Changing strategies in utility regulation: the case of energy conservation in California

Thesis/Dissertation · Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1987

OSTI ID:6955851

Barkovich, B R

This paper considers changes in the strategy of utility regulators. It finds that prior to the early 1970s regulators pursued largely unintrusive regulatory strategies, deferring to utility managers or ratifying the latters' decisions after minimal review. Since the early 1970s regulators have become more interventionist, undertaking widespread oversight of utility management decisions and assuming some responsibility for such decisions. The intent of interventionist regulation during the 1970s and early 1980s is found to be (1) minimizing utility cost increases and (2) reducing the impact of related rate increases on customers. The paper explores reasons for this strategy change. It finds theories of regulation differentially see 3 factors as influencing regulator decision-making: interest groups, the regulatory commission as organization, and regular ideology. Its analysis suggests that all 3 help explain interventionism and proposes some consolidation and extension of existing theory to join these factors. This analysis is applied to a case study of interventionism: the decision of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to implement energy conservation through utilities during 1975-1984.

• Research Organization: California Univ., Berkeley (USA)
• OSTI ID: 6955851
• Resource Relation: Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D.)
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC UTILITIES
ENERGY CONSERVATION
REGULATIONS
DECISION MAKING
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
MANAGEMENT
STATE GOVERNMENT
FEDERAL REGION IX
NORTH AMERICA
USA
293000* - Energy Planning & Policy- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
296000 - Energy Planning & Policy- Electric Power
291000 - Energy Planning & Policy- Conservation