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Title: Carry Hard ICBM basing: A technical assessment

Abstract

Carry Hard is a deceptive, multiple-aimpoint ICBM basing concept in which hardened, encapsulated missiles are shuttled among several thousand, low-cost, water-filled vertical shelters. Since most of the essential launch and operational support equipment is carried with the missile (not provided with each shelter), the overall system costs are reduced. High system hardness permits relatively close shelter spacing, which in turn allows Carry Hard to be deployed on a comparatively small piece of land (a few hundred square miles) that could be removed from public access. Controlled access to the deployment area helps in maintaining concealment of the missiles among the shelters. If concealment is successfully maintained, the system is believed to be survivable against plausible Soviet threats, regardless of whether attack-warning information is received or acted upon. Thus, Carry Hard holds high promise as a feasible, affordable, and survivable means of ICBM deployment, and a high priority should be given to developing the concept to the point that an informed decision on full-scale engineering development can be made. 33 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs.

Authors:
; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOD; DOE/DP
OSTI Identifier:
7138938
Report Number(s):
UCID-21840; CTS-005-89
ON: DE90010973
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; ARMS CONTROL; VERIFICATION; MISSILE LAUNCHING SITES; HARDENING; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; SURVIVAL CURVES; COMMUNICATIONS; CONCENTRATION RATIO; CONSTRUCTION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DESIGN; FEASIBILITY STUDIES; MAINTENANCE; MEASURING METHODS; MILITARY STRATEGY; NATIONAL DEFENSE; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; RELIABILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SENSITIVITY; SITE CHARACTERIZATION; WEAPONS; 450400* - Military Technology, Weaponry, & National Defense- Nuclear & Radiological Warfare- (1990-); 350300 - Arms Control- Verification- (1987-)

Citation Formats

Harvey, J.R., Schaffer, A.B., Speed, R., and Todaro, A.F. Carry Hard ICBM basing: A technical assessment. United States: N. p., 1989. Web.
Harvey, J.R., Schaffer, A.B., Speed, R., & Todaro, A.F. Carry Hard ICBM basing: A technical assessment. United States.
Harvey, J.R., Schaffer, A.B., Speed, R., and Todaro, A.F. Wed . "Carry Hard ICBM basing: A technical assessment". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_7138938,
title = {Carry Hard ICBM basing: A technical assessment},
author = {Harvey, J.R. and Schaffer, A.B. and Speed, R. and Todaro, A.F.},
abstractNote = {Carry Hard is a deceptive, multiple-aimpoint ICBM basing concept in which hardened, encapsulated missiles are shuttled among several thousand, low-cost, water-filled vertical shelters. Since most of the essential launch and operational support equipment is carried with the missile (not provided with each shelter), the overall system costs are reduced. High system hardness permits relatively close shelter spacing, which in turn allows Carry Hard to be deployed on a comparatively small piece of land (a few hundred square miles) that could be removed from public access. Controlled access to the deployment area helps in maintaining concealment of the missiles among the shelters. If concealment is successfully maintained, the system is believed to be survivable against plausible Soviet threats, regardless of whether attack-warning information is received or acted upon. Thus, Carry Hard holds high promise as a feasible, affordable, and survivable means of ICBM deployment, and a high priority should be given to developing the concept to the point that an informed decision on full-scale engineering development can be made. 33 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Nov 15 00:00:00 EST 1989},
month = {Wed Nov 15 00:00:00 EST 1989}
}

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  • The purpose of this report is to identify those areas that could potentially support deployment of the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) utilizing basing modes presently considered viable: the Hard Mobile Launcher in Random Movement, the Hard Mobile Launcher at Minuteman Facilities, and the Hard Silo in Patterned Array. Specifically, this report describes the process and the rationale supporting the application of Exclusionary and Evaluative Criteria and lists those locations that were eliminated through the application of these criteria. The remaining locations will be the subject of further investigations.
  • The purpose of this report is to identify those areas that could potentially support deployment of the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) utilizing basing modes presently considered viable: the Hard Mobile Launcher in Random Movement, the Hard Mobile Launcher at Minuteman Facilities, or the Hard Silo in Patterned Array. Specifically, this report describes the process and the rationale supporting the application of Exclusionary and Evaluative Criteria and lists those locations that were eliminated through the application of these criteria. The remaining locations will be the subject of further investigations.
  • The purpose of this report is to identify those areas that could potentially support deployment of the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) utilizing basing modes presently considered viable: the Hard Mobile Launcher in Random Movement, the Hard Mobile Launcher at Minuteman Facilities, and the Hard Silo in Patterned Array. Specifically, this report describes the process and the rationale supporting the application of Exclusionary and Evaluative Criteria and lists those locations that were eliminated through the application of these criteria. The remaining locations will be the subject of further investigations.
  • This report makes a preliminary examination of the nuclear-mine threat to the multiple aimpoint, carry-hard ICBM system. By attacking the ICBMs in flight as they leave their shelters, the number of weapons required to attack the system could, in principle, be reduced from several thousand to several hundred or less. However, the Soviets would face serious technical problems in implementing the concept. Moreover, there appears to be a number of effective US countermeasures available. Thus, in practice, the nuclear mine approach is likely to be a very high risk, uneconomical method of attack.
  • In January 1983, President Reagan formed a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces to review the strategic modernization program of the United States. Known as the Scowcroft Commission, the panel of distinguished experts conducted an extensive review that offered conclusions and recommendations intended to develop a broad national consensus on several difficult issues. These included recommendations on basing our forces, achieving equitable arms control agreements, and improving strategic stability. The Commission's recommendations were accepted by the President and Congress and have since become the foundation for the current Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Modernization Program.