Hazards review for electrolytic dissolver installation, Hood 3, 236-Z Building
Abstract
A comparison of the hazards involved in the existing process and the electrolytic process for dissolving plutonium metal shows that, in the opinion of the review team, no net increase in hazards will occur by operating the electrolytic dissolvers. This new process eliminates several hazardous operations such as metal burning and PuO/sub 2/ powder handling, and reduces operator time and, therefore, exposure. The new facility can be operated safely provided that the recommendations given previously are implemented.
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Atlantic Richfield Hanford Co., Richland, WA (USA)
- OSTI Identifier:
- 7216126
- Report Number(s):
- ARH-2755
- DOE Contract Number:
- EY-76-C-06-2130
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY; CHEMICAL REACTORS; HAZARDS; CRITICALITY; DISSOLUTION; PLUTONIUM; PROCESSING; ACTINIDES; ELEMENTS; METALS; TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS; 054000* - Nuclear Fuels- Health & Safety; 400400 - Electrochemistry
Citation Formats
Anderson, R.D., Barney, G.S., Helbling, T.J., and Kofoed, R.J. Hazards review for electrolytic dissolver installation, Hood 3, 236-Z Building. United States: N. p., 1973.
Web. doi:10.2172/7216126.
Anderson, R.D., Barney, G.S., Helbling, T.J., & Kofoed, R.J. Hazards review for electrolytic dissolver installation, Hood 3, 236-Z Building. United States. doi:10.2172/7216126.
Anderson, R.D., Barney, G.S., Helbling, T.J., and Kofoed, R.J. Tue .
"Hazards review for electrolytic dissolver installation, Hood 3, 236-Z Building". United States.
doi:10.2172/7216126. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/7216126.
@article{osti_7216126,
title = {Hazards review for electrolytic dissolver installation, Hood 3, 236-Z Building},
author = {Anderson, R.D. and Barney, G.S. and Helbling, T.J. and Kofoed, R.J.},
abstractNote = {A comparison of the hazards involved in the existing process and the electrolytic process for dissolving plutonium metal shows that, in the opinion of the review team, no net increase in hazards will occur by operating the electrolytic dissolvers. This new process eliminates several hazardous operations such as metal burning and PuO/sub 2/ powder handling, and reduces operator time and, therefore, exposure. The new facility can be operated safely provided that the recommendations given previously are implemented.},
doi = {10.2172/7216126},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Mar 13 00:00:00 EST 1973},
month = {Tue Mar 13 00:00:00 EST 1973}
}
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