skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL

Abstract

The programmatic, facility and criticality safety support staffs at the LLNL Plutonium Facility worked together to successfully develop and implement a project to process legacy (DNFSB Recommendation 94-1 and non-Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) labeled) materials in storage. Over many years, material had accumulated in storage that lacked information to adequately characterize the material for current criticality safety controls used in the facility. Generally, the fissionable material mass information was well known, but other information such as form, impurities, internal packaging, and presence of internal moderating or reflecting materials were not well documented. In many cases, the material was excess to programmatic need, but such a determination was difficult with the little information given on MC&A labels and in the MC&A database. The material was not packaged as efficiently as possible, so it also occupied much more valuable storage space than was necessary. Although safe as stored, the inadequately characterized material posed a risk for criticality safety noncompliances if moved within the facility under current criticality safety controls. A Legacy Item Implementation Plan was developed and implemented to deal with this problem. Reasonable bounding conditions were determined for the material involved, and criticality safety evaluations were completed. Two appropriately designatedmore » glove boxes were identified and criticality safety controls were developed to safely inspect the material. Inspecting the material involved identifying containers of legacy material, followed by opening, evaluating, processing if necessary, characterizing and repackaging the material. Material from multiple containers was consolidated more efficiently thus decreasing the total number of stored items to about one half of the highest count. Current packaging requirements were implemented. Detailed characterization of the material was captured in databases and new ES&H container labels applied. In many cases, legacy material that was inspected was determined to be excess to programmatic needs and it was then either processed to meet the DOE-3013-STD or designated as TRU waste and disposed of accordingly. During FY2003 through FY2004 approximately 1600 items were opened and the items processed if necessary, repackaged and newly labeled with ES&H labels. As of April, 2005, there are only 32 non-ES&H labeled items in existence within the Plutonium Facility. Due to a consolidated effort in dealing with the legacy items, the problems associated with storage of these items at LLNL has been substantially abated. The paper will discuss the background, implementation, and results of the SNM Legacy Items Implementation Project. Benefits and Lessons Learned will be identified.« less

Authors:
; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
877764
Report Number(s):
UCRL-CONF-210883
TRN: US0601686
DOE Contract Number:  
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Presented at: American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting NCSD Topical Meeting, Knoxville, TN, United States, Sep 19 - Sep 22, 2005
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE; 22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; ALPHA-BEARING WASTES; CONTAINERS; CRITICALITY; FISSIONABLE MATERIALS; GLOVES; IMPLEMENTATION; IMPURITIES; LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; PACKAGING; PLUTONIUM; PROCESSING; RECOMMENDATIONS; SAFETY; STORAGE

Citation Formats

Pearson, J S, Burch, J G, Dodson, K E, and Huang, S T. Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL. United States: N. p., 2005. Web.
Pearson, J S, Burch, J G, Dodson, K E, & Huang, S T. Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL. United States.
Pearson, J S, Burch, J G, Dodson, K E, and Huang, S T. Tue . "Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/877764.
@article{osti_877764,
title = {Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL},
author = {Pearson, J S and Burch, J G and Dodson, K E and Huang, S T},
abstractNote = {The programmatic, facility and criticality safety support staffs at the LLNL Plutonium Facility worked together to successfully develop and implement a project to process legacy (DNFSB Recommendation 94-1 and non-Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) labeled) materials in storage. Over many years, material had accumulated in storage that lacked information to adequately characterize the material for current criticality safety controls used in the facility. Generally, the fissionable material mass information was well known, but other information such as form, impurities, internal packaging, and presence of internal moderating or reflecting materials were not well documented. In many cases, the material was excess to programmatic need, but such a determination was difficult with the little information given on MC&A labels and in the MC&A database. The material was not packaged as efficiently as possible, so it also occupied much more valuable storage space than was necessary. Although safe as stored, the inadequately characterized material posed a risk for criticality safety noncompliances if moved within the facility under current criticality safety controls. A Legacy Item Implementation Plan was developed and implemented to deal with this problem. Reasonable bounding conditions were determined for the material involved, and criticality safety evaluations were completed. Two appropriately designated glove boxes were identified and criticality safety controls were developed to safely inspect the material. Inspecting the material involved identifying containers of legacy material, followed by opening, evaluating, processing if necessary, characterizing and repackaging the material. Material from multiple containers was consolidated more efficiently thus decreasing the total number of stored items to about one half of the highest count. Current packaging requirements were implemented. Detailed characterization of the material was captured in databases and new ES&H container labels applied. In many cases, legacy material that was inspected was determined to be excess to programmatic needs and it was then either processed to meet the DOE-3013-STD or designated as TRU waste and disposed of accordingly. During FY2003 through FY2004 approximately 1600 items were opened and the items processed if necessary, repackaged and newly labeled with ES&H labels. As of April, 2005, there are only 32 non-ES&H labeled items in existence within the Plutonium Facility. Due to a consolidated effort in dealing with the legacy items, the problems associated with storage of these items at LLNL has been substantially abated. The paper will discuss the background, implementation, and results of the SNM Legacy Items Implementation Project. Benefits and Lessons Learned will be identified.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2005},
month = {3}
}

Conference:
Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share: