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Title: Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office

Abstract

At the request of the Assistant Manager for Safety and Engineering, the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (RL) Engineering Support Division, performed an oversight review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) nuclear Criticality Alarm System (CAS). The review was conducted to satisfy requirements and agreements associated with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2000-2, ''Vital Safety Systems.'' The PFP is managed by Fluor Hanford, Inc. for RL. The field assessment and staff interviews were conducted August 12 through August 19,2002. This was a limited scope assessment that consisted of a review of the nuclear CAS operations, maintenance, and compliance with National Consensus Standards Requirements. The main purpose of the assessment was to determine the adequacy of the existing alarm system and its associated infrastructure to support the PFP facility mission through the remaining facility lifetime. The Review Plan was modeled upon Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRAD) developed for DNFSB Recommendation 2000-2 reviews conducted across the Hanford Site. Concerns regarding component degradation and failure, increasing numbers of occurrence reports associated with the alarm system, and reliability issues were addressed. Additionally, RL performed a review of the engineering aspects of the CAS including the functions of design authoritiesmore » and aspects of systems engineering. However, the focus of the assessment was on operations, maintenance, and reliability of the CAS, associated procurement practices, adequacy of safety and engineering policies and procedures, safety documentation, and fundamental engineering practices including training, qualification, and systems engineering. This assessment revealed that the PFP CAS and its associated infrastructure, administrative procedures, and conduct of operations are generally effective. There are no imminent criticality safety issues associated with the operation of the existing CAS. The Assessment Team believes that the CAS, as it presently exists at the PFP facility, is adequate to support the remaining mission lifetime of the facility while continuing to ensure personnel safety. This conclusion is dependent upon a continued level of funding adequate to support the required maintenance and occasional system upgrade. Two findings were identified during this assessment. Additionally, the report identified eight observations and two recommendations. The assessment revealed that recent changes to OSR compliance procedures and other documents do not contain the signature of the CSR as required by procedure. Lack of appropriate approval signatures is a noncompliance with site-level procedures.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
DOE-RL (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) (US)
OSTI Identifier:
808361
Report Number(s):
DOE/RL-2002-58, Rev.0
TRN: US0302505
DOE Contract Number:  
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 1 Oct 2002
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS; ALARM SYSTEMS; CRITICALITY; MAINTENANCE; PLUTONIUM; RELIABILITY; SAFETY ANALYSIS

Citation Formats

NIRIDER, L T. Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office. United States: N. p., 2002. Web. doi:10.2172/808361.
NIRIDER, L T. Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office. United States. doi:10.2172/808361.
NIRIDER, L T. Tue . "Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office". United States. doi:10.2172/808361. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/808361.
@article{osti_808361,
title = {Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office},
author = {NIRIDER, L T},
abstractNote = {At the request of the Assistant Manager for Safety and Engineering, the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (RL) Engineering Support Division, performed an oversight review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) nuclear Criticality Alarm System (CAS). The review was conducted to satisfy requirements and agreements associated with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2000-2, ''Vital Safety Systems.'' The PFP is managed by Fluor Hanford, Inc. for RL. The field assessment and staff interviews were conducted August 12 through August 19,2002. This was a limited scope assessment that consisted of a review of the nuclear CAS operations, maintenance, and compliance with National Consensus Standards Requirements. The main purpose of the assessment was to determine the adequacy of the existing alarm system and its associated infrastructure to support the PFP facility mission through the remaining facility lifetime. The Review Plan was modeled upon Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRAD) developed for DNFSB Recommendation 2000-2 reviews conducted across the Hanford Site. Concerns regarding component degradation and failure, increasing numbers of occurrence reports associated with the alarm system, and reliability issues were addressed. Additionally, RL performed a review of the engineering aspects of the CAS including the functions of design authorities and aspects of systems engineering. However, the focus of the assessment was on operations, maintenance, and reliability of the CAS, associated procurement practices, adequacy of safety and engineering policies and procedures, safety documentation, and fundamental engineering practices including training, qualification, and systems engineering. This assessment revealed that the PFP CAS and its associated infrastructure, administrative procedures, and conduct of operations are generally effective. There are no imminent criticality safety issues associated with the operation of the existing CAS. The Assessment Team believes that the CAS, as it presently exists at the PFP facility, is adequate to support the remaining mission lifetime of the facility while continuing to ensure personnel safety. This conclusion is dependent upon a continued level of funding adequate to support the required maintenance and occasional system upgrade. Two findings were identified during this assessment. Additionally, the report identified eight observations and two recommendations. The assessment revealed that recent changes to OSR compliance procedures and other documents do not contain the signature of the CSR as required by procedure. Lack of appropriate approval signatures is a noncompliance with site-level procedures.},
doi = {10.2172/808361},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2002},
month = {10}
}

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