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Title: Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope

Abstract

The HC-4, HC-7, HC-227s and the tank 50 High Level Liquid detection interlock systems detect the potential for a liquid up take into the 26 inch Vacuum Headers. All of the detectors are well upstream of the 26 inch Vacuum Liquid Detection system that is designed to prevent a criticality due to liquid uptake. Failure of any of the four glovebox liquid detection systems would not impact the operation of the 26 inch Vacuum Liquid Detection system. The systems are completely separate. The liquid detectors and interlocks were installed after an incident in HC-227s resulted in a significant volume of RMC feed grade plutonium solution to be drawn out of the glovebox and into the vacuum header. The vacuum trap liquid detection interlock system operability is verified by a weekly functional test per maintenance procedure 2222124. Removal of the HC-7 Liquid Detection Interlock system from the WHC-SD-CP-SDD-013 document will not impact this maintenance procedure.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
BWHC (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (US)
OSTI Identifier:
798079
Report Number(s):
HNF-SD-CP-SDD-013, Rev.3
TRN: US0206020
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 1 Sep 1999
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; CRITICALITY; INTERLOCKS; MAINTENANCE; PLUTONIUM; VACUUM SYSTEMS; LEVEL INDICATORS; HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES; LIQUID WASTES; PERFORMANCE TESTING; GLOVEBOXES; FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS

Citation Formats

THOMAS, R.J. Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope. United States: N. p., 1999. Web. doi:10.2172/798079.
THOMAS, R.J. Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope. United States. doi:10.2172/798079.
THOMAS, R.J. Wed . "Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope". United States. doi:10.2172/798079. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/798079.
@article{osti_798079,
title = {Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope},
author = {THOMAS, R.J.},
abstractNote = {The HC-4, HC-7, HC-227s and the tank 50 High Level Liquid detection interlock systems detect the potential for a liquid up take into the 26 inch Vacuum Headers. All of the detectors are well upstream of the 26 inch Vacuum Liquid Detection system that is designed to prevent a criticality due to liquid uptake. Failure of any of the four glovebox liquid detection systems would not impact the operation of the 26 inch Vacuum Liquid Detection system. The systems are completely separate. The liquid detectors and interlocks were installed after an incident in HC-227s resulted in a significant volume of RMC feed grade plutonium solution to be drawn out of the glovebox and into the vacuum header. The vacuum trap liquid detection interlock system operability is verified by a weekly functional test per maintenance procedure 2222124. Removal of the HC-7 Liquid Detection Interlock system from the WHC-SD-CP-SDD-013 document will not impact this maintenance procedure.},
doi = {10.2172/798079},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1999},
month = {Wed Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1999}
}

Technical Report:

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