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Title: TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT & ASSOCIATED REPRESENTED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

Abstract

This document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) and describes the process and basis for assigning risk bins for the nuclear criticality representative accident and associated hazardous conditions. Revision 1 incorporates ORP IRT comments to enhance the technical presentation and also makes editorial changes. This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for the nuclear criticality representative accident and associated hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
CH2M (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) (US)
OSTI Identifier:
812338
Report Number(s):
RPP-12371, Rev.1
ECN-720690; TRN: US0303362
DOE Contract Number:
AC27-99RL14047
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 17 Jun 2003
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS; ACCIDENTS; CRITICALITY; EVALUATION; SAFETY; SAFETY ANALYSIS; SUPERCONDUCTING SUPER COLLIDER

Citation Formats

GOETZ, T.G. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT & ASSOCIATED REPRESENTED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. United States: N. p., 2003. Web. doi:10.2172/812338.
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GOETZ, T.G. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT & ASSOCIATED REPRESENTED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. United States. doi:10.2172/812338.
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GOETZ, T.G. Tue . "TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT & ASSOCIATED REPRESENTED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS". United States. doi:10.2172/812338. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/812338.
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@article{osti_812338,
title = {TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT & ASSOCIATED REPRESENTED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS},
author = {GOETZ, T.G.},
abstractNote = {This document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) and describes the process and basis for assigning risk bins for the nuclear criticality representative accident and associated hazardous conditions. Revision 1 incorporates ORP IRT comments to enhance the technical presentation and also makes editorial changes. This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA), and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for the nuclear criticality representative accident and associated hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous condition based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence.},
doi = {10.2172/812338},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Jun 17 00:00:00 EDT 2003},
month = {Tue Jun 17 00:00:00 EDT 2003}
}
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DOI:  10.2172/812338
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