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Title: Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis

Abstract

This paper compares the cost and effectiveness of several potential options that may be used to monitor silo-based ballistic missiles. Silo door monitoring can be used to verify that warheads removed to deactivate or download silo-based ballistic missiles have not been replaced. A precedent for monitoring warhead replacement using reentry vehicle on site inspections (RV-OSIs) and using satellites has been established by START-I and START-II. However, other monitoring options have the potential to be less expensive and more effective. Three options are the most promising if high verification confidence is desired: random monitoring using door sensors; random monitoring using manned or unmanned aircraft; and continuous remote monitoring using unattended door sensors.

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (US); Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
US Department of Energy (US)
OSTI Identifier:
750347
Report Number(s):
SAND99-3173
TRN: US200221%%301
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 1 Jan 2000
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; STORAGE FACILITIES; DOORS; MISSILES; MONITORING; MONITORS; VERIFICATION; ARMS CONTROL; BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE; REMOTE SENSING

Citation Formats

EDENBURN,MICHAEL W., and TROST,LAWRENCE C.. Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis. United States: N. p., 2000. Web. doi:10.2172/750347.
EDENBURN,MICHAEL W., & TROST,LAWRENCE C.. Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis. United States. doi:10.2172/750347.
EDENBURN,MICHAEL W., and TROST,LAWRENCE C.. 2000. "Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis". United States. doi:10.2172/750347. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/750347.
@article{osti_750347,
title = {Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis},
author = {EDENBURN,MICHAEL W. and TROST,LAWRENCE C.},
abstractNote = {This paper compares the cost and effectiveness of several potential options that may be used to monitor silo-based ballistic missiles. Silo door monitoring can be used to verify that warheads removed to deactivate or download silo-based ballistic missiles have not been replaced. A precedent for monitoring warhead replacement using reentry vehicle on site inspections (RV-OSIs) and using satellites has been established by START-I and START-II. However, other monitoring options have the potential to be less expensive and more effective. Three options are the most promising if high verification confidence is desired: random monitoring using door sensors; random monitoring using manned or unmanned aircraft; and continuous remote monitoring using unattended door sensors.},
doi = {10.2172/750347},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2000,
month = 1
}

Technical Report:

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