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Title: Criticality Prevention Specification 224-T Process Cell Characterization Activities Involving Unknown Quantities of Fissionable Material

Abstract

The fissionable material addressed in the criticality prevention specification (CPS) is the residual material within the 224-T process cells from previous processing operations. It is anticipated that the majority of the material will be within the process vessels; however, lower levels of contamination external to the vessels is expected and anticipated to include fissionable material. Specifically, this CPS addresses the activities involving unknown quantities of fissionable material and therefore the initial phase of characterization activities.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
FH (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) (US)
OSTI Identifier:
806004
Report Number(s):
HNF-7794, Rev.0
EDT-610390; TRN: US0301079
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 27 Feb 2001
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; CONTAMINATION; CRITICALITY; FISSIONABLE MATERIALS; SPECIFICATIONS

Citation Formats

DODD, E.N. Criticality Prevention Specification 224-T Process Cell Characterization Activities Involving Unknown Quantities of Fissionable Material. United States: N. p., 2001. Web. doi:10.2172/806004.
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DODD, E.N. Criticality Prevention Specification 224-T Process Cell Characterization Activities Involving Unknown Quantities of Fissionable Material. United States. doi:10.2172/806004.
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DODD, E.N. Tue . "Criticality Prevention Specification 224-T Process Cell Characterization Activities Involving Unknown Quantities of Fissionable Material". United States. doi:10.2172/806004. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/806004.
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@article{osti_806004,
title = {Criticality Prevention Specification 224-T Process Cell Characterization Activities Involving Unknown Quantities of Fissionable Material},
author = {DODD, E.N.},
abstractNote = {The fissionable material addressed in the criticality prevention specification (CPS) is the residual material within the 224-T process cells from previous processing operations. It is anticipated that the majority of the material will be within the process vessels; however, lower levels of contamination external to the vessels is expected and anticipated to include fissionable material. Specifically, this CPS addresses the activities involving unknown quantities of fissionable material and therefore the initial phase of characterization activities.},
doi = {10.2172/806004},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Feb 27 00:00:00 EST 2001},
month = {Tue Feb 27 00:00:00 EST 2001}
}
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DOI:  10.2172/806004
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  • This document serves as a notice of construction (NOC) pursuant to the requirements of Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247-060, and as a request for approval to construct pursuant to 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61.07, for entering and characterizing the 224-T Facility process cells. The 224-T Facility is a small canyon building with six process cells separated from three levels of operating galleries by a 0.3-meter thick concrete wall. The original mission was to concentrate dilute solutions of plutonium received from the 221-T Plutonium Separation Facility from 1945 until 1956. Various shutdown activities were carried out including flushing themore » tanks and piping during the 1960s. During the second mission from 1975 to 1985, the operating gallery areas of the structure were converted into a storage area for plutonium-bearing scrap and liquids. The third and final mission converted the operating galleries for use as the 224-T Transuranic Waste Storage and Assay Facility (224-T TRUSAF). All stored waste from the gallery areas was removed in the late 1990s. The process cells were not considered part of the waste storage areas and were isolated from storage activities. The 224-T Facility has been excessed with no anticipated plans for further missions. The purpose of the characterization effort is to determine the condition and contents of the cells, tanks, and vessels. This information is needed to update the Facility's Authorization Basis, maintain appropriate managing practices, and ensure there is no potential threat to the public or environment. The information also will be used to establish operational criteria for the decontamination and decommissioning of this facility. Using the currently approved unit dose conversion factors in HNF-3602, the estimated potential total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) resulting from the unabated, fugitive emissions from characterization of the 224-T process cells is 7.37 E-03 millirem per year.« less

  • ;

  • The need for developing a user`s guide for shipping Type B quantities of radioactive and fissile material, including plutonium, in a US Department of Transportation Specification 6M (DOT-6M) packaging was identified by the US Department of Energy (DOE)-Headquarters, Transportation Management Division (EM-261) because the DOT-6M packaging is widely used by DOE site contractors and the DOE receives many questions about approved packaging configuration. Currently, EM-261 has the authority to approve new DOT-6M packaging configurations for use by the DOE Operations Offices. This user`s guide identifies the DOE-approved DOT-6M packaging configurations and explains how to have new configurations approved by themore » DOE. The packaging configurations described in this guide are approved by the DOE, and satisfy the applicable DOT requirements and the identified DOE restrictions. These packaging configurations are acceptable for transport of Type B quantities of radioactive and fissile material, including plutonium.« less

  • This report documents the technical basis for an exemption from beta-gamma radiological survey requirements for personnel, material, and equipment at the 224-T Facility.