phase was found. Average degree of crystallinity was estimated to be {approx}12 vol.%. Cesium was found to be the most volatile component (up to {approx}60 wt.% of total). Lithium, sodium and boron are less volatile. Other major feed constituents (Al, Si, Mg, Fe, Mn) were not volatile but their carry-over with gas-vapor flow occurred.« less