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Title: Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility

Abstract

This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings.

Authors:
; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
80372
Report Number(s):
WHC-SD-NR-ISB-001
ON: DE95013349; TRN: 95:016387
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-87RL10930
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 23 May 1995
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; HANFORD RESERVATION; RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; DECOMMISSIONING; SAFETY; URANIUM

Citation Formats

Brehm, J.R., Deobald, T.L., Benecke, M.W., and Remaize, J.A. Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility. United States: N. p., 1995. Web. doi:10.2172/80372.
Brehm, J.R., Deobald, T.L., Benecke, M.W., & Remaize, J.A. Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility. United States. doi:10.2172/80372.
Brehm, J.R., Deobald, T.L., Benecke, M.W., and Remaize, J.A. Tue . "Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility". United States. doi:10.2172/80372. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/80372.
@article{osti_80372,
title = {Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility},
author = {Brehm, J.R. and Deobald, T.L. and Benecke, M.W. and Remaize, J.A.},
abstractNote = {This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings.},
doi = {10.2172/80372},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue May 23 00:00:00 EDT 1995},
month = {Tue May 23 00:00:00 EDT 1995}
}

Technical Report:

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  • This ISB, in conjunction with the IOSR, provides the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements or the facility is shut down. It is concluded that the risks associated with tha current and anticipated mode of the facility, uranium disposition, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within risk guidelines.
  • This document establishes the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility (FSS) as managed by the 300 Area Deactivation Project (300 ADP) organization in accordance with the requirements of the Project Hanford Management Contract procedure (PHMC) HNF-PRO-700, ''Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements''. A hazard classification (Benecke 2003a) has been prepared for the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 resulting in the assignment of Hazard Category 3 for FSS Facility buildings that store N Reactor fuel materials (303-B, 3712, and 3716). All others are designated Industrial buildings. It is concluded that the risks associated with the currentmore » and planned operational mode of the FSS Facility (uranium storage, uranium repackaging and shipment, cleanup, and transition activities, etc.) are acceptable. The potential radiological dose and toxicological consequences for a range of credible uranium storage building have been analyzed using Hanford accepted methods. Risk Class designations are summarized for representative events in Table 1.6-1. Mitigation was not considered for any event except the random fire event that exceeds predicted consequences based on existing source and combustible loading because of an inadvertent increase in combustible loading. For that event, a housekeeping program to manage transient combustibles is credited to reduce the probability. An additional administrative control is established to protect assumptions regarding source term by limiting inventories of fuel and combustible materials. Another is established to maintain the criticality safety program. Additional defense-in-depth controls are established to perform fire protection system testing, inspection, and maintenance to ensure predicted availability of those systems, and to maintain the radiological control program. It is also concluded that because an accidental nuclear criticality is not credible based on the low uranium enrichment, the form of the uranium, and the required controls, a Criticality Alarm System (CAS) is not required as allowed by DOE Order 420.1 (DOE 2000).« less
  • These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance).
  • The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility.
  • The Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility safety bases was completely revised to become 10CFR830 compliant and to reflect the current mission and reduced risks associated with the operation of the facility, due to reduced radioactive material inventory. This Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) revision includes requirements to ensure the hazards and accident scenarios identified in the new safety basis are adequately controlled. The TSR controls are limited to Administrative Controls (ACs), which have been developed to either protect the assumptions in the accident scenarios or further reduce the scenario consequences. Design features have also been designated to further reduce the dosemore » consequences of accident scenarios and to reduce the probability of a criticality event. A Bases section was added to further describe the reasons for several of the ACs to provide operations and engineering staff with the necessary information to maintain operation of the FSS Facility within the safety envelope and to ensure that any future changes to these requirements will not affect their original intent or purpose.« less