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Title: Reactor safeguards using compact antieurino detectors.

;  [1];  [1]; ;  [2]; ;
  1. (Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory)
  2. (Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories
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Conference: Proposed for presentation at the MARC VII conference held April 5-7, 2006 in Kona, HI.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Allen, Matthew, Winant, Celeste, Hagmann, Chris, Brennan, James S., Bernstein, Adam, Bowden, Nathaniel S., and Lund, Jim. Reactor safeguards using compact antieurino detectors.. United States: N. p., 2006. Web.
Allen, Matthew, Winant, Celeste, Hagmann, Chris, Brennan, James S., Bernstein, Adam, Bowden, Nathaniel S., & Lund, Jim. Reactor safeguards using compact antieurino detectors.. United States.
Allen, Matthew, Winant, Celeste, Hagmann, Chris, Brennan, James S., Bernstein, Adam, Bowden, Nathaniel S., and Lund, Jim. Wed . "Reactor safeguards using compact antieurino detectors.". United States. doi:.
title = {Reactor safeguards using compact antieurino detectors.},
author = {Allen, Matthew and Winant, Celeste and Hagmann, Chris and Brennan, James S. and Bernstein, Adam and Bowden, Nathaniel S. and Lund, Jim},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2006},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2006}

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  • Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique aremore » underway across the globe.« less
  • No abstract prepared.
  • As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independentmore » access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful diversion is calculated for one specific scenario, for two cases: (1) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods; and (2) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods along with antineutrino detectors. The relative improvement in IAEA safeguards are assessed by taking the ratio of the two probabilities (with and without antineutrino detectors).« less