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Title: A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

Abstract

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventorymore » of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.« less

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA). Technical Support Organization
OSTI Identifier:
7229141
Report Number(s):
BNL-38584; ISPO-196; TSO-86-15
ON: DE87003224
DOE Contract Number:
AC02-76CH00016
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; FEED MATERIALS PLANTS; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; FUEL CYCLE; FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS; BWR TYPE REACTORS; INSPECTION; MATERIAL BALANCE; PWR TYPE REACTORS; SLIGHTLY ENRICHED URANIUM; ACTINIDES; ELEMENTS; ENRICHED URANIUM; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS; MATERIALS; METALS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; REACTORS; SAFEGUARDS; URANIUM; WATER COOLED REACTORS; WATER MODERATED REACTORS; 055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability- Technical Aspects; 050400 - Nuclear Fuels- Feed Processing; 050700 - Nuclear Fuels- Fuels Production & Properties

Citation Formats

Fishbone, L.G., and Higinbotham, W.A. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle. United States: N. p., 1986. Web. doi:10.2172/7229141.
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Fishbone, L.G., & Higinbotham, W.A. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle. United States. doi:10.2172/7229141.
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Fishbone, L.G., and Higinbotham, W.A. Sun . "A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle". United States. doi:10.2172/7229141. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/7229141.
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@article{osti_7229141,
title = {A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle},
author = {Fishbone, L.G. and Higinbotham, W.A.},
abstractNote = {At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.},
doi = {10.2172/7229141},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sun Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 1986},
month = {Sun Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 1986}
}
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Technical Report:
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DOI:  10.2172/7229141
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